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PREFACE 
The utility of studying the manifest content of com-
munication in determining changes in usage of propaganda 
symbols characterizing an external stimulus was shown. 
Investigation of the speeches of Fidel Castro and of the 
content of the Cuban Communist Party's official newspaper 
indicated considerable differences in propaganda content 
over the period of the study--1966 to 1984--in relation to 
the United States. The two instruments of communication 
were seen as usd~lly presenting somewhat different messages, 
Change in the use of aggressive and ideological symbols was 
shown in relation to the events taking place that might have 
some influence on policy and propaganda values, 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Historical Background 
Few events since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor 
have so shaken the United States as did Fidel Castro's 
conversion to communism after taking power in Cuba. Cuba 
has been a special interest of this nation's foreign policy 
since the founding of the United States. The writings of 
Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, James Monroe, Henry Clay, 
John C. Calhoun, and John Quincy Adams mentioned the 
strategic and economic importance of the island. By the 
1850s Americans were working with Cubans to overthrow 
Spanish colonial rule and toward annexation of the island by 
the United States. 1 
On April 19, 1898, Congress passed an authorization 
for President William McKinley to conduct war against Spain 
in Cuba. The resolution included a proposal by Senator 
Henry Teller of Colorado that the Un~ted States not annex 
Cuba but give control of the country to the Cubans when 
they were able to govern.2 The end of Spanish rule was 
easily accomplished; but as the end of American occupation 
neared, the United States government enacted the Platt 
Amendment, which gave the United States the unilateral 
1 
right to intervene in Cuban affair~. Its main points con-
cerning Cuba were: 
(1) a commitment not to sign any treaty that 
impaired Cuban independence or to grant foreign 
powers special concessions without American 
.p er mis s ion , ( 2 ) a p 1 e d g e to k e e p th e Cub an d e b t 
at a low level, (3) an extension of authority 
to the United States to intervene to protect 
Cuban independence and maintain stability, (4) 
ratification of the acts of the military occupa-
tion, and (5) a grant of sites for naval bases 
on the island.3 
From 1902 until 1934 the United States government 
demonstrated its belief that it had the right through the 
2 
Platt Amendment to intervene in Cuba's affairs at any time. 
According to Lester Langley, the "Cuban issue," which began 
as a humanitaria? effort, became part of a broader United 
States Caribbean-security policy. While the Teller Amend-
ment provided a moral commitment to Cuban independence, 
the Platt Amendment gave the United States the "legal" 
authority to keep Cub~ independent, by intervention if 
necessary. Langley stated that for Cuba, however, 
the distinction between the Teller and Platt 
amendments was crucial: the Teller amendment 
constituted a moral obligation to secure Cuban 
independence; the Platt amendment was not only a 
spiritual violation of the 1898 pledge but a 
symbol of colonialism. The United States merely 
replaced Spain as the arbiter of Cuba's destiny.4 
On September 3 and 4, 1933, in a dispute over _pay 
reductions, Sergeant Fulgencio Batista and other non-
commissioned officers gained the support of the Cuban army 
against its officers and overthrew the government of 
Dr. Carlos de Cespedes. President Franklin Roosevelt sent 
two warships into Cuban waters but did not intervene. 
3 
Batista continued to head the revolution and installed a 
succession of presidents, but did not personally take over 
the presidency until 1940. Roosevelt backed away from the 
interventionist policy of the United States, and in May of 
1934 the two countries signed a new treaty that abolished 
the Platt Amendment. All that remained for the United States 
was the Guantanamo Naval Base lease.5 However, the end of 
United States intervention did not mean the end of economic 
control. Langley stated that the "aim of this 'new' 
economic program was to sustain the search for markets in 
Cuba but within a different structure. 11 6 Cuba changed from 
a protectorate to what Langley called an "economic colony" 
of the United St~tes. 
When Batista lost a re-election bid in 1944, he stepped 
down from the presidency, but eight years later, on 
March 20, 1952, he returned to power in a coup. Under 
Batista, Langley stated, 
American investment received beneficial treat-
ment. His periodic xenophobic statements and 
proclamations of widespread reform were passed over 
as political electioneering by an American people 
and government which equated Batistismo with 
stability, prosperity, and protection. Beneath 
th~ gilded shell of a wealthy and democratic 
Cuba loomed a revolu~ionary force that would pro-
claim social and economic reformation~ political 
regeneration, and the terminatio~ of American 
influence in Cuba. That revolutionary force would 
be commanded by Fidel Castro.7 
Castro's first military adventure was during his 
college days, when he participated in a raid to overthrow 
Dominican Republic dictator Rafael Truillo. Castro was 
influential in the Orthodox Party, which he saw as the 
4 
successor to the revolution and as a vehicle for him to 
gain an elective office, Langley stated. He became "an 
unremitting foe" of Batista after the 1952 coup. 8 On 
July 26, 1953, Castro led a raid against the Moncada 
barracks in Santiago de Cuba, during which 84 of his 126 
men were killed.9 It was at his trial for the attack that 
he quoted Thomas Paine and stated his now-famous words: 
"Condemn me. It does not matter. History will absolve 
me. 11 10 Castro was criticized by all the other foes of 
Batista, and the communists called him and his followers 
"petit bourgeois," adventurers and "putschists. 1111 
Castro was sentenced to prison for 15 years, but Batista 
released him and. other political prisoners in 1955 and 
Castro left Cuba. In December, 1956, he led an "invasion" 
in Oriente Province. He and 82 other men left Mexico in 
the formerly American-owned boat "Granma," and in the 
fighting after the landing all but 12 of the group were 
killed or captured. Fidel Castro, his brother Raul, and 
Ernesto "Che" Guevara escaped with nine others into the 
Sierra Maestra mountains. From that mount•inous hideaway, 
he undertook what became an effective guerrilla campaign.12 
Batista's police methods brought_ him loss of popular 
support, Langley stated, and made Castro a national hero, 
which put the United States in a difficult position. An 
interview of Castro by Herbert Matthews of The New York 
Times did much to give Castro prestige in the United States. 13 
United States ambassador Earl Smith said that a State 
5 
Department mission headed by William Pawley went to Cuba 
in December of 1958 to ask Batista to resign and exile 
himself in Daytona Beach, Florida, but the mission failed. 
Langley stated: 
As a private citizen, Smith wrote later that 
Castro came to power partially by the failure of 
the Department of State to act decisively. The 
Matthews interview gave Castro prestige in the 
United States; guerrilla terrorism was given 
little press coverage. Most damaging of all, in 
Smith's view, was the fact that Cuban policy was 
shaped_ by the lesser bureaucrats of the fourth 
floor of the Department of State. There labored 
men who longed for the triumph of Castro's 
rebellion.14 
In 1958, the Eisenhower administration stopped selling 
arms to Batista, who also was trading with the Soviets, 
because he was u~ing the weapons against Castro. Batista 
fled the country on January 1, 1961, and Castro set up a 
provisional government in Santiago de Cuba with Dr. 
Urrutia Lleo as president and Castro as commander-in-chief. 
Castro arrived in Havana on January 8 after a six-day 
victory march the length of the island,15 When Castro, 
then 33, entered Havana, he was able to do so, Langley 
stated, because the middle class had abandoned Batista. 16 
The Eisenhower administration was quick to recognize 
the Castro government,17 Castro was ~till popular in the 
United States when he visited the country, supposedly to 
seek a loan--though he probably wanted economic aid but 
did not want to ask for it. 1 8 Langley stated of the visit 
that the 
truth about his encounter with American 
officials will not be known for a long time. It 
seems reasonable to assume, however, that the April 
visit was the last real hope for friendly relations 
between Washington and Havana, and that hope was 
doomed because neither Castro nor the Eisenhower 
administration was willing to trust each other.19 
6 
Castro's treatment of Batista loyalists and his nationaliza-
tion of foreign-owned businesses soon resulted in American 
hostility. First came the nationalization of mining and 
petroleum and then the American sugar mills.20 The takeover 
of American properties was completed by mid-1960.21 The 
diplomatic break came on January 3, 1961. The day before, 
Castro ordered the American embassy to reduce its staff in 
Havana to 11 people within two days. President Eisenhower 
then terminated diplomatic relations.22 Eisenhower 
authorized plans for an invasion of Cuba, but it was John F. 
Kennedy who carried out the plans. Rebel forces supported 
by the United States landed at the Bay of Pigs on April 17, 
1961, but were defeated. In December of 1961, Castro 
announced that he had converted to Marxist-Leninism. 23 
Langley stated that by 
•.• proclaiming communism, Castro has not only 
irritated the American government but denied a 
fundamental American assumption about Cuba. He 
has declared Cuba's problem to be one of distri-
bution of wealth rather than the lack of democracy 
or unrestricted investment. He has not only 
taken Cuba into the Soviet orbi~ politically but 
he has transformed the Cuban economy along 
Marxist lines. It is not Castro's political 
dictatorship that is so reprehensible as his open 
denial of the Jacksonian credos of democracy, 
capitalism, and progress .... 24 
In the spring of 1962, President Kennedy embargoed 
exports to Cuba except for medicines and imports of Cuban 
products as well as anything of Cuban origin. The United 
7 
States also restricted travel to Cuba by Americans except 
for a few journalists and scholars.25 American reconnaissance 
flights over Cuba in September and early October of 1962 
determined the existence of offensive nuclear missiles 
there. President Kennedy began a blockade of the island 
on October 22 and states the following American policy 
toward Cuba: 
The first step was a quarantine of offensive 
military supplies headed for Cuba; the second, con-
stant surveillance of the island and directions to 
the armed forces to prepare for 'any eventualities'; 
and the third, an explicit statement that a missile 
launched from Cuba against any hemispheric country 
would be interpreted as an attack against the United 
States and would require a retaliatory nuclear 
response .... Finally, the President appealed to 
Krushchev to withdraw the missiles.26 
The crisis ended on October 28, when Krushchev stated that 
the missiles would be removed. President Kennedy was able 
to regain some of his prestige lost after the chaotic and 
unsuccessful invasion at the Bay of Pigs, and war between 
the superpowers was averted. Langley added that the crisis 
demonstrated to the world, and most importantly, 
to Latin America, that Castro was responsive to 
Soviet command. And the danger of nuclear 
annihilation--the collision of Soviet-American 
power on the world stage--cast the confrontation 
as the climactic moment of the Cold War •... 27 
The missile crisis and the Bay of Pigs inv~sion remained 
fresh in the minds of Cuba's leaders for years, as is 
evident in Granma, and they provide a backdrop for the 
study of Cuban attitudes toward the United States. 
Focus of the Research 
Purpose 
The purpose of this study was to determine whether ?n 
externally circulated newspaper's manifest content might 
be used as an indicator of changing policy positions in an 
authoritarian country. The policy studied was that of 
Cuba toward the United States. The vehicle for the study 
was the English languag~ edition of Granma Weekly Review, 
an official newspaper of the Cuban Communist Party. The 
study included both the regular articles in the newspaper 
and Fidel Castro's speeches published since 1966, when the 
newspaper began. 
The study may be useful as an indicator of whether 
the official Cuban policy toward the United S.tates changed 
during the period studied, 1966 to 1984, thus providing 
clues as to the opportunities for improved relatio~s 
between the two countries. The study may also be useful 
8 
to future researchers evaluating the decision-making trends 
reflected in Cuban propaganda. 
The Problem and Hypotheses 
The problem was to delineate more clearly the "official" 
Cuban policy toward the United States and to determine a 
way of quantifying that policy or attitude. The first 
null hypothesis posited was that propaganda language used 
in Granma would not be significantly similar to the 
9 
language used by Castro in his speeches. The other null 
hypothesis was that Cuba's attitude toward the United States 
had not changed over the period studied. The research 
method was a content analysis of official Cuban propaga~da, 
as published in the English language edition of a Communist 
Party newspaper, Granma Weekly Review. Content studies 
have been made of Soviet newspapers, 2 8 Red Chinese news-
papers,29 communist cross-national propaganda,30 North 
Korean newspapers,31 and World War II German newspapers 
and propaganda.32 Cuban newspapers, however, have been 
virtually ignored. 
Sub-hypotheses 
In propaganda, as in other types of communication, 
words can be seen as symbols.33 Harold Lasswell wrote, 
"During a crisis, symbols on the whole increase."34 
Lasswell and Goldsen theorized that when the "self" is 
threatened, "attention concentrates on the part of the self 
which.is most directly threatened. 11 35 Ole Holsti was even 
more specific: 
Perceptions of the United States should provide a 
useful and valid index of the level of agreement 
or disagreement with Chinese and Soviet decision 
makers .... 36 
These three propositions suggest the value of studying 
changes in political symbols over time in cross-national 
situations. 
The null hypothesis stating there would be no change 
in the use of propaganda symbols over time had two 
10 
sub-hypotheses: 
1. During periods of increased tension in Cuban-
United States relations, there would be an increased 
use of propaganda symbols. 
2. During times of increased tension in Cuban-
United States relations, there would be greater 
mention of the United States in Cuban propaganda. 
Conversely, there would be fewer symbols referring to the 
United States in times of eased tensions, types of symbols 
used would change over time, and there would be fewer 
mentions of the United States when tensions lessened. In 
summary: 
There were periods during the 1970s when 
political statements that attacked the United 
States were fewer than normal during the study 
period, which would suggest that Cuban policy 
toward the United States moderated. Further-
more, durin~ the Carter administration there 
would be the lowest level of such attacks. 
Verification of such hypotheses might indicate that there 
was a time when United States-Cuban relations might have 
become normalized if the United States had responded to 
Cuban entrees. Furthermore, such data might underscore 
the valu~ of on-going trend analyses in improving diploma-
tic relations, if acted upon. 
Review of Literature 
The author's search revealed fe~ articles about 
Cuban newspapers in which content analysis was used. 
Likewise a computer search of social science articles and 
dissertations did not show any analysis of the newspaper 
Granma during the period 1973 through early 1984. Only a 
few books have touched upon the subject.37 One 
descriptive monograph, Cuban Mass Media, was published 
in 1982.3 8 
11 
Using content analysis, Ernesto Rodrigues in 1978 
studied letters-to-the-editor published by the daily edition 
of Granma,39 However, that research does not impinge upon 
the present study. John Nichols did a content analysis of 
five Cuban publications over three time periods.40 He 
determined that these publi~ations set -~ifferent agendas 
in some categories, and suggested that the Cuban press is 
not monolithic, that major changes have occurred over the 
past decade, and that there is audience input on political 
issues. 
Critical Events During the Study Period 
Support for the assumption that Cuban policy toward the 
United States moderated during the late 1970s is derived 
from critical-events analysis, Critical-events analysis is 
used "to identify those events which will produce the most 
useful explanations and predictions of ~ocial change. 11 41 
Several key events in the period under study had major 
~mpact on the relations between Cuba and the United States. 
The first area of potential conflict was in Latin America. 
In January, 1966, for example, the Cuban government 
organized the Latin American Solidarity Organization to 
foment revolutionary movements. George Volsky stated that 
by 1970, however, not only had the organization ceased to 
be effective, but guerrilla groups backed by Cuba were 
12 
disappearing and Che Guevara not only had failed in Bolivia 
but had been killed. 
Another area of international revolutionary activity 
by Cuba was in Africa. William LeoGrande said of those 
acti~ities that~ with 
the security of the revolution virtually 
assuted, Cuba was able to pursue much more 
vigorously a policy objective which during the 
1960s had been of low priority relative to the 
aim of ensuring the revolution's survival. This 
objective was the expansion of Cuban influence 
in the Third World; it was pursued by an expan-
sion of Cuban aid missions, a more vocal Cuban 
role in the Movement of Nonaligned Nations, and 
(eventually) by the deployment of Cuban combat 
troops in Africa.42 
By 1965, Cuba was providing arms and training for the 
Movimiento Populir de Libertacao de Angola, the Partido 
Africano da Independencia da Guine e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), 
and the Frente de Libertacao de Mozambique (FRELIM0).43 
The Cuban involvement in Africa was minimal from 1968 to 
1972, when most ac-tivity moved to the Middle E~st.44 From 
1974 to 1979, however, Cuban troops participated in the 
Angolan civil war, and from 1977 to 1979 they participated 
in the civil conflict in Ethiopia. Cuban involvement grew 
from 750 to 1,100 men in 1966 (the high point of the 1960s) 
to a high of around 39 1 000 ~n 1978.45 Volsky stated about 
Angola, the location of the greatest Cuban military 
involvement: 
Cuba's participation in the Angola civil war 
raised momentarily the specter of bilateral 
U.S.-Cuban military conflict .... And yet the 
Carter administration refrained from military 
confrontation of Cuban activities in the Horn of 
Africa and did not threaten Cuba directly. In 
sum, the U.S. military threat to continued revo-
lutionary rule in Cuba was negligible by the late 
1970s--drastically different from what it had 
been in the previous decade.46 
In contrast, the relationship between Cuba and the 
United States has become more tense during the past four 
years. The anti-communist rhetoric of Ptesident Reagan's 
administration, which was inaugurated in January of 1981, 
13 
was bellicose. Reagan launched a Caribbean Bas.in Initiative 
to counter Cuban moves in the area. He began the build-up 
of military support to the government df El Salvador, which 
was fighting leftist rebels, and he ptovided funds for the 
support of reactionary forces in their fight to topple the 
Cuban-backed Nic?raguan Sandinista government. Then, in 
October of 1983, President Reagan sent an invasion force 
to the Caribbean island of Grenada, where Cuban construction 
workers were building an airfield; 24 Cuban workers were 
killed.47 It is to be expected, then, that the Cuban 
government's attitude toward the United States changed for 
the worse in the early 1980s, worsening even moreso in 
late 1983. 
George Volsky stated that Cuban "hostility toward the 
United States was inherent in the dynamics of thi revolu-
tionary process, 11 48 
, 
He pointed out that Castro was not 
interested in reconciliation with the United States in the 
early 1960s, which was one reason the United States did 
not relax its policy toward Cuba. By 1970 the threat of 
Castro's revolution seemed less a problem, while the 
United States had more urgent problems at home and overseas. 
Nevertheless, Volsky saw the United States as being 
unbending ~nits opposition to Cuba under Castro, even 
when other nations in the hemisphere were becoming more 
conciliatory. He stated that in spite of 
signs in 1970 that many Caribbean and South 
American nations would favor a change in the 
United States' Cuban policy, Washington's posture 
toward the Castro government remained unchanged 
in its hostility. In broad terms, the American 
policy sought to isolate revolutionary Cuba 
ideologically, preventing her influence from 
spreading to other Latin American countries. 
Moreover, by applying the so-called policy of 
economic denial, Washington strove to make the 
island's development as difficult as possible 
and its support by the Soviet Union equally 
costly ...• 49 
14 
That a change in attitude between the two countries was 
possible in the late 1970s is suggested by Jorge Dominguez, 
who stated in 1979: 
In the mid-1960s, the Cuban government was 
concerned that U.S. foreign policy had taken a 
virulently aggressive turn. The United States 
invaded the Dominican Republic and introduced 
large numbers of U.S. troops in South Vietnam. 
In Latin America the U.S. took a strong anti-
communist position with a distinct anti-Cuban 
slant. But in the late 1970s, the Dominican 
invasion has faded in the past. The U.S. is out 
of Vietnam. And there seems to be little taste 
among the U.S. public or its leaders for foreign 
intervention or, indeed, any kind of foreign 
policy which might increase the level of U.S. 
involvement anywhere in the world. 
The United States Departme~t of Defense does 
not consider Cuba a· serious threat to the U.S. 
security, though it considers it some threat . 
... As for possible use of Cuba by the Soviets, 
the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has 
testified that the 'soviet Union does not 
currently possess the capability to embark on 
military aggression in the region.' ... U.S. 
military forces are no longer poised to pounce 
on Cuba, and this fact reflects the basic policy 
judgment that a military confrontation in the 
Caribbean, with Cuba or the Soviet Union, has 
become highly unlikely. Cuba, in turn, .has 
derived security from this judgment.SO 
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William LeoGrande also commented on the relaxing of hostile 
posturing. He stated that the 
easing of international tensions, together 
with the U.S. defeat in Vietnam, greatly reduced 
the threat of U.S. military action against Cuba. 
It also stimulated political pressures for an end 
to sanctions against Cuba both in the United States 
and in the OAS .... In the United States, the obvious 
failure of the 1960s policy of isolation and 
destabilization set in motion a low but clear pro-
cess of normalizing relations. Portions of the 
economic embargo were lifted, an anti-hijacking 
treaty was signed, and in 1974 secret negotiations 
on normalization were begun. 
During this period Cuba pursued a conciliatory 
foreign policy which reinforced these developments .. 
With the U.S. threat sharply reduced, Cuba began to 
seriously pursue normalization of relations in hopes 
of establishing trade relations which would reduce 
its economic dependence on the USSR.5 1 
Granma, Cuban Media, and Propaganda 
Granma Weekly Review 
The data base for the study is the English language 
version of the Cuban Communist weekly review, Granma. The 
600,000 circulation Granma daily was begun in 1965 with the 
merger of two newspapers with divergent ideologies--
Naticias de~' headed by Soviet-sty~e communists, and 
Revolucion, headed by Che Guevara.52 The weekly review 
started in 1966. It is printed in Spanish, French, and 
English. It is a broadsheet newspaper, usually 12 pages 
in length in two sections. It makes liberal use of red 
ink as spot color. The front page identifies it as the 
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"Official Organ of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of Cuba." The front page often covers only one 
topic and consists of many large headlines as well as large 
photographs. The newspaper covers events in Latin America 
and the Caribbean mainly, though it also covers international 
events. It runs stories and features that have appeared in 
the daily edition and reprints some stories that have run 
in other Cuban newspapers and magazines as well as in 
American newspapers. It also uses th~ Prensa Latina news 
service, supposedly an organization independerit of the 
Cuban government. All of Castro's speeches are printed in 
the weekly edition. It runs stories on the arts, health, 
sports and other subjects. It also runs advertising for 
such things as Cuban cigars and tourism. 
A letter to the author from the United States Department 
of State co~mented on how the publication is delivered in 
the United States: 
U.S. regulations allow the entry of single 
copies of Cuhan publications into the United States. 
Specific licenses are also granted to universities, 
libraries, and scientific institutions for the 
importation of Cuban publications provided those 
institutions are on a list approved by the Library 
of Congress or the National Science Foundation. In 
such cases, no restriction is put on the method in 
which payment is made to Cuba. _ 
Cuba may also sell commercial quantities of 
publications in the United States to organizations 
other than those mentioned above. In such cases, 
the proceeds of these sales go into a blocked 
account in the name of the Cuban seller.53 
Postal treaties in effect are a postal money order 
convention, signed in Washington on June 29, 1908, and 
operative on July 1, 1908; and the parcel post convention, 
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signed in Washington on July 24, 1930, and entered into 
force on September 1, 1930. An agreement for the exchange 
of official publications took place in an exchange of notes 
at Havana on May 4 and 12, 1938, and entered into force 
May 12, 1938.54 
The newspaper was caught in a struggle between the 
Treasury Department and the Department of State in 1981. 
Cuban mail sent to the United States is delivered to Montreal 
on Cubana de Aviacion. It is put into the Canadian mail 
system and is not inspected when it enters the United States. 
When, in mid-May of 1981, a postal strike in Canada seemed 
imminent, 30,000 copies of Granma and the magazine Bohemia 
were delivered at one time to the Boston post office. It 
was said to be the largest amount of Cuban literature at any 
one place in the country at any one time. Boston customs 
officials notified the Treasury Department's Foreign Assets 
Control Division, and the Cuban Assets Control Regulations 
of July 8, 1963, were put into effect and the newspapers 
impounded under the 1917 trading with the enemy act. The 
1963 regulations had not previously been put into effect.SS 
Under the regulations, American citizens had to have a 
license to receive such controlled publications. 
Persons to whom the newspapers were addressed were 
notified they had to obtain a permit before they would be 
sent the publication. To obtain a permit, a person had to 
be a journalist, professor or researcher with a bona fide 
interest in the publications. According to an article by 
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Susan Breidenbach, many subscribers were afraid to apply 
for a permit for fear they would appear on a "list of 
suspicious characters. 11 56 Others objected because they 
thought the First Amendment did not allow the use of li~enses, 
which would restrict the flow of information. On July 21, 
1981, representatives from the American Civil Liberties 
Union, the National Lawyers' Guild, the Center for Constitu-
tional Rights, and other organizations met with Treasury 
Department officials. The Treasury Departmen~ proposed new 
regulations to let people have a single copy of each 
publication and groups to purchase up to 50 copies with no 
license. Hal Mayerson of the National Lawyers Guild said 
of the sit~ationi 
The government is b~sing the licensing require-
ment on the alleged goal of keeping Cuba from 
benefiting financially from the sale of literature. 
But the maximum Cuba could realize through this is 
minuscule compared with the $50 million a year it 
gets from American tourism. And it is nothing 
when balanced against the First Amendment rights 
of Americans.57 
An article in The New York Times on July 6, 1981, 
stated that Dennis D. O'Connell, director of the Foreign 
Assets Control Office, said of the action: "Our primary 
interest is financial transactions." He said "enemy" did 
not apply to Cuba but related to a national emergency that 
had been in effect since the 1962 embargo was declared. 
He said the Treasury Department was concerned with the 
unusually large shipment and that licensing was a secondary 
concern.5 8 On July 9, 1981, The New York Times ran the 
following editorial: 
The Government is using an inappropriate law 
for dubious purposes to block delivery of 30~000 
Cuban publications to American citizens. No one 
can sanely argue that national security is 
jeopardized by the distribution of such Cuban 
publications as Granma, a clearly labeled and 
crudely written propaganda weekly. To the contrary_, 
access to Cuban journals is an important resource 
for scholars. 
These publications are sent free, meaning that 
Cuba gets no economic benefit from sending its 
journals by way bf Canada .... 
Petty in itself, the restriction carries a 
worrisome implication--that in the guise of national 
security, the administration is prepared to embargo 
the import of ideas. That is Fidel Castro's way of 
dealing with inconvenient doctrines. How ~eculiar 
that Americans should follow his example. 5 
Jose Pertierra said in a letter to the editor of The New 
York Times on July 15, 1981, that 
... my right to believe as I choose {should] be 
securely guaranteed by the First Amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States. That right is 
presumably what sets this country.apart from the 
rest of the world. Similarly guaranteed by the 
First Amendment is the right to read magazines and 
journals from other countries .... 
I suppose I should apply for that 'license' 
from the Treasury Department if I want to continue 
to receive news from Cuba, But that would amount 
to a request to the government for permission to 
read, a request that I believed an American would 
never have to make.60 
In February of 1982 the Treasury Department released 
the 100,000 copies of the publications that had been 
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collecting for the previous nine months. Faced with a law 
suit from the American Civil Liberties Union, the Reagan 
administration had agreed to allow Americans to subscribe to 
publications from Cuba, Cambodia, North Vietnam, and North 
Korea, and delivery of Granma resumed.61 
Mass Media in Cuba 
Control of mass media has been important to Fidel 
Castro. Herbert Matthews, who interviewed Castro during 
his days in the mountains and chronicled the revolution, 
called Castro's use of revolutionary slogans in communica-
ting with the people as "government by television," a 
phrase which Matthews originated in 1959. Matthews wrote 
about the place of emotion as 
... a religious faith which came pouring over the 
radio waves and through the television screens 
in the words and presence of Fidel Castro. I coined 
a phrase at the time: government by television. 
The Revolution came in a flood of talk, as Fidel 
exhorted, explained, reasoned with, and aroused 
Cuba's millions day after day, night after night, 
four, five, "six hours at a time. The world was 
amused; Cubans listened enthralled.62 
Swiss journalist Jean Ziegler explained "government by 
television" by stating: 
With his non-stop TV shows Fidel Castro has 
actually created a new form of government that is 
just as original and will perhaps prove no less 
significant in its historic effects than the Greek 
invention of government by ballot, better known 
under the name of Democracy.63 
John Nichols commented about the term: 
'Government by television' is an apt descrip-
tion, Castro and his lieutenants knew that the 
success of their government depended on their 
ability to integrate disparate sectors of the Cuban 
society and collectively mobilize them behind goals 
of the communist Revolution. The mass media became 
prime tools in this process. And although Castro's 
public appearances and television addresses are 
less frequent today, the importance of the media has 
not diminished but is actually greater because it 
serves additional functions for the maturing Cuban 
Revolution.64 
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Castro's view of propaganda was: "Propaganda cannot 
be abandoned for a single minute, because it is the soul 
of every struggle. 11 65 Nichols stated that since 1959 two 
factors have influenced Cuban media: 
First, mass communication is not only impor-
tant to the Revolution, but Castro considers it 
the very soul of the process. Second, mass com-
munication in a revolution must be flexible, able 
to adjust to changing circumstances. Accordingly, 
as the Cuban Revolution zigzagged through several 
phases during the past two decades, so too has 
the role of the Cuban media frequently changed. 6 6 
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By late 1960 Castro had closed private newspapers and maga-
zines and had taken over the broadcasting media. Soon he 
had installed a Soviet communist mass media system with the 
motto: "For those within the Revolution, complete freedom; 
for those against the Revolution, no freedom.67 Che Guevara 
merged the two competing party newspapers in 1965 in favor 
of a new vehicle, Granma, to be an educational medium for 
the masses and a way to keep them.following the Marxist 
ideological line. Since 1975 Cuban publications have served 
a "critical function in which they serve as channels for 
citizens' complaints about the tactical operation of the 
11 6 8 government. The other of the dailies in Juventud 
Rebelde (Rebellious Youth), published by the Union of Young 
Communists. Los Trabajadores (Workers) is published by 
the Central Union of Cuban Workers three times a week. 
There are more than 50 magazines and journals, which have 
more latitude in commenting on political issues,69 
Persons with important positions in communication 
also are among the top leadership of the party and 
government. Nichols stated that 
the cooperation of the channel subsystem by 
the source subsystem is so complete that it may 
be said that, whereas Marxist-Leninist theory 
dictates that communicators must be servants of 
the state, Cuban media policy-makers and, to a 
large degree, practitioners, are not only servants 
of the state, they are the state. 70 
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Nichols found that 71 percent (32) of the media policy-makers 
in Cuba had at least one position of significance within the 
power structure and--although information available is 
limited--the same may be said of many others. Jorge Enrique 
Mendoza, director of Granma, was one of Castro's main 
propagandists during his guerrilla war. He is a member of 
the Central Committee and a deputy to the National Assembly 
while formerly holding important positions in the Ministry 
of Education and the National Institute of Agrarian Reform. 
As Nichols put it, "It is, of course, unlikely that the 
Cuban government would find the need to censor such a member 
of the inner circle of power." 71_ A study by Jorge I. 
Dominguez revealed that 25.2 percent of Cuban reporters are 
members of the Communist Party and another 16.4 percent 
members of the Communist Youth Union, as compared to 2.2 
percent of the population.72 That the mass media in Cuba 
are tightly controlled also can be seen by a .statement made 
by Castro in 1964: "We have a goal, a program, an 
objective to fulfill, and that objective essentially controls 
the activity of the journalists. 11 73 
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CHAPTER II 
RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY 
Structure of the Communication Act 
A model for the structure of communicative behavior was 
presented almost 40 years ago by Harold Lasswell when he 
posed this theoretical question: Who says what in 
which channel to whom ... and with what effect? 1 Since 
then many researchers have studied the various parts of 
that question, and there still is uncertainty about the 
way the links in the communication process are joined to-
gether. All that is known, as Bernard Berelson stated is 
that, "Some kinds of communication on some kinds of issues, 
brought to the attention of some kinds of people under some 
kinds of conditions, have some kinds of effects. 112 The 
question remains: How do the model's ingredients interact? 
Early communication theory suggested communication was 
a passive activity for the receiver. The message was 
"injected" as with a hypodermic needle or "shot" as magic 
bullets into the listener or reader.3 Later research led 
to the concept of communication not as a stimulus-response 
act but as an active process, with the receiver seen at 
times as being obstinate in rejecting media persuasion.4 
Communication research evolved from research in psychology, 
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sociology and political science in the 1930s because, 
first, advertisers were interested in finding out how to 
spend their money with more effectiveness and, second, 
because Americans were frightened about the propaganda 
activities of Hitler's Germany. Peter Sandman, David Rubin, 
and David Sachsman wrote: 
The research tradition that developed over 
the next 30 years was devoted to answering one 
basic question: What factors determine how much 
impact a particular piece of communication will 
have on the attitudes of its audience? 5 
Persuasion and propaganda, then, more than information 
or entertainment, were the first concern of communications 
researchers. At least six major findings came out of the 
early studies of propaganda and persuasion: 
1. It is usually better to state your con-
clusions explicitly than to let your audience 
draw its own conclusions, 
2. Arguments presented at the beginning or 
end of a communication are remembered better than 
arguments presented in the middle, 
3, Emotional appeals ·are ofien more effective 
than strictly rational ones. 
4. When dealing with an audience that disa-
grees with your poiition, it helps -to acknowledge 
some validity to the opposing view. 
5. Attitude change may b~ greater some time 
after a communication than right after it. 
6. High-credibility sources ... provide more 
attitude ch~nge than low-credibility sources, even 
if the reason for the credibility has nothing to 
do with th~ topic of the communtcation.6. 
The findings proved useful in advertising and both in 
countering Nazi propaganda and in producing Allied pro-
paganda, as well as in producing other types of persuasion 
in everyday life in a capitalistic, democratic society. 
Researchers, however, found that the principles did not 
always work.7 They found four things wrong with them: 
First, the majority of the early studies were 
conducted in the laboratories of academic social 
sciences, using students as subjects .... The 
complexities and counter-pressures of reality just 
couldn't be duplicated in controlled laboratory 
experiments. 
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Second, most of the studies dealt with topics 
of some intellectual importance but practically no 
audience involvement .... The way attitudes are 
changed on these sorts of topics turned out to be 
almost irrelevant. Most propagandists were inter-
ested in gut-grabbing topics .... Audiences already 
had strong emotional commitments to those issues .... 
Third, most attitude-change research was based 
on an over-simplified model of how attitudes are 
related to information and behavior. Most studies 
assumed that if the audience learned the message, 
its attitudes would be changed. Even more studies 
assumed that if attitudes (as expressed on a ques-
tionnaire) were changed, behavior would inevitably 
change, too .... 
Fourth, the early research on attitude change 
virtually {gnored the audience .... The audience 
was viewed as just being there, passive, receiving 
the message and then changing or not changing 
depending on the sour.ce's skill and know-how. 
It took communication researchers thirty 
years to acknowledge these truths fully, because 
for thirty years they concentrated on the source and 
the message and almost ignored the audience. 8 
Communication is more than a transfer of ideas, then. 
It is more than stimulus and response. Theory suggested 
the audience must be taken into account. In 1949 Wilbur 
Schramm used the terms "immediate reward" and "delayed 
reward" to account for audience response,9 and Leon 
Festinger suggested a continuum of "consummatory purpose" 
(at the point of consumption) and "instrumental purpose" 
(as an instrument for future behavior) to explain the 
effects of different messages.lo Schramm saw that, for 
communication to take place, the sender and receiver must 
take equal part. He stated: 
This concept of the equality of sender and 
receiver in the communication process is one 
building block for a newer model of process. Com-
munication is not a process in which somebody does 
something to someone, or in which something flows 
unchanged through a channel from one person to 
another, but rather it is a relationship .... If 
one accepts this viewpoint, then he can make use of 
a number of social concepts that illuminate the 
communication relationship .... What function is 
communication performing for the different partici-
pants? (Is one expecting to be entertained, to be 
informed, to be instructed? Is one trying to per-
suade, to sell, to please, or to seek inform~tion?) 
What customs govern the behavior within the rela-
tionship? ... 11 
Has the pendulum now swung too far from source to 
31 
receiver, from the "magic bullet" to "obstinate audience"? 
Sandman, Rubin, and Sachsman stated that in the 1970s 
communication shifted toward the middle in the debate. 
wrote, reminiscent of Berelson: 
... The mass media do affect the audience. The 
nature of that ~ffect is controlled jointly by 
individual sources, by individual members of the 
audience, by the social system surrounding both 
source and audience, and by the media themselves. 12 
Schramm also wrote that a synthesis might be helpful in 
They 
understanding the communication process better. He stated: 
Thus, the building blocks of a new social 
model of communication are available, although 
no one as yet has put them together in a fully 
satisfying form. However, the readers of these 
volumes might be well advised to consider this 
kind of social model rather tha~ the process 
model that typically has been used. It is inter-
esting to note that whereas Harold Lasswell's 
distinguished essay of 1948 specified the cata-
logue headings that have long been used for 
examining the process in its minutiae, another 
part of that same essay may in the long run be 
more helpful to the understanding of communica-
tion in society. This is the passage in which he 
spoke of the functions of communication as 
surveillance, coordination, and transmission of 
the social heritage.13 
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W. Phillips Davison also suggested the utility of 
looking again at the three functions outlined by Lasswell.14 
He proposed looking at both closed and open systems. He 
wrote: 
Regardless of the manner in which channels 
are operated or controlled, they must perform a 
number of sociopolitical functions if the society 
in which they are located is to survive, and if 
they themselves are to survive. The three basic 
functions have been described by Lasswell as pro-
viding surveillance of the environment, linking the 
parts of a society together so that it can function 
as an organism, and transmitting the social inheri-
tance from one generation to another. The sur-
veillance function involves providing many varieties 
of social units, and the nation itself, with infor-
mation about the external situation .... 
Social linkage is provided by communication in 
social units of all sizes .... These internal 
communications enable decisions to be made and 
implemented, with each element of the organization 
doing its part. A similar process can be observed 
in whole nations .... 
The nature of political and economic systems 
plays a large part in determining the kinds of 
differentiated channels that emerge and the effici-
ency with which these channels function helps to 
determine the nature of the political and economic 
systems .... 
Transmission of the social inheritance is a 
third basic function that communication provides 
for society .•.. For a channel to exist it must 
be able to provide a service to the society; and 
if social needs change then the structure and/or 
content of the channel also will change.ls 
Even though source, channel, and audience are inter-
related, they can be looked at separ~tely, too. Davison 
stated that the communication channel has five dimensions: 
Diffusion: How widely is it available? 
Control: Who determines the content flowing 
through it? 
Social functions: What role does it play in 
the society? 
Individual functions: 
individual? 
How does it serve the 
Physical 
capabilities, 
characteristics: 
and so on?l6 
What are its costs, 
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Davison added that: 
Just as the components of the total communica-
tions process are interrelated, so are the dimensions 
of the subsystems that constitute the channel. The 
degree of availability or dispersion of a ~hannel 
has a bearing on its control, its functions, and its 
size or other physical aspects .... 17 
The dimensions of the channel will differ in various types 
of societies, depending upon the amount of government 
regulation of the media, and for the type of consumption--
internal or external. 
Fred Siebert, Theodore Peterson, and Wilbur Schramm 
proposed four "theories of the press"--four forms of govern-
ment interference or non-interference in mass media affairs.18 
They are the "authoritarian," "libertarian," "social re-,. 
sponsibility" and "Soviet communist" theories. In the 
authoritarian system, the media are controlled by government 
patents, licensing or censorship. In the Soviet communist/ 
totalitarian system, only orthodox party members are allowed 
to operate the media, which may not be adversely critical 
of the system or its objectives. In the libertarian system, 
the media are owned and run by anyone with the money, time, 
and desire to do so. Under social responsibility--more a 
theory than the others--the media ~re controlled by public 
opinion and professional ethics with ~he government prepared 
k h d .. 1· "f 19 to eep t e me ia in ine 1 necessary. Referring to 
those theories, Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm stated: 
Partly, of course, these differences reflect 
the ability of a country to pay for its press, the 
mechanical ingenuity and resources that can be put 
behind mass communication, and the relative degree 
of urbanization which makes the circulation of mass 
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media at once easier and more necessary. Partly, 
the differences in the press of different countries 
reflect simply what people do in different places 
and what their experience leads them to want to read 
about. 
But there is a more basic and important reason 
for these differences. The thesis of this volume is 
that the press always takes on the form and colora--
tion of the social and political structures within 
which it operates. Especially, it reflects the 
system of social control whereby the relation of 
individuals and institutions are adjusted. We 
believe that an understanding of these aspects of 
society is basic to any systematic understanding of 
the press. 
To see the differences between press systems 
in full perspective, then, one must look at the social 
systems in which the press functions. To see the 
social systems in their true relationship to the 
press, one has to look at certain basic beliefs and 
assumptions which the society holds: the nature of 
man, the nature of society and the state, the relation 
of man to the state, and the nature of knowledge and 
truth .... 20 
Most of the components of a study of mass media are 
now in place. First, it is necessary to look at the source, 
message, channel, receiver, and the effect of the communica-
tion. Then, too, it is necessary to look at the political 
system and how it affects source, message, channel, and 
receiver and what its goals are in the determination of 
the effect. Davison addressed the problems of such a 
determination: 
Who determines what content flows through all 
these channels? Obviously, those who control or 
own the channels do so. But thi~ answer is as 
unsatisfactory as it is equivocal. What we really 
are interested in is how decisions about content 
are made, and in specifying the forces that influ-
ence what is actually communicated. From the 
viewpoint of content determination, channels can be 
ordered within a spectrum: at one end are media 
whose content are determined entirely by the 
interests of the communicator; at the other end are 
those whose content is determined entirely by the 
audience .... 21 
What are some of the interests of the ~ommunicator? 
Davison stated: 
All five dimensions of communication channels 
that have been mentioned can be used as a basis for 
categorizing them. They may be widely available 
or scarce; they may be 'free' or controlled; they 
may be vehicles for political propaganda or may 
serve other functions; people may use them for 
entertainment, information, or other purposes. 2 2 
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Schramm wrote that knowledge from research on various 
process elements "is neither simple nor straightforward, 
and almost invariably it is interactive with other elements 
in the process,23 He added: 
Furthermore, studies of this kind, which are 
as a group the most carefully designed and conducted 
example of communication research, typically have 
used attitudes and opinions as dependent variables, 
persuasion as the measured effect. This is all right 
except that it neglects the relation of attitudes to 
action; or, more precisely, the relation of expressed 
opinions to other behavior. Often these other actions 
are the effects one actually desired,24 
He stated that reviews by A.W. ·wicker25 and Leon Festinger26 
determined that f~w studies had been able to show that 
behavior change has resulted from shown attitude change. 
Indeed, 
... the relationship has proved as often to be 
the other way: attitudes have been changed to 
fall into line with behavior. This is not to say 
that attitudes are unimportant or that such 
research is not useful--only th~t this relation-
ship, like most of the other relationships we 
have been discussing, is a complex one. No cook-
book of infallible recipes for communication 
effect emerges from the research on elements of 
the communication process, as Hans Speier pointed 
out nearly twenty-five years ago in 'Psychological 
Warfare Re-examined.' 27 
Schramm stated that a model was proposed in 1949 that 
can "bridge the gap between research on process elements 
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and practical use of communication to achieve a result.n28 
The main points in the 1949 study were: 
1. The 'message' (information, facts, etc.) 
must reach the sense organs of the persons who are 
to be influenced. 
2. Having reached the sense organs, the 
'message' must be accepted as a part of a person's 
cognitive structure. 
3. To .induce a given action by mass persuasion, 
this action must be seen by the person as a path to 
some goal that he had. 
4. To induce a given action, an appropriate 
cognitive and motivational system must gain con-
trol of the person's behavior at a particular point 
in time.29 
Schramm proposed that the model is not a simple one. It 
must consist of such information as: 
What categories does the person wh~ is to be 
influenced ~se to 'characterize stimulus situations,' 
and what changes in his cognitive structure does he 
try to proteGt himself against? Under what circum-
stances will a message that is inconsistent with a 
person's cognitive structure produce a change in that 
structure rather than be rejected or distorted? What 
are the 'desired goals' that a message must be made 
to seem to lead toward?30 
The simple stimulus-response psychological model, 
Schramm stated, should be replaced by a stimulus-organism-
response model from cognitive psychology.31 Based on such 
a model, the present status of res~arch in the area of media 
effects is limited, ·both in its positive and negative effects. 
Schramm said what can be stated at this time is that 
... whether the predominant influences are good 
or bad, the media clearly enter into the forming 
of character, values, ideas, and social behavior. 
Although we cannot say exactly what their influence 
is, we can hardly doubt that it is profound.32 
/ 
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Communication and Propaganda Research 
Since communication research began as a means of 
studying persuasion and propaganda, those areas seem a 
logical place to begin in firming up the bridge Cartwright 
constructed in 1949 between research on process elements 
and a practical use of communication research. The Insti-
tute for Propaganda Analysis, which operated from 1937 until 
the United States entered into World War II, stated in its 
journal, Propaganda Analysis, thatpropaganda is 
the expression of opinion or action by 
individuals or groups deliberately designed to 
influence opinions or actions of .other individuals 
or groups without reference to predetermined ends.33 
It stated that 
... propaganda analysis, viewed in its whole scope, 
becomes a method not only of detecting propaganda " 
but of understanding the conflicting points of 
view that give rise to it ... ,34 
John Clews pointed out that the use in Europe of the 
word "propaganda" in the sense of an organized campaign goes 
back to 1622, when Pope Gregory XV founded the Sacre 
Congregatio de Fide for missionary work abroad. By 1842 
its dictionary meaning was: "The spread of opinions and 
principles by secret associations, which are viewed by most 
governments with. horror and aversion.••35 Clews noted that 
political connotations soon overcame the original positive 
meaning. He stated that, though the Penguin Political 
Dictionary of 1942 did not list the word, Penguin's 1957 
edition of A Dictionary~ Politics called propaganda: 
"Statements of policy or facts, usually of a political 
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nature, the real purpose of which is different from their 
apparent purpose. 11 36 The transformation of the word was 
complete. 
Despite the late emergence of the political use of the 
word, the act has a long history. The history of what Clews 
calls "dynamic propaganda"--i.e., a "deliberately planned 
campaign aimed at influencing the minds, emotions and 
ultimately the actions of specific groups 11 --goes back as 
fai as the spoken word.37 A well-known 19th century example 
is that of Harriet Beecher Stowe's Uncle Tom's Cabin, which 
Clews called ''an outstanding example of agitation 
literature. 11 38 He called a companion book, The !.IT to Uncle 
Tom's Cabin, "a documentary collection prepared by Mrs. 
Stowe for the use of what communists today would call 
propagandist cadres. 11 39 Clews stated that propaganda tactics 
became widely known because of the techniques perfected by 
Nazi Germany but that many of those techniques ~an be 
traced back to Napoleon.40 
The details of propaganda technique were outlined in 
The Crowd by Gustave le Bon and were used by Lenin and 
later communist leaders as well as by Hitler. Clews wrote:· 
A man alone, said le Bon, may be a cultivated 
individual, but put him in a crowd and he is a 
barbarian, a creature acting on instinct .... 
Crowds think in extremes, accepting or rejecting 
beliefs as a whole ..•. 41 
The Institute of Propaganda Analysis identified seven common 
propaganda devices: 
1. Name .fu,}lling is a device to make us form 
a judgment without examining the evidence on which 
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it is based. Here the propagandist appeals to our 
latent fear. 
2. Glittering Generalities is a device by 
which the propagandist identifies his program with 
virtue by use of 'virtue words.' Here he appeals 
to our emotions of love, generosity, and brother-
hood. He uses words like truth, freedom, honor, 
liberty, social justice, public service, the right 
to work, loyalty, progress, democracy .... 
3. Transfer is a device by which the propa-
gandist carries over the authority, sanction, and 
prestige of something we respect and revere to 
something he would have us accept. 
4. The Testimonial is a device to make us 
accept anything from a patent medicine or a 
cigarette to a program of national policy. In 
this device the propagandist makes use of testi-
monials; counter~testimonials may be employed. 
5. Plain Folks is a device ... [propagandists 
use] to win our confidence by appearing to be 
people like ourselves. 
6. Card Stacking is a device in which the 
propagandist employs all the art of deception to 
win our support for himself, his group, nation, 
race, policy, practice, belief or ideal. He stacks 
the cards against the truth ... [by] red-herring, 
smoke screen, lies, censorship, distortion, half-
truth •... 
7. Band Wagon is a device to make us follow 
the crowd, to accept the propagandist's program 
en masse. Here the theme is: Everybody's doing 
it.42 
However, even the best propaganda techniques are not 
going to succeed unless the audience is receptive. The 
degree to which a propagandist is successful, Lasswell 
stated, depends a great deal on his method of organization.43 
Serge Chatotin in The Rape .9.f. the Masses stated that good 
propaganda campaigns must be planned and must list not only 
the groups to be influenced but also the way each is to 
be influenced. 44 John Clews stated that the definitions of 
groups "is most important, for to be successful propaganda 
must activate emotions and it can only do this when they 
are already in existence or lying dormant. 11 45 The Institute 
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of Propaganda Analysis listed the mental processes a 
successful propagandist must appeal to in influencing an 
audience as: 1. custom; 2. simplification; 3. frustra-
tion; 4. displacement; 5, anxiety; 6. reinforcement; 
7 • association; 8. universals; 9, projection; 10. 
identification; and 11. rationalization.46 
The receptivity of an audience is improved by what 
Lasswell called "the holy phrase which crystallizes public 
aspirations about it. 11 47 The "holy phrase" is an example 
of the propagandist's use of what Lasswell called "signi-
ficant symbols. 11 48 The Institute of Propaganda Analysis 
stated that 
symbols" are substitutes for words. Like 
words, they stand for various ideas, things, 
actions, ideals, goals. Some stand f9r whole 
complexes of ideas, actions, ideals, goals .... 
These meanings and our responses to 
them are implanted in our minds, through educa-
tion and training. Finally, they get to our spinal 
cords. Our responses to them become automatic .... 
I t i s th is f a c t or o f ' au t oma t i c re s po n s e ' that 
propagandists count on when they employ symbols. 
They seek our instant automatic approval or 
disapproval of the individual, group or goal 
they would have us approve or condemn.49 · 
Communist Propagand~ Techniques 
The Institute of Propaganda Analysis differentiated 
between two types of propaganda: "ordinary propaganda" 
and "provocative propaganda." It suggested that the two 
types must be analyzed differently. One article stated: 
All propaganda is designed to influence our 
thinking. The propaganda of provocation is 
particularly effective because its unique form 
helps it to escape recognition and analysis when 
the usual rules of detection are applied. It 
obtains its effect in a backward, second-hand way. 
It seldom tries to tell us what to think; instead, 
it tries to create in us the belief that another 
person or group has certain beliefs or designs; 
and then relies on our own mental backgrounds to 
produce the desired reaction.SO 
Ordinary propaganda, on the other hand, is easier to 
analyze, because the propagandist is working "for pre-
determined ends." The propagandist 
... may not tell the truth about anything else, 
but about one thing_ he will not lie: what he 
wants people to do or to believe. Hence a piece 
of ordinary propaganda can often be analyzed by 
asking first what the propagandist wants you to 
do or believe .... 
Not so with provocative propaganda. The 
master of this technique does not try to influ-
ence your thinking directly; he goes iri round-
about fashion •.•. 51 
41 
Provocative propaganda is more likely to anger a large seg-
ment of a population. It uses false or "planted" arguments 
as "straw men" that can be knocked down easily.52 
The problem of the modern world, Clews stated, is that 
it is becoming more difficult to tell the difference between 
truth and lies. Because of the difficulty in discerning 
truth, ·many people see their side as having a "corner" on 
the truth and the other side on lies. In that situation 
the skilled operator of deliberat~ lies has 
a receptive audience, for where an accidental 
half-lie becomes accepted as fact, things are made 
easy for the complete and deliberate fabrication. 
Occasionally, as they mount up, so the lies will 
react on those who make them.53 
Communist propaganda may be seen as not merely "provocative" 
with no substance. Even though non-communists may not 
understand communist propaganda, Clews noted, "they are 
perfectly clear in their own minds. 11 54 
How is communist propaganda to be interpreted, then? 
Clews wrote: 
In assessing communist propaganda, we must 
first assess ourselves. We must be quite sure in 
our own minds what we mean when we use those words 
~hich flow so freely off the tongue--freedom, de-
mocracy, equality, fraternity, peace. We must be 
just as sure of ourselves when we resort to those 
equally glib adjectives reactionary, undemocratic, 
fascist, anti-popular, repressive. When weighing 
the communist use of such words, we must remember 
the esoteric double-talk meanings given to them 
in Party parlance. For the communist, freedom, 
democracy, equality, fraternity and, above all, 
peace can only come when communism is firmly 
established throughout the world. Whatever forces 
oppose communism, they are by their very nature 
reactionary, undemocratic, fascist, anti-popular 
and repressive. When we study the communist view-
point, we must consider it in terms of these double 
val_ues. 55 
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A recent article tested the hypothesis that communists 
tell the truth--at least in some contexts. Robert Axelrod 
and William Zimmerman studied statements in the Soviet 
Communist Party newspapers Pravda and Izvestia that related 
to foreign policy action after 1945. They found that the 
Soviet leadership is careful about what 
appears in Pravda and Izvestia on Soviet foreign 
policy. The attention to words often results in 
a highly ambiguous style of discourse. It is an 
ambiguity that derives not from careless disregard 
for the facts, but that is carefully formulated. 
(T)he formulations employed to describe Soviet 
policy rarely represent direct deceptions.56 
John Martin listed international political propaganda 
as "nothing but purposive communication at the international 
leve1. 11 57 He stated that Soviet propaganda seeks to reach 
"the masses" (a term Levin said "changes in accordance with 
the character of the struggle") ,58 Martin stated that 
the targets of communist propaganda are all 
those alienated elements of the public that are 
looking for an antipodal banner to which to rally 
so that they can work out their resentments 
against the establishment. This is considered to 
be the magnetic power of communist propaganda .. ,. 
(C)ommunist doctrine .•. calls for a 
target or audience structure shaped like an 
inverted pyramid. All-~ncompassing at the top 
is the tiniverse of disaffected individual~ who, 
according to communist dogma, tend to be the 
downtrodden masses of 'toilers.' ••. Conceptually 
lower but subsumed withiri this majority are the 
discriminated-against radical, ethnic, social, and 
otherminorities ...• Marxist-Leninist theory 
specifies three adititinal groups, ..• the armed 
forces, young people, and intellectuals .... 
Communist propaganda generally works through the 
next level, which .comprises a variety of impor-
tuning and denunciatory groups, in which the propa-
ganda target is the leadership .•.. Finally, at 
the pyramid's nadir is the small nucleus.of 
trained agitators, an audience of faithful party 
workers, ... 59· 
Phillip J. Tichenor, George A. Donahue, and Clarice 
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Olien have stated that all systems have some sort of press 
contro1.60 Fred Siebert, .Theodote Peterson, and Wilbur 
Schramm noted in their book tbat different political systems 
also have different types of· controls over media. In 
communist countries, mass media not only· are more strongly 
influenced by policies of the government, but they are an 
instrument of government, Phillips Davison stated that this 
.•• influence can be seen in the degree of dif-
fusion of the media, the extent of state or party 
control, the functions that the media serve for 
the society and the individual, arid even in the 
physical characteristics of some of the media.61 
He stated that the basic social responsibilities of the media 
in communist states are similar to those of mass media in 
industrialized democracies; however, "the communist media 
are concentrated to a far greater extent on advancing 
purposes defined by the party and the state~62 He wrote 
that all communication channels' function is 
to bring instructibns from those in authority 
to the masses, to inform people how to do the jobs 
called for in economic or political plans, and to 
inculcate approved norms and values .... 63 
Propaganda Analysis and Content Analysis 
John Clews stated that the lessons of history "have 
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shown repeatedly the vital strategic and tactical funct~on 
of propaganda at decisive periods in the progress of civili-
zation.1164 The analysis of propaganda, then, may be seen 
as an area where fruitful--and useful--information might 
be discerned. The Institute of Propaganda Analysis 
suggested such an undertaking in the final issue of its 
journal. It stated: 
Thus the analysis of any major propaganda 
gives an insight into the social forces which the 
propaganda represents. So propaganda analysis--
the search behind the propagandist's words to see 
what he is trying to accoinplish--becomes an a,pproach 
to the study of current social issues. It is a 
method as old as Socrates~ as has often been pointed 
out, but so many ideas have come to be taken for 
granted that the study of them has all the novelty 
of exploration.65 
Harold Lasswell's 1927 study of World War I was a 
pioneering work in propaganda analysi~. In it he determined 
four major objectives of propaganda: 1. to mobilize hatred 
against the enemy; 2. to preserve the friendship of allies; 
3. to preserve the friendship and, if possible, to procure 
the cooperation of neutrals; and 4. to demoralize the 
enemy.66 In 1935 Lasswell called for a continuous survey 
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of "world attention" by looking at symbolic behavior.67 
Lasswell proposed general categories of content and the 
development of some quantitative indicators to measure 
content. Lasswell conducted a "Wartime Communication Study" 
in 1940-41.68 He and Paul Lazarsfeld performed a content 
• 
analysis study of German newspapers during World War II--
and later of Japanese newspapers--and were able to learn 
a great deal about the Axis war effort.69 Ernst Kris and 
Hans Speier carried out a wartime study entitled "Research 
Project on Totalitarian Communication," and the Media 
Division of the Office of War Information conducted content 
studies of newspapers, magazines, radio, newsreels, and 
comics. The FeJ~ral Communications Commission prepared 
weekly reports and special reports on domestic newspaper 
content.70 
Alexander George, who wrote about inferences made 
from the Nazi propaganda in World War II, stated that 
propaganda analysis has two purposes: "the summary, or 
selective description of what is being said by the 
propagandist"; and "the interpretation of the intentions, 
strategy, and calculations behind propaganda communica-
tions. 11 71 George stated that while ~wo types of propaganda 
analysis--description and inference--were useful, inferences 
were possibly more valuable and more difficult. He 
suggested a distinction be made between "procedures followed 
to infer the actions taken by a political elite and its 
propagandists and those used to infer the speaker's meaning. 11 72 
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He also noted the problem of estimating both the meaning 
of words and inferring the speaker's purpose or propaganda 
goal. He stated: 
An inference ab~ut the speaker's purpose (9r 
propaganda goal) in turn may lead· to inferences 
about their aspect of the action, such as the 
political policy or intention which that propa-
ganda goal is designed to promote or the calcula~ 
tions and situational estimates on which that policy 
and that propaganda strategy is based.73 
George stated that the attempt to clarify the means 
to the inference of meaning and action through propaganda 
analysis is part of a wider problem, that of "transforming 
inferential procedures and expert judgments which at the 
present time are largely in the nature of intuitive art 
into s c i enc e . " 7 4· The has i c as sump t ion o f the W or 1 d War I I 
study was that changes in Nazi propaganda content reflected 
changes in "situational factors" and in German policy rather 
than changes in basic ideology or cultural factors affecting 
behavior.75 George added that the propaganda analyst 
makes the assumption )'that the elite and the propagandist 
are trying to achieve something they want." He also stated 
that the an~lyst assumes that, at least to some extent, 
propagandists use "rational calculation for this purpose. 11 76 
One technique of propagand~ ana~ysts is content 
analysis. Content analysis of non-propaganda aspects of 
communication began about the same time as propaganda 
analysis, The first major study of communication was The 
Country Newspaper, published in 1926 by Malcolm Willey.77 
The categories were subject ones previously used in 
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literature. Paul Lazarsfeld's work about public opinion, 
as well as propaganda, consisted of description of subject 
matter and measurement of the space given to each category.78 
Bernard Berelson repeated a 1943 statement as to what 
the purpose of content analysis was: 
The content analyst aims at a quantitative 
classification of a given body of content, in 
terms of a system of categories devised to 
yield data relevant to specific hypotheses con-
cerning that content.79 
Ole Holsti stated the following definition: 
Content analysis is a multipurpose research 
method developed specifically for investigating 
a broad spectrum of problems in which the content 
of communication serves as the basis of inference.BO 
Fred Kerlinger s.tated: " Con. t en t an a 1 y s i s i s a me tho d o f 
studying and analyzing communications in a systematic, 
o b j e c t iv e, and q u an t i t a t hT e man n e r t o meas u r e var i ab 1 es . " 81 
Berelson stated that of most concern in content analysis 
is "the extent to which the analytic categories appear in 
the content, that is, the relative emphases and omissions. 1182 
The assumption of content analysis, first, is that inferen-
ces can be made concerning the relationship of intent to 
content or of content to effect or that an actual relation-
ship can be found. A second assumption is that research on 
"manifest meaning" is meaningful. 83 
Berelson said of content analysis: "In the classic 
sentence identifying the process of communication--'who 
says what to whom, how, with what effect'--communication 
content is the what. 11 84 Holsti, however, stated that con-
tent analysis can be used in each of the elements of 
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communication. Of the characteristics of content, he cited 
the following uses: 
'What': to describe trends in communication 
content; to audit communication content against 
standards .... 
'How'! to· analyze techniques of persuasion; 
to analyze style .... 
'To Whom': to relate known characteristics 
of the audience to messages produced for them; 
to describe patterns of commuriication,85 
Of the antecedents of content, he ga~e the following uses: 
'Why': _to secure military and pol~tical 
intelligence; to analyze psychological traits of 
individuals; to infer aspects of culture and 
cultural change; to provide legal evidence ... , 
'Who': to determine who wrote a communica-
tion ... ,86 
He commented about the uses of the results of cqmmunication: 
'With ~hat Effect': to measure readability; 
to analyze the flow of information; to assess 
responses to communication,87 
Though most authorities on the subject indicate that 
content analysis subsumes propaganda analysis, George gave 
several differences. He stated that content analysis is 
quantitative and not qualitative. Propaganda analysis 
makes use of quantitative procedure but also uses procedures 
not employed in content analysis. He stated that content 
analysis is used for "relatively precise, objective, and 
reliable observations about the freq~ency with which 
given content characteristics occur singly or in conjunction 
with another. 88 
George noted that sometimes frequency of word 
appearance is not so important as the fact that particular 
words appear in the communication, something he called 
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"qualitative analysis. 11 89 Holsti called it "contingency 
analysis," a term earlier used by Charles Osgood.90 
Berelson, considering the qualitative dimension, said 
frequency of appearance alone is not enough. He stressed 
the content of particular symbols. 91 Berelson stated 
that such "qualitative analysis is done in small or in-
complete samples and that it is somewhat less concerned 
with content as such as with content as "a 'reflection' 
of 'deeper' phenomena. 11 92 He cautioned, however, that 
the question of counting has occasionally 
been considered in the literature as a matter 
of compromise between reliability of analysis 
and richness of categories, or as the sacrifice 
of one to the other. In this view only relatively 
simple or tµreadbare categories are amenable to 
reliable counting, and hence qualitative analysis 
is limited to them. If reliability is rigidly 
required, then ideas of a sophisticated, novel, 
or subtle nature are automatically excluded and 
must be analyzed qualitatively .. , ,93 
Andrew G. Walder stated that what ties the various content 
analysis methods tog~ther is: a) the development of 
typologies or scales for classification; b) the application 
of numerical coding for each category; and c) the statisti-
cal manipulation of the coding to discover relationships and 
the extent of change. He stated that content analysis makes 
the best use of limited information by using "strictly 
definedprocedures", and rigorous statistical techniques 
allow the analyst to discover "relationships and patterns 
of variation that are not intuitively obvious. 11 94 As to 
the problems of content analysis, Berelson cautioned: 
If the study does not deal with a large and 
representative body of materials to be analyzed 
in terms of a set of highly specifiable cate-
gories which appear with substantial frequencies, 
in order to produce objective and precise results 
--if these conditions are not met, careful count-
ing is probably not warranted .... 95 
Content Analysis as a Research Tool 
Andrew Walder stated that content analysis' strength 
is not just that of its technical advantages but that its 
use necessitates "careful thought and explicit enumeration 
of possible sources of bias, and strategies to circumvent 
or correct them." Furthermore, he commented: 
The strength of content analysis, therefore, 
is not so mµch that it eliminates the problems 
presented by the sources, but that it exposes to 
the critical reader the set of assumptions and 
decisions that lead to a particular conclusion--
information that is not made explicit in other 
methods,96 
Morris Janowitz stated: "Content analysis has been joined 
more and more with oth~r methodologies to produce a more 
integrated research strategy. 11 97 
so 
What, then, is the current status of content analysis 
as a research tool? Janowitz stated that he noticed an 
improvement of research from 1969 to 1976. He stated that 
it had become more of a "standard meth9dology of academic 
research and it has been used conspicuously in public policy 
investigations, such as that of the Kerner Commission."98 
He stated that the major problem in the use of content 
analysis has been the lack of "an extensive and accessible" 
data base.99 The first significant attempt for such a 
data base came in 1969 with the "Trend Report of the Center 
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for Policy Process," under John Naisbitt.100 The data 
base was used by Naisbitt for his recent best-seller, 
Megatrends. 101 The "revival" of content analysis has come 
about, to some extent, by problems inherent in the 
dominant technique in mass communication studies, public 
opinion surveying. Janowitz wrote about the resurgence 
of interest in content analysis: 
Rap~dly--and almost unexpectedly--the 
importance of content analysis has been enhanced. 
Of course, survey research is certain to remain 
a dominant technique for the study of mass atti-
tudes and the influence of the mass media. How-
ever, a variety of intellectual, professional, 
and technical observations has been made about 
sample surveys; not the least pressing is caused 
by the steep increase in costs as well as the 
escalation.of nonresponse rates. On the other 
hand the procedures and the logic of content 
analysis as they relate to the study of socio-
political change have improved and sharpened.102 
Content analysis, then, has increased in usefulness as 
the problems of survey research have become better under-
stood. Janowitz mentioned these reasons for the growing 
critical evaluation of surveying: increased costs and 
increased rate of non-response; questions of respondent 
rights; a growing intellectual criticism about how it 
charts change in social dynamics; and the narrow perspective 
it gives on the development of the s9cial sciences. 1 03 
Most telling may be that survey research has come to be 
thought of as "an instrument for mass manipulation rather 
than as an aid to collective problem solving. 11 104 Content 
analysis does not have those weaknesses, and it measures 
what people say or write in a non-laboratory, real-world 
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setting. It rests on "demonstrated results and not ad 
hoc arguments about potential developments."lOS 
Janowitz stated: "The revitalization of content analysis 
draws on a rich body of intellectual tradition and a 
growing level of methodological sophistication."106 
Research by the Trend Report in one content field 
(urban affairs), using as a data base the country's top 
newspapers, has shown that the content of stories in one 
area can be seen as a "relatively closed system." 
Janowitz said of the trend that he sa~: 
The data show a pattern of stability and 
change. Thus, for example, from the summer of 
1973 to ·the summer of 1974, there was a discerni-
ble increas,e in attention paid to housing and 
urban development, while law and order, and 
welfare and poverty declined. Attention to the 
others remained constant.107 
Content analysis's utility has been found to be directly 
proportional to the time span covered. Such cumulative 
aspects of the mass media is another area in which Janowitz 
has found survey research has fallen short. He noted that 
recent social research into the effect of the mass media 
confirms the cumulative effect of the media and is in line 
with the trend study approach to content analysis.108 
Richard A. Peterson has develop~d a "non-exhaustive 
taxonomy" covering five types of content analysis: 
textual analysis, communication analysis, persuasion analy-
sis, bias analysis, and production analysis. His defini-
tions of the types are as follows: 
Textual analysis ... focuses on the text of 
the cultural products being studied (to relate it 
to t~xts of a similar theme, metaphor, linguistic 
structure; used in humanity areas such as music, 
literature) 
Communication analysis ... focuses on the 
process of communication, asking whether the 
sender encodes what he intends and whether the 
receiver decodes the same or a different message 
Persuasion analysis focuses on how 
communicators craft their messages in an effort 
to be most influential, ... 
Bias analysis ... asks whether a particular 
set of symbols accurately represents a known 
state of society or of a social institution .... 
Reflection analysis asks in what ways 
the content of the symbols are [sic] shaped by 
the milieu in which they are produced (generally 
looking more closely at the dynamics of the 
symbol-producing organization itself).109 
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Peterson suggested a merging of American "positivist" 
and European Mar'xist or "philosophical" methods, which 
would 
combine the methodological rigor and care 
about generalizations characteristic of the 
positivist solving and concern about the politi-
cal implications of research characteristic of 
the critical/theoretical continental tradition. 11 0 
What is in the future for content analysis, then? 
Peterson stated that it 
will most likely come not in the method and 
application of content analysis per se but 
through more systematically seeking out the social, 
political, and economic determinants of the 
symbolic content which has been_analyzed.111 
Janowitz had a similar opinion. He wrote that if 
content analysis is able to monitor and 
analyze the emerging efforts to cope with socio-
political change, it serves to inform and has 
the potential to stimulate conflict resolution. 
In this way the academic interest of social 
science and the requirements of a great variety of 
organized groups are linked to the expanded interest 
in the systematic coding and analysis of the content 
of the mass media.112 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
Why is content analysis a reliable way to study social 
change? According to Megatrends author John Naisbitt, it is 
... because the news hole in a newspaper is a 
. ~~- -~~ 
closed system. For economic reasons, the amount 
of space devoted to news in a newspaper does not 
change significantly over time. So, when some-
thing new is introduced, something else or a com-
bination of things must be omitted. You cannot 
add unless you subtract. It is the principle of 
forced choice in a closed system.I 
Another reason c9ntent analysis is reliable is that the 
methodology is free from "the effects of biased reporting 
because it is only the event or behavior that we are 
interested in. 11 2 It also is useful because it is the only way 
to obtain some types of information--because it happened in 
the past ~r because a particular source cannot be interviewed 
(as in the present study and in all trend studies).3 In the 
current study trends over time are being sought. Thus, the 
increase, decrease or lack of symbols in certain categories 
all will have meaning and utility in the study. 
-There is a need to analyze propaganda for what it can 
tell us about policy--the manifest content of propaganda. 
In propaganda analysis broad thematic constructs with vague 
boundaries will be less useful than specific symbols and 
categories of symbols. In using specific words or word pairs 
(women's rights, secretary of state), the problem of category 
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construction is simplified and the necessity of using judges 
to categorize words is eliminated--both events improving 
reliability of the current study. 
Some key terms in content analysis, as defined by 
Bernard Berelson, who provided the first major summary of 
content analysis research, are: 
Recording unit: smallest body of content in 
which the appearance of a reference is counted; 
Context unit: largest body of a content that 
may be examined in characterizing a recording unit; 
Unit tl classification: basis [upon which] 
the item is analyzed (e.g., news item or word): 
Unit of enumeration: basis of tabulation 
(inch;;-;r~imes symbol appears).4 
The major units of measurement are words (key symbols); themes 
(sentences); characters (persons); items (entire natural units: 
books, newspapers, stories, speeches); space and time measures 
(column-inch, page, line); and inter-relation of groups (more 
than one mentioned). In this study the space measure was 
the page for Granma and the column for Castro's speeches. 
Words, characters, and items (the entire newspaper, the entire 
speech) as well as inter-relation of groups were the major 
units of measure. The context unit was the entire page for 
the Granma study and the column for Castro's speeches. The 
recording unit for the Granma study was anything larger than 
a news brief, i.e., three paragraphs or more. For Castro's 
speeches it was any speech longer than half a newspaper page. 
The unit of classification was the word or word pair. The 
unit of enumeration in both cases was the number of times the 
symbol appeared. 
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Berelson stated that validity is not a problem if the 
categories are defined well. 5 For the study to have 
reliability, he stated, it must be objective. It rests upon 
consistency (a) among analysts and (b) through time. H~ 
stated: ''The reliability of content analysis as an instrument 
for scientific research depends to a large extent upon the 
achivement of high reliability on both counts!~ He added that 
complicated and sophisticated categories reduce reliability 
and that reliability is higher with (a) simpler categories and 
units; (b) more experienced coders; and (3) a precise and 
complete set of coding rules.7 His criteria for reliability 
and validity appear to have been met in the present study. 
As to the problem of sampling, Berelson stated: 
In the large majority of cases, it is possible 
to devise a representative and adequate sample which 
is economical of administration. For most purposes, 
analysis of a small, carefully chosen sample and the 
relevant content will produce just as valid results 
as the analysis of a great deal more.8 
In sampling, three decisions are necessary: determination of 
(a) titles (e.g., editorial position, size or importance, 
ownership and control, time of issue; in this study time of 
issue was controlled and the other factors were reflected in 
the single publication being analyzed); (b) issues (seasonal 
-
variation, importance of events; a random selection of issues 
of Granma, one per month during the time span, was made in 
this study); (c) content (are parts representative of the 
whole? In this study articles of a feature nature as well as 
news articles were surveyed for references to the United 
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States),9 Berelson noted that there can be samples for both 
extensive and intensive purposes.lo In this study Castro's 
speeches were treated intensively (each one studied) and 
Granma articles extensively (sampling done). 
The sampling plan was random and stratified. For each 
month, one issue was picked randomly for the extensive Granma 
sample. A page number was picked randomly. If a page con-
taining a Castro speech was selected in the random selection 
of Granma pages for analysis, another page was randomly 
selected instead. If no mention to the United States larger 
than a brief was noted, then a notation of that absence was 
made and another random page was picked. The search con-
. 
tinued until the'first significant mention (larger than a 
brief) was found. If no mention of the United States was 
found in an issue, that fact was noted and another issue in 
the same month was selected randomly. For the intensive sam-
ple, each of Castro's. speeches was studied. A column of each 
speech text was selected randomly and scanned for a mention 
of the United States (by any of the top-frequency symbols 
determined in the Granma study). If no mention was found, 
further columns were randomly selected until all columns 
were depleted or a mention was found: 
Analysis was by chi square and the Pearson r correlation 
in order to determine if there was significant variation in 
the use of symbols (as categorized) over the period studied. 
It was expected that changes in symbol usage should parallel 
events inside Cuba and changes in Cuba's policy toward the 
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United States. Both increased numbers of references to the 
United States and increased aggressivity of the language 
were considered to be indicators of policy changes, The 
first was interpreted to indicate increased interest and the 
second increased hostility. 
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CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSIS OF THE DATA--PART I 
A Qualitative Comparison of 
Two Issues of Granma 
The obvious changes in Granma over the period covered 
by the study have been few. The nameplate is the same--
the same flag with a 36-point red rule above and a 24-
point red rule below. 1 Headline type and style of heads are 
similar, and the .. number of pages has remained at 12 except 
for an occasional 16-page edition. Pages are of various 
column widths--four to six, but most often five. The 
departmental headings are the same, and the amount of 
space devoted to each category has changed little. No 
column-inch count was conducted to determine the extent 
of change. 
the study. 
Such a count was not within the perimeters of 
The researcher's reading of randomly selected 
pages from throughout the time span revealed little change 
in the tone of the propaganda symbols: The symbols them-
selves seemed to be fairly consistent throughout. Only 
such things as the name of the U.S. president or secretary 
of state were the obvious indicators of change. Terms 
used were remarkably consistent despite changes in U.S. 
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administrations. 
The researcher had expected that a critique of two 
issues of widely separated dates would reveal any 
sweeping alteration in tone or format. As it had been 
determined that the format of the newspaper had not 
changed significantly, the dates of the two issues 
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selected for the critique were chosen primarily to study 
possible differences in symbolic propaganda content. The 
period from 1966 to the end of the Vietnam War was elimina-
ted because the language would have been expected to be 
particularly hard-lined toward the United States. The 
Carter years were thought to be less aggressive in tone 
and, in addition, did not allow a sufficient passage of 
time between the two issues to be compared. After careful 
consideration, the two dates selected were January 5, 
1975, the week of the 16th anniversary of the revolution 
(Figure 1), and January 1, 1984, the day of the 25th 
anniversary (Figure 2). While the issues were not random-
ly selected nor was the analysis scientific, the critique 
was expected to reveal any major changes in format and 
any obvious shift in attitude. 
Both issues have pictures of Castro approximately the 
same size, one vertical and the other horizontal. The 
1975 issue has a single, short story on the front, and 
the 1984 issue has a "refer" box inviting the reader 
inside. The earlier issue has an "Articles and Commentaries" 
section on pages 2 and 7, "National News" on pages 3, 5, 
......... .,._,,. 5, 1975 
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Cl 1111 CDMIIIIST 
PAIJYGf aDA 
Long live the 16th anniversary 
of the triumph of the Revolution! 
1975: 
Year 
of 
the 
1st 
Congress 
• HAVANA (AlN). - ins will be the 
YeM ol the 1st Congrus, u a rault 
of the suggestions made by poliuc.11 and 
mass organaauons to the lndership of the 
Pany. 
Our workers, peRS&nts, intellectuals and 
students, men and women, fully iden-
tified with the Leninist idea that the 
Conaras is .. the most important, deci.live 
and 111nificant meeting of the Party and 
the Republic," will strive to create with 
their conscientious and enthusiastic work 
an appropnate spirit for the holding of the 
1st Congress of the Party by fulfilling 
economic pl.ans, increumg productivity -
Wtth sp«ial stress on the tall of opt1m.z.ing 
the sugu harvftt - incorporating women 
into the acu,·e life of the country on an 
ne:r c:rutier bub, obtaining bightt pr,,mo-
tlon and lower dropout nta in acboob, 
lmprovlna the qu.ality of services and 
~ the eombat readiness of the 
Revolution.uy Armed Forces, the Minlltry 
at the Interior and our re:.uvists. 
Fully awue of the historic impo~ 
of the Party Congress, our working mauet 
and the people .. a whole will participate 
lo the dacussion uf its thetes and of the 
,uidelines for the Five-Year Plan. From 
an an.alysia of the9e docume:nb will come 
the deciaiom that #ill govern the future 
coune of the development of the Rev-
olution. 
The wgntioo by the political and mass 
orpniutions that ins be named the Year 
of the lst Congrns WU in.Ide with the 
following thlng:s in mind: improving ideo-
J.oci,cal worlr. and the cultural and ttth-
'1ieal education of worlln, obtaining vic-
toriea in the~ofgoalsandcon,. 
du.ion of shoc.k.-l.uk proJttU, etc., aa the 
bl.thest tribute to lhe Party Congress and 
all thMe who, based on the e:&llmpl.es of 
our ancestors wbo fought for lndep~ndence 
and on Marn.st-Leninist ideology, gave 
\hm' liTU for the c..aus,e of socialism. 
~ UI/Dlk 
Figure 1. January 5 , 1975, Granma 
Z!i JANUARY 1959: THE REBEL ARMY, LED BY FIDEL CASTRO RUZ, MAKES ITS TRIUMPHAL ENTRANCE INTO HAVANA 
Hn-• .hlnuvy 1, 1114 
YHr HI / Number 1 
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II . Yur of the 25th Annln rH ry of the Trl llffllMI of the R•volu, ton Prlc• In Cube: 10 Ctl . OFFICIAL ORW Of THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PAm Of CUIA 
THE CUBAN 
REVOLUTION 
IS ONE 
QUARTER OF A 
CENTURY OLD 
IVA CUBA LIBREI \JIVA FIDEL 
Fi gu r e 2 . J a nu a r y 1 , 1984 , Granma 
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and 6, "Cultural News" on page 4, "Sports" on pages 8 
and 9, and "International News" on pages 11 and 12. In 
the 1984 issue, pages 2, 3, 4, and 5 are classified as 
"National News." Page 6 has the section "Cultural News," 
page 7 "Sports," page 8 "General News," pages 9, 10, and 
11 "International News," and.page 11 a "Special Feature." 
Two stories about the United States are on page 2 of 
the 1975 issue. The first is three columns wide with a 
two-line, 36-point medium weight headline in capital 
letters. It is entitled "Background and aftermath of the 
notorious Hay-Bunau Varilla Treaty" and discusses the 
treaty that authorized the construction of the Panama Canal. 
The other story 'is entitled "The industrialization of the 
mass media in capitalism: a new form of ideological and 
cultural subversion." The head is set three-columns 
wide with three lines of 36-point type in down style on 
a five-column page. 
A subhead on the Panama story notes in 12-point sans 
serif: "The Isthmus of Panama, center of imperialist 
ambitions, conflict and plunder, now witnesses the 
unyielding determination of the Panamanian people to 
regain the sovereignty of the territo!y usurped by the 
Yankees." Accompanying is a map of Panama and a close-up 
map of the Canal Zone. The lead on the story about the 
mass media in capitalism reads: 
Monopoly concentration was one of World War 
II's aftereffects on the U.S. economy. Today 
• the backbone of the capitalist system in the 
United States consists of about a hundred large 
corporatloni, which control banking, industry, 
transportation, energy resources, trade and 
insurance.2 
The article is illustrated by an octopus (labeled Essa, 
ITT, Ford, TWA, etc.)--wrapping its tentacles around a 
photograph of an urban scene processed as a line conver-
sion. 
On page 7 of "Articles and Commentaries" is a story 
with a kicker head, "The world of raw materials," in 24-
point bold capital letters and a main head, "An obsolete 
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economic order," in three-column, two-line, 42-point bold-
face capitals. It features a 12-point subhead with a 12-
point medium insert of a quote by Fidel Castro. The 
quote states: 
The underdeveloped and colonial world, which 
yesterday paid at the price of Blavery, blood and 
rapacious exploitation, for the birth of the 
industrialized societies of Europe and North 
America, today sustains with its poverty and with 
the mortgage of the resources that could serve 
tomorrow as the base of its development, the 
absurd luxuries and criminal waste of a handful 
of consumer soc~eties,3 
The lead of the story reads: 
The underdeveloped world is the world of 
raw materials--but the raw materials do not belong 
to the underdeveloped woild. They belong to a 
microcosm of industrialized capitalist countries 
which are voraciously gobbling up the resources 
of mankind.4 -
The article details the colonial system at work and 
discusses the "imperialistic" role played by the United 
States. A typical paragraph reads: 
The colonial system created monopoly. Take-
over or control of the sources of raw materials, 
which were in short supply as of the mid~l9th 
century, became the main objective of finance 
capital. From that moment on, every capitalist 
war, the U.S. aggression or CIA operation was 
in one way or another linked to a raw material 
or basic product in a poor country: tin, sugar, 
oil, cobalt or copper, to cite just a few 
examples.5 
The article is supported graphically by a reproduction 
of "An account of sugar and coffee, exported from the 
island of Jamaica, in the following years; viz, 1772-
1775." 
Under "International News" on page 10 is an article 
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with a hammer head in 72-point capitals, "Colonial crisis." 
The subhead is a bold upper- and lower-case streamer that 
reads: "Believe it or not this is Puerto Rico today." 
An early paragraph states: 
This is the Puerto Rico that can no longer 
conceal the bankruptcy of a colonial society in 
crisis where unemployment is a chronic disease. 
Puerto Rican society--colonial by definition 
--is seriouslj affected by the reverses of the 
capitalist crisis. While in the United States--
the metropolis--inflation and unemployment make 
eveiyone feel the hardships of a new economic 
recession, in Puerto Rico its effects are making 
things even worse by shaking the colonialist 
structures imposed by Yankee masters since 1898.6 
The illustration is a line conversion depicting American 
soldiers in combat gear with a Puerto Rican policeman 
behind stopping Puerto Rican men in the street (an obvious 
montage of several photographs) along with symbols of 
corporations such as PanAm, Holiday Inn, and Exxon, all 
superimposed on a map of Puerto Rico. 
The two other stories on the page also are about 
Puerto Rico. One, in a down-style three-column, two-line 
36-point bold head reads, "Construction--an industry on 
its death throes." It is accompanied by a photograph 
reportedly depicting Puerto Rican children in an urban 
slum. The lead paragraph reads: 
Puerto Rico's population runs to a little 
over 2 and a half million. There are 455,000 
people in San Juan, the capital. Here, as in 
every other capital in the underdeveloped world, 
hunger, unemployment and poverty run rampant. 
Here, in the face of beautiful, modern buildings, 
the urban slums--the eyesores that are never 
within range of a tourist's camera--stand in 
mute challenge.7 
The third story is headed "The kilowatt meter ... " in 
three-column, 36-point bold down-style. Discussing the 
high cost of electricity for the average person, the 
article notes: 
The colonial governors, true lackeys of 
imperialism, have ~lways tried to make investors 
feel right at home in Puerto Rico. Two of the 
investment incentives used are corporation tax 
exemption and low industrial electric power 
rates. 
The results have been excellent, but of 
course for the big Yankee corporations, Puerto 
Rico has been flooded with huge petrochemical, 
pharmaceutical and highly mechanized industries 
which consume a considerably high percentage of 
electrical energy and which, according to the 
laws of the so-called Associate Free State, 
pay low rates because supposedly they are contri-
buting to the country's development.8 
The "International News" section entitled "South of 
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the Rio Grande" consists mainly of news briefs. Headlines 
are 12-point light face. Articles mentioning the United 
States have the following headlines: "Fascists agree to 
pay Anaconda Copper 12 million dollars in compensation" 
(Chile); "Decision to nationalize Yankee mining from 
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Marcona Mining is reaffirmed" (Peru); "Mexico's Secretary 
of National Property, Horacio Flores de la Pena, says there 
have been several attempts on his life, probably ordered 
by oil companies" (Mexico). Under "News in Brief," there 
are two articles in 12-point bold type that concern the 
United States--"H.arry W. Shlaudeman named U.S. Ambassador 
to Venezuela" and a short article about Shlaudeman under 
"The man in the news." The only multi-column story is 
one headlined "Latin-American governments reject new trade 
law passed by U.S. Congress as discriminatory to oil-
producing nations." It is set in 24-point medium type and 
has a straight news lead: 
Ecuador became the fourth Latin-American 
nation this week to reject the new foreign trade 
bill passed by the U.S. Congress,9 
On· p age 12 , under " Int er n a t ion a 1 News , " i s a two -
column, three-line~ 24-point headline entitled ''Ceremony 
in Hanoi in tribute to those killed in the bombing of 
the Kham Thien neighborhood by U.S. planes in 1971." This 
is surprinted on a screened red box. In columns tw6 and 
three are stacked cartoons by Neuz running 14 inches deep 
entitled "The capitalist crisis." The first shows Uncle 
Sam standing on a crumbling block of stone labeled 
"crisis." The second shows Uncle Sam kicking a workman 
(a plumber), who leaves a rising trail behind labeled 
"unemployment." The third shows a skeleton labeled 
"crisis" walking behind Uncle Sam while standing in Uncle 
Sam's boots, 
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The 1984 edition shows Castro on the cover making his 
entrance into Havana in January 1959. Instead of the 18-
point red rules used for boxes in 1975, it uses 24-point 
red rules to box the picture. Below it is a six-column, 
5 1/4-inch "refer" box headlined "Cuban economy grows by 
five percent in 1983." 
The· second through fourth pages are mainly a report 
of a meeting of the National Assembly of People's Power 
described as the supreme organ of state power. The 
assembly is composed of 499 deputies representing the 
country's 169 municipalities, and it holds twb regular 
sessions a year. There were two mentions of the United 
States in the report. One reads: 
Garcia Valls' report emphasizes the positive 
development of domestic finance, despite the 
damaging effect of the capitalist world crisis 
and U.S. imperialism's blockade of Cuba, and 
despite the expenditures for the defense and 
protection of the country, under direct threat 
by the United States, and the weather catastrophes 
which reduced sugar production by more than a 
million tons in comparison with the previous 
harvest,10 
Another reference, seven paragraphs later, reads: 
He [Flavia Bravo] referred to a series of 
events of extraordinary importance to humanity 
and this region and Cuba in particular: the 
insane warmongering policy of t~e U.S. administra-
tion now bent on deploying 572 Cruise and 
Pershing missiles in Western Europe and whose 
policy of force endangers detente and brings us 
all closer to a holocaust that would eliminate 
humankind from the face of the planet; and the 
cowardly, ferocious aggression on tiny Grenada, 
which attests to the reactionary, fascist nature 
of the Reagan administration. 
'The continuous imperialist threat,' he 
underscored, 'confirms to us the need to strengthen 
as much as possible our defense tasks and give 
them our gre~test and immediate attention.' 
He emphasized the heroic stand taken by the 
Cuban internationalists who worked in Grenada 
carrying out.various cooperation tasks for the 
country's economic and social development. He 
asked for a minute of silence to honor the memory 
of our 24 comrades who were killed on Grenadian 
soil. •• , 11 
On page 5, under "National News," is an article 
entitled "Antares Castle in Colonial Havana's defense 
sys tern.'·' It contains a few historical referen~es to·the 
United States. One reads: 
That same year [1905], the Cuban government 
donated to the United States five of the six 
bronze Gannon in Antares Castle, to be placed 
as landmarks on the scenes of the battles that 
preceded the siege and capture of Santiago de 
Cuba during the famous Spanish-Cuban-American 
war. 
A wood~n-tile-roofed barracks built on the 
road leadiqg to the fortress' main entrance 
during the second period of U.S. occupation 
later became the fir~t School for Rural Guard 
NCOs •••. 12 
An article on page 7 "Sports" discussed the Los 
Angeles Olympics.13It carries an 18-point medium, all-
capitals kicker, "An insult to sports circles," over a 
two-column, three-line, 36-point down-style head, "The 
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contrast between Los Angeles and Sarajevo," in a box with 
a 2-point red rule. The lead reads: 
MOSCOW (TASS)-~Many athletes are expressing 
concern about the organization o'f the 1984 Summer 
Olympics in Los Angeles, although the organizing 
committee claims that all is in order and that 
existing problems are insignificant and do not 
merit the attention they are being given.14 
The headlines on that page and two on the preceding page of 
cultural news are printed over boxes screened in red. 
Instead of the heavy screen used on several stories (one 
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about the United States) in 1975, a light (15 to 20 
percent) screen .is used in 1984. No surprint is used on 
a story about the United States in this issue. On page 8, 
under "General News," is an article taken from the magazine 
Oclae that covers half a page horizontally. It has a 
three-column, two-line, 36-point bold headline entitled 
"Transnationals and war business." It is accompanied by 
a two-column line conversion of an aircraft carrier and a 
two-column photograph of U.S. Marines on which special 
screening is used. The second paragraph of the lead 
reads: 
The transnationals play a particularly macabre 
role in the 1business' of war, in the production 
of mass-extermination weapons, in the arms traffic 
and modern -arms supplies to puppet governments. 
According to UN statistics, humanity spends more 
than one million dollars per minute on the arms 
race, 600,000 million dollars a year, that is, 30 
times the aid to developing countries.15 
Several articles on page 9 of "International News" 
mention the United States. One at the top of the page is 
surrounded by a two-point red rule with a three-column, 
one-line, 30-point down-style headline, "The great 
Nazifascist sanctuary." It is accompanied by a one-column, 
3.5 inch drawing of a hairy-faced, unsavory-looking "angel" 
wearing a halo with a U.S. flag atta~hed. The "angel" 
holds a short Nazi who has a swastika on his helmet and 
needs a shave. The lead states: 
The United States has gradually become the 
'great sanctuary' for fascists and other kindred 
elements throughout the world as soon as their 
regimes are defeated. This is really nothing 
new. Part, although a small part, of the 
nobility, the bourgeoisie and officialdom 
removed from power by the October Revolution in old 
Russia ended up in the United States. 
And this has been the traditional practice of 
tyrants and their gangs of paid assassins and 
henchmen of dictatorships south of the Rio Bravo, 
once they have been deposed by popular and 
revolutionary move~ents.16 · 
A story on Sun Myung Moon carries a three-column, one-
line, 36-point bold capitals headline, "Moon's secret 
empire." It discusses his property acquisitions in the 
United States. Midway in the article is the following 
quote: 
In the 1979-80 period, with the likelihood 
of the Republican Party entering the White House 
--a party to which Moon has close ties--the sect 
embarked on the conquest of Latin America. 
They set their sights on Panama, Guatemala, 
El Salvador and Hondurus and poured large sums 
of money irrio these countries. Overtly anti-
communist seminars and l~ctures were organized, 
and in some cases considerable backing was given 
to political organizations that oppose national 
liberation movements. Its newspapers were used 
to work out a carefully prepared propaganda cam-
paign to defend U.S. regional policy.1 7 
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An article entitled "The dirty lie against Bulgaria" 
discusses the shooting of Pope John Paul II in 1982 and 
Italian efforts to link the suspect to Bulgaria. The 
article suggests that the CIA itself might be involved in 
the shooting. It notes: 
Kidnapping and murder of political figures, 
armed robberies of banks, etc. are commonplace in 
the capitalist system and proliferate in the 
United States. 
Terrorism and crime have always been instru-
ments of imperialist policy. It is known that 
the CIA was directly linked to many killings, 
like those of Lumumba, Martin Luther King, 
Allende .... 18 
79 
Below that story is a two-column stand-alone photograph 
of demonstrators being drenched with water cannons. Under 
an 18-point all-capitals catchline "There will be no 
tranquility .•. ," is a cutline that begins: "U.S. deploy-
ment of Pershing 2 and Cruise missiles in certain countries 
of Western Europe is meeting with action that is con-
tinuously growing in scope." It concludes: "As a peace 
movement leader noted not too long ago, it seems there 
will be no tranquility there until there are no U.S. 
nuclear missiles in Europe. 1119 
On page 11, under "International News," is an article 
about the Portuguese Communist Party congresses. There 
were four references to the United States in the article. 
One mention was derived from a speech: 
In his speech, Perez Herrero condemned the 
United States' warmongering policy and its attacks 
on other peoples. He mentioned the invasion of 
Grenada, calling it 'the most recent and eloquent 
demonstration of the lack of scruples of the 
present U.S. administration, which did not hesitate 
to use its enormous military power to trample on 
the sovereignty of one of the smallest countries 
in the wo r 1 d. ' 2 0 
There was a reference to the United States in an article 
about the Spanish Communist Party. It states: 
Contrary to the expectatio~s of certain mass 
media and political observers who hoped that the 
Congress would be characterized by endless 
internal bickering, the delegates .tackled the 
main international problems and voiced their 
support for the struggle for peace, and condemned 
the current U.S. policy ('which has been and still 
is a determining factor in the increase of world 
tension'), the U.S. invasion of Grenada and the 
U.S. pressure on the Caribbean area. 
Iglesias reiterated 'once again the Spanish 
Communists' solidarity with the Cuban people, 
now a target of the aggressive plans for the 
Caribbeandevised by President Reagan and his 
adviser Henry Kissinger.' 21 
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On page 11, under "International News," is an article 
with a three-column, three-line, all-capitals headline, 
"U.S. intervention in Central America is a fact: All five 
countries are subject to it--Commander Rolando Moran." 
One Moran quote reads as follows: 
'Unfortunately, intervention by Yankee 
imperialism is a factor which all Central American 
revolutionaries must consider when planning our 
struggle for the national liberation of our 
peoples and the building of their future. We 
are all duty-bound to do whatever we can to prevent 
it, but if, regardless of our will, the forces of 
imperialism impose it on us, then we all have the 
sacred obl{gation of fighting until it has been 
repulsed victoriously.' 22 
The page contains an interview with Costa Rican President 
Luis Alberto Monge in which there are two mentions about 
the United States. One is a denial that 1~000 U.S. 
military engineers would go to Costa Rica. The other was 
as follows: 
When asked how he viewed the United States' 
economic blockade of Cuba in the context of his 
policy of neutrality, the president said, 'At 
first I supported the blockade. Those were the 
years of the feverish anti-Cuba wave. Then I 
felt it was an ineffective measure. Now I feel 
it would be better if the blockade was lifted 
and a direct dialogue established between Cuba 
and the United States. 1 23 
The topics in the two issues ran the gamut of issues 
and ideological differences between the United States and 
Cuba: the Panama Canal, Puerto Rico, the blockade of 
Cuba, the role of the mass media, exploitation of the 
underdeveloped world in general and Latin America in 
particular by U.S. corporations, the Vietnam War, the 
inhumanity of capitalism and its negative effect on the 
entire world economy, the U.S. military threat to Cuba 
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and the U.S. threat to world peace, the past U.S. domination 
of Cuba, the United States as a fascist country and the 
heir to Nazi Germany, U.S. opposition to national libera-
tion and its support of military dictators, the role of 
the Central Intelligence Agency in terrorism around the 
world and particularly in Cuba, the isolation of the United 
States in world affairs, and the refusal of the United 
States to negotiate its differences with Cuba. 
Stories from 1975 appeared similar in tone to those 
in 1984. Some of the same political issues were mentioned 
in both years. 
were similar. 
Not only the language, but the cartoons 
The researcher's look at newspapers from 
throughout the 19~year period supports an assertion that 
the United States consistently is put in a bad light. 
The only positive comments about the United States noted 
were those of Castro, discussed later, that indicated 
he has no ill feelings toward the people of the United 
States and his remarks that Jimmy Carter (early in his 
term) and Jesse Jackson were honorable men. Photographs 
always show the worst side of the United States. All 
cartoons noted were anti-United States. 
The caricature of Uncle Sam has changed little. He 
started out short and fat but thinned down somewhat over 
the years, and he no longer wears glasses. Otherwise his 
uniform is about the same. He wears a stars-and-stripes 
top hat and has a dollar sign on his tie. He usually 
carries either a club (a "big stick"?) with a nail stick-
ing out of it or a knife--both of them dripping blood. 
Sometimes he shoots missiles out of the top of his head, 
and sometimes he flies a jet and drops bombs. Other 
symbolic representations of the United States have been a 
snowman with a skull for a face, a vulture, and a snake 
with a dollar sign for a forked tringue--all wearing Uncle 
Sam hats. Another symbolic repres~ntation is the use of 
a swastika for the "x" in Nixon. 
A Qualitative View of U.S. References 
in Castro's Rhetoric 
An Associated Press article published July 27, 1984, 
reported that Fidel Castro in his speech marking the 31st 
anniversary of the 1954 attack on the Moncada garrison 
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"made a new appeal for improvement i.n U.S.-Cuban relations." 
The speech, given July 26, was reported in the August 5 
Granma (Figure 3). On the cover, along with a picture of 
Castro giving the speech, was a quota~ion, "Just as we are 
willing to fight and die, we have no fear of talks and dis-
cuss ion." The quote was given prominent display even though 
it was not the main focus of the speech, It was located in 
the text at the top of page 8. Its prominent display suggests 
its importance. 
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The only thing "new" about the appeal was that it was 
another appeal. Castro has been making such appeals for 
several years. In the same story but earlier, near the end 
of page 5, is another quote that is pulled out and set in 
large type on page 4. It states, "When the imperialists 
say that if we want to live in peace we should break our 
ties with the socialist community, we say: those ties 
will never be broken." There is nothing new in that 
statement either. It is the same line that Castro con-
sistently has presented as one of his non-negotiable demands. 
It may be the reason his earlier pleas for talks have not 
resulted in the action he seeminglydesired. In the speech, 
Castro goes into' the reason why he cannot bend on the 
question of Cuba's ties with the socialist world. He said: 
Not only because of our principles, that's 
the main reason, because of a question of ele-
mentary gratitude, but also because those ties 
have been fundamental to our socio-economic 
development over these years and they are deci-
sive for our future development.24 
Castro continued for most of three columns castigating 
United States policy. At the end of the first column on 
page 7, he discussed the visit of Jesse Jackson and 
suggested that it was the reason he was pushing for talks. 
Castro stated: 
In the case of Cuba there is something new, 
the Jackson visit to our country, which was well 
received by our people, who are hard to fool . 
. . . As a result of that visit, and on the basis 
of a bipartisan consensus in the United States, 
talks have started between representatives of 
the Cuban and U.S. governments in New York on 
matters of migration and other related questions 
of interest to both sides. 
We are ready to continue these talks in a 
serious manner, with the gravity, maturity, valor 
and sense of responsibility that are characteristic 
of our Revolution .... 
.. . He brought a message of peace and we 
are responsive to that type of gesture. Nobody 
will ever get anything from our country by force; 
with gestures of peace, approaches can be made 
and talks can be held with our country.25 
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In seeking an ideological reason for the talks, Castro 
quoted Lenin: "Lenin, who was a realist, a man of convic-
tions, a man of peace, was the first to proclaim as a basic 
principle the need for peaceful coexistence between 
different social systems. 11 26 Despite the talk of peaceful 
coexistence, Castro reiterated that Cuba has had to oppose 
"a powerful and aggressive neighbor": 
It isn.it easy for a small country such as 
ours to oppose such a powerful and aggressive 
neighbor, but neither is it easy for the mighty 
neighbor to fight against a small but brave, 
intelligent, worthy and united people as ours. 
This senseless policy must cease and many 
conscientious people in the United States feel 
the same way.27 
After mentioning that El Salvador, Nicaragua and Cuba are 
not and cannot be a threat to the United States, he made 
the statement that was quoted on the cover: 
... All our effort is a defense effort and I 
repeat clearly that anyone who tries to destroy 
those values will have to fight us and we will 
know how to defend ourselves; the aggressor will have 
to pay a very high price and noi reach his goal 
in the end .... 
Just as we are willing to fight and die, we 
have no fear of talks and discussion.28 
Castro spent the remainder of his speech confirming that 
the Cuban defense forces can meet any threat. 
Was Castro's call for talks a result of the Grenada 
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invasion? Was Jackson's visit a Cuban version of "ping 
pong" diplomacy? Either may be accurate, but a look at 
Castro's past speeches shows that his remarks are nothing 
new. His call for talks go back at least a decade. 
Castro was not in any mood for reconciliation in the early 
1970s because of the Vietnam War and his dislike of Nixon. 
In a press conference in May, 1972, reported on June 4, 
1972, Castro stated his position: 
(.W)e are not at all interested in such a 
meeting, and, moreover, we would refuse any 
meeting of that kind. What can we talk about 
with Nixon? What can we ask Nixon to do? To 
stop being an imperialist? To stop being an 
aggressor? What are our possibilities for 
demanding this? 
Nixon and the Goverrtment of the United 
States have clearly stated that they would be 
willing to improve relations with Cuba if Cuba 
broke her ties with the Soviet Union, if Cuba 
broke her ties with the Socialist camp, if 
Cuba stopped supporting the revolutionary move-
ment. In a nutshell, Nixon wants Cuba to kneel, 
to become neutralized, to furl her revolutionary 
banners .... 
... We will not give in one iota in this 
respect. This is our position .... 
Nixon's the one who has to do something. 
He's got to put an end to his gendarme policy, 
his acts of aggression and his intervention 
against Latin America, his war against Vietnam 
and his blockade of Cuba and get his Naval 
base out of our territory. And all this with 
no strings attached. 
The Yankees didn't talk things over with 
us when they organized the blockade and the 
invasion against our country. Therefore, we 
have nothing to talk about with Nixon.29 
Castro's dislike for Nixon goes at least as far back 
as his trip to the United States the last two weeks of 
April, 1959. Eighteen years later, Castro told Barbara 
Walters in an interview reported in Granma July 24, 1977, 
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that after an interview with him, Nixon--in May, 1959--
begged Eisenhower to intervene in Cuba. At that time, on 
May 17, 1959, Castro enacted the Agrarian Reform Law to 
break up holdings of American companies. Castro said in 
a speech reported May 26, 1974, about the law: 
And it was the Agrarian Reform Law that 
made the imperialists decide to set right about 
organizing the invasion of Giron; it was that 
law that made them decide to do it. It was the 
Agrarian Reform Law that made the imperialists 
decide to take away our sugar quota from us, to 
take the oil away from us and to set up the 
economic blockade of Cuba. This law, whose 15th 
anniversary we are now celebrating, was the law 
that brought imperialism into direct confronta-
tion with Cuba,30 
A year after rejecting any idea of talks with the 
United States, Castro again presented his non-negotiable 
demands. In a statement reported in the May 13, 1973, 
issue, he said: 
We clearly state that we won't discuss.any-
thing with the United States as long as the blockade 
exists. And if, someday, it wants to discuss 
things with us, it'll first have to end the 
blockade unconditionally. There will be no 
improvement in the relations between Cuba and 
the United States as long as the United States 
keeps trying to impose its sovereignty over 
Latin America, as long as it keeps trying to play 
the role of gendarme over our sister nations in 
this part of the world. That, to us, is the main 
problem.31 
In the same speech--after talking ab~ut the uselessness of 
the Organization of American States as long as the United 
States is a member and about the imperialistic intentions 
of the United States toward Cuba from the beginning of the 
19th century--he discussed the issue of Guantanamo. Asked 
if an earlier speech indicated any relaxation on the issue 
of Guantanamo, he stated: 
What we were trying to say was that, in our 
opinion, the Guantanamo Base wasn 1 t the main 
thing. Not being the main thirii doesn't mean 
that we will give up reclaiming it, however--
not by a long shot. Regardless of the situation, 
we will always demand the return of that part of 
our t~rritory which was seized by force.32 
The issue of Vietnam poisoned relationships between 
Cuba and the United States. for years, moreso than these 
relationships would have been damaged otherwise. Even 
after the United States had extracted itself from the 
war, it was on Castro's mind, as this comment published 
April 7, 1974, indicates: 
Imperialism arrived in Vietnam in an arro-
g an t , ' b o as t. f u 1 and ha ugh t y man n e r , f e e 1 in g 
itself to be superior to all and everything, and 
it left defeated and demoralized with an 
unforgettable lesson. 
Through their heroic st~uggle, the Vietnamese 
bound the claws of the imperialists. They pre-
vented imperialism from committing crimes in many 
other parts of the world. We Cubans noticed that 
as the imperialists got bogged down up to their 
necks in Vie·tnam, the provocation ai the Guantanamo 
base fell off, as did the. crimes and other acts of 
aggression against our country.33 
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Conditions did not impr6ve much a~ter the end of the war, 
if Castro's language is any indication. In a speech 
reported December 1, 1974, Castro continued to pre~ent a 
hard line, even though he suggested the possibility of 
talks: 
And for how long will imperialism remain 
our enemy? As long as imperialism exists: Our 
relations with the imperialist Government of the 
United States are anything but good. But even 
if one day there should be economic and even 
diplomatic relations between us, that wouldn't 
give us the right to weaken our defense, because 
our defense can never depend on the imperialists' 
good faith.34 
Other events were intervening to keep animosities high, 
among them Cuban troops in Africa. Cuban actions in 
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Africa had a long-lasting effect on Cuba's relations witb 
the United States, as a speech reported January 11, 1976, 
indicates: 
While this [First Party] Congress was being 
held, the President of the United States declared 
that, as a result of our aid to the sister people 
of Angola, any prospects or hopes or possibilities 
of improving relations between the United States 
and Cuba were--more or less--cancelled. 
(I)f we must renounce this country's 
principles in order to have relations with the 
United States, how can we possibly have relations 
with the United States? 
Apparently, according to the mentality of 
the United States leaders, the price for im-
proving relations, or for having trade or economic 
relations is to give up the principles of the 
Revolution. And we shall never renounce our 
solidarity with Puerto Rico.35 
Later in the same speech he once again put the blame on 
the United States: 
It is not we who are obstinately opposed to 
having normal relations. But if capitalism, 
mighty and authoritarian, doesn't want anything 
to do with us, not even speak with or look at 
this small nation, then we'll wait until capitalism 
is wiped out in the United States.36 
It was not long until Castro became more optimistic 
about improved relations with the Unfted States. In an 
interview published May 22, 1977, he gave a rundown of 
the attitudes of previous presidents concerning Cuba and 
gave the new president something different--praise: 
President Carter is the first president in 
more than 16 years who hasn't committed himself 
to a policy of hostility against Cuba. Kennedy 
inherited Eisenhower's policy of premediated 
aggression, and, when Kennedy was killed, John-
son, who was involved in the Vietnam war, main-
tained that same policy. As for Nixon--who was 
vice-president in Eisenhower's administration--
his complicity in the preparations for the 1961 
attack on Cuba and his close ties with the 
counterrevolutionaries and several wealthy 
Cuban-born families in the United States made 
him a prisoner of the same policy of hostility. 
As far as the Ford-Kissinger administration is 
concerned, it should be pointed out that the 
latter felt very irritated with and hostile 
toward Cuba, especially when Cuba assumed her 
internationalist duty of giving concrete support 
to the Angolan people in their struggle against 
the racists and imperialist aggressors. Thus, 
the U.S. economic blockade of Cuba has been 
maintained, unchanged, for 16 years. 
I was saying that Carter hasn't committed 
himself to t,his policy, but we might add that he 
has taken a number of steps, namely: 1. his 
public declarations in favor of discussions 
with Cuba, 2. the declarations made by U.S. 
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to the effect 
that the United States was ready to hold 
talks with Cuba without setting any previous 
conditions and 3. the authorization granted U.S. 
citizens to visit Cuba (the prohibition of such 
visits has been constantly renewed and maintained 
throughout the last few years). 
I might add two more things here: we have 
noted that, since Carter's inauguration as presi-
dent, there have been no more flights by U.S. 
spy planes over our territory, and we have also 
discussed the setting of fishing rights within 
the 200-mile limit. 
We haven't renewed the agreement on aircraft 
hijacking with the United States, because, after 
the sabotaging of the Cuban plane, we said that 
we were willing to discuss the matter with the 
United States only on the basis of its com-
pletely abandoning its policy of hostility 
against Cuba--and its economic blockade of Cuba 
is a very serious act of hostility .... Partial 
lifting isn't enough. The United States has 
trade with China, with the USSR and with the 
other socialist countries. Why, then, all this 
arbitrary discrimination against us? Now then, 
I repeat, fishing rights are the only things 
being discussed between us,,,,37 
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Castro also discussed the first contact with the 
United States, at the end of the Nixon administration: 
Two years ago, the U.S. authorities sought 
to get in contact with us. This was after Nixon 
had resigned. Such contacts were established and 
served to show them that we weren't ready to 
hold talks as long as the blockade was in effect. 
These contacts were limited to this. Nothing more. 
We still maintain this position, and I'd like to 
tell you why. There's a basic reason for this. 
We haven't imposed any blockade against the United 
States. We don't practice subversion and 
espionage in the United States. This is why we 
believe that it is necessary for the economic 
blockade to be lifted before any talks can be held. 
We believe that this is a very just position--
contacts, not talks. 
This means that we're ready to discuss our 
problems as soon as the blockade is lifted. Let 
me say one more thing here: I don't think that 
the problem of the contradictions that exist 
between socialism and capitalism is going to be 
so 1 ved throU:-gh war, because we' re not living in 
the age of the bow and arrow; this is a nuclear 
world, and a war could wipe out the whole world. 
One way or another, nations with different social 
regimes will have to learn to live with one 
another.38 
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Journalist Barbara Walters asked Castro in an interview 
reported in the July 17, 1977, issue when there would be 
normal relations between Cuba and the United States. He 
said: 
I can say for certainty that, for our part, 
we are willing to work in that direction and that 
we will be responsive to the United States' will 
in that respect. However, even from an optimistic 
standpoint, I don't think that relations will be 
reestablished in the near future; in fact, not 
even in Carter's present term of office. Maybe in 
the second, between 1980 and 1984--or perhaps even 
later. I believe Carter himself would have to 
remove internal obstacles in order to change his 
policy.39 
About lifting the embargo, Castro stated: 
I think that it would be a decisive step. 
Then we could sit down, on an equal footing, to 
discuss the differences between the United States 
and us .... 
We consider the economic blockade as a serious 
act of hostility against our country, one that 
encourages terrorism. You blockade Cuba. Why? 
I realize that we should think about 
what kind of gestures we can make--things that it 
is in our power to do .... 40 
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Castro went into even more detail about his desire to trade: 
This is what I think: the United States' 
policy of hostility toward Cuba is its worst 
policy. I am convinced that, in regard to Cuba, 
a policy of normal relations and a trade policy 
would be much more intelligent. I won't say ... 
that we are going to change our way of thinking, 
our ideology or our political principles .... 
However, experience--even our own--shows 
that, when economic ties are established between 
two countries, any responsible government, any 
government ;hat is really concerned about its 
people, takes those economic ties and interests 
into account and, in one way or another, these 
ties and interests have a certain bearing on the 
attitude taken by governments ... ,41 
In spite of Castro's apparent desire for better rela-
tions with the United States, he continued his attacks on 
the country in his speeches. In the Walters interview, 
the American journalist asked Castro about the response given 
by his audiences when he attacked the United States--"hit 
the Yankees hard." Castro responded: 
An old slogan that has persisted for all these 
years .... [T]he United States acts as an enemy of 
Cuba and the United States maintains a severe 
economic blockade. They know this. These are 
slogans. Often, in many public meetings, these 
are slogans that catch on and then are repeated . 
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In a portion of the Walters interview published July 24, 
1977, Castro stated his friendship with Americans: 
I want to tell them clearly. l feel the best 
wishes for the people of the United States. Every 
time when I know a new American, I always have a 
reason to try to understand your people. And I 
think that every time I find, too, that the 
Americans, the newsmen, the workers, the techni-
cians, are wonderful people. Really, I appreciate 
and admire the people of the United States for 
what they have achieved ...• I hope in the future 
we will understand each other better and we will 
be friends.43 
Such comments appear to reflect a conciliatory mood. 
It appears that at that time Castro wanted normalization of 
relations. Did the same barriers remain? Castro said they 
did, but he was optimistic for improvement in relations. 
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In a press conference reported January 1, 1978, he went into 
detail not just on the problems that separated the United 
States and Cuba, but also the prospects for some type of 
agreement: 
How are our relations with the United States 
coming along? Well, they're progressing somewhat. 
Naturally, first of all, imperialism has been dealt 
a great number of blows of all kinds, such as 
Vietnam, Watergate and others. Its economic 
blockade and its attacks against us have been dis-
credited and are untenable before the eyes of the 
world. The imperialists have no moral basis from 
which to defend that kind of policy against us. 
Truthfully speaking, we've emerged victorious 
from this struggle .... There's a new administra-
tion in power. As we've said before, there've 
been some positive gestures. It was not 
characterized by a hostile policy toward our 
country, it didn't commit itself during the 
electoral campaign to follow an aggressive policy 
against Cuba. It has made some gestures, and we, 
on our part, have made some small gestures as 
well. Ourshave been small gestures, for what other 
kind can we make?44 
Castro then mentioned discussions being held on halting 
marijuana trafficking, settling the 200-mile boundary 
question, allowing tourists into Cuba, and establishing the 
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United States Interests Office. Castro added his concerns: 
But let's look at the essentials; what's the 
essential thing? The blockade. The blockade is 
still on. What's immoral about the United States' 
policy is that they're trying to use the blockade 
as a weapon for negotiation to deal with us .... 
(T)hey want to use the blockade as a weapon 
for negotiation: I hold you in a strangle hold 
and we talk; one of us is in a strangle hold and 
the two of us are talking. That's profoundly 
immoral on the part of the United State~ govern-
ment. 
We are ready to acknowledge the losses sus-
tained by their corporations if they acknowledge 
damages to Cuba .... 45 
Castro added something new--repayment to U.S. corporations. 
He also restated the other issues. About Puerto Rico, he 
said, "We're not promoting violence in Puerto Rico." About 
troops in Africa, .. he said, "We have made it very clear to 
them that Cuba's solidarity with the African people is not 
negotiable." About South America, he stated: "They used 
to talk about Latin America being subverted, but they no 
longer talk about that. 11 46 
In the same press conference Castro again defended. his 
position of not bending on his matters of principle: 
This doesn't mean at all that we reject the 
possibility -0f improving the relations betwe~n 
Cuba and the United States, for us this is 
based on a matter of principle as we sincerely 
believe that the efforts of everybody are required 
to bring about international detente and peace ... , 
This means that whenever th~reis a possi-
bility for improvement we're simply following 
a principle when we think we should go to work 
on that connection. But apparently the United 
States government doesn't understand that,,,, 
Decisive are our relations with the 
Socialist community and the USSR, these are 
indeed decisive! And these relations could never 
be replaced by relations with the United States 
because the nature of imperialism prevents it . 
••. What moral basis can the United States have 
to speak about Cuban troops in Africa? What 
moral basis can a country have whose troops are 
on every continent ... ? 
If we're going to talk about troops stationed 
where they shouldn't be, and that indeed has a 
lot to do with the bilateral relations between 
Cuba and the United States, the only troops that 
should be talked about are those now stationed 
at the Guantanamo Naval base. It's the only 
point regarding troops in other countries we can 
talk about. 
It's all right for the imperialists to 
have troops and advisers everywhere in the world, 
but we can't have them anywhere .... 47 
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The continuing problem of Cuban troops in Africa wor-
sened again in the summer of 1978 after a Carter attack on 
Castro concerning Cuban military activity there. Castro 
said that Carter misunderstood the situation. Castro dis-
cussed the matter in a statement published June 25, 1978: 
I'm not questioning President Carter's pres-
tige and I'm not questioning his honesty. On 
other occasions I said, as I believe, that Presi-
dent Carter is a personally honest man and that 
he has his ethics, which spring from his religious 
beliefs. I have said so publicly and I don't mind 
saying so, because one thing has nothing to do 
with the other; but this does not rule out the 
possibility of his being deceived .... I don't 
think Carter is lying deliberately. I say this 
with all sincerity. He simply believes the infor-
mation he was given.48 
Castro was not so understanding two months later, however. 
In a statement published August 6, 1978, he stated: 
Every U.S. ruler has his ow~ rhetorical phrase 
for Latin America or the world; one spoke of a 
'Good Neighbor Policy'; another, of the 'Alliance 
for Progress.' Now the watchword is human rights. 
Nothing has changed in U.S. policy toward the 
hemisphere and the world; everything is just the 
same; gunboat and dollar diplomacy, the law of 
the might, has always prevailed. The phraseology 
is just as fleeting as the administrations. The 
only content in the Yankees' policy is the pro-
pensity to lie.49 
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That statement indicated a severe worsening of conditions 
between the two countries. However, some progress in the 
other direction was evident again with Castro's release of 
political prisoners on December 8, 1978. Castro talked 
about the planned release in the September 17, 1978, edition: 
The Government of the United States might 
have had some indirect influences on this, but 
not due to its verbal human rights policy, but 
rather because there's no question this admin-
istration put an end to the policy of support-
ing terrorist activities against Cuba, 
terrorist and counter-revolutionary activities 
regarding Cuba. And that policy created the 
conditions enabling us to take some of these 
steps . 
... The blockade and other hostile acts 
continue, but we cannot say that at present the 
government of the United States is giving its 
support to terrorism or to armed counter-revolu-
tionary activities against Cuba. And I believe 
this has had some influence.SO 
In a press conference reported in the December 3, 1978, 
issue, Castro was asked what he considered "the most basic, 
the minimum, the essential factor for there to be very 
serious dialogue between Cuba and the United States.'' He 
answered as he had answered before: 
What's essential is the lifting of the block-
ade, because the economic blockade is like a 
knife at Cuba's throat and under such conditions 
there can be no really fruitful negotations 
between the two countries .•. ,51 
Despite the release of the prisoners, relations appeared to 
be as bad as they had been at any time so far during the 
Carter term. In a press conference held December 9, 1978, 
and reported December 17, Castro again was asked what he 
thought of the Carter administration. He responded: 
97 
•.. I must say that, in our opinion, the 
Carter administration was the best to come along so 
far with regard to Cuba--so far, but this has started 
to change. 
There are two important things: one of them, 
when the problem of Saba occurred, and they led 
Carter on a wild goose chase, fooled him and led him 
to making false charges against .Cuba .•.. Another 
problem, when the United States unilaterally declared 
their 200-mile preferential waters, we had histori-
cally fished in those waters .... They imposed such 
requirements and conditions that it proved absolutely 
impossible to fish there. 
Now there is this irritating violation of our 
airspa~e with the SR-71. Very serious and grave 
things have happened.52 
Furtherimprovements in relations were not possible in 
1979 because of another "misunderstanding." It was the inci-
dent of the "Red Brigade." In that incident Carter charged 
that Soviet troo~s had been stationed iri Cuba recently. 
Castro replied to the charges in a press conference 
September 28, 1979, that was reported in the October 7 
edition. 
What you call a brigade and we call a train-
ing center has been in Cuba for 17 years. That 
miLitary installation was set up at the end of the 
1962 October Crisis, within the spirit of the 
October agr~ement of that year .... 
•.• I think Carter's actions on this problem 
have been dishonest, insincere, immoral, and that 
he has been fooling world public opinion and U.S. 
public opinion .... 
(I)n the first place there has been 
absolutely no change in the functions or the size 
of the installation .... 53 
Though it continued to affect United States-Cuban relations, 
the issue soon died down in the United States when Carter 
discovered that the troops had been there for years, just 
as Castro had claimed. In a speech March 8, 1980, Castro 
brought up the incident again. In the speech, published 
March 16, Castro stated that: 
... they started a campaign and mounted a big 
scandal around this issue to justify their hos-
tile policy toward Cuba, to combat Cuba's influ-
ence and also to justify interventionist moves 
in the area and to delay the ratification of 
SALT II. 
After that they renewed their spy flights 
over our country; they organized some landings 
in Guantanamo Bay .... 54 
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Elsewhere in the March 8 speech Castro commented upon 
the state of United States-Cuban relations: 
In the last few weeks, the international 
situation has become worse. There has been a 
significant step backward in the gains made in 
halting the arms race, promoting international 
detente and the search for peace as a result of 
imperialist policy, of the actions of the most 
reactionary imperialist elements that have made 
the situation worse as of a few months ago.SS 
Those comments came less than three months after Castro's 
speech on the 20th anniversary of the Cuban revolution in 
which he once again indicated his willingness for talks. 
In that speech, published January 14, 1980, Castro had said: 
Cuba is not opposed to trade or even normal 
diplomatic relations with the United States. We 
sincerely believe in the need for peace and co-
existence between different social regimes, 
but it does not imply the imperialists' 'right' 
to intervene in and repress revolutionary move-
ments of any country in the world .... 
The very fact that the United States trades 
with the vast majority of the other socialist 
countries while trying to maintain this measure 
[blockade] constitutes a deeppolitical immorality, 
resounding proof of its scorn for the right to 
self-determination of the peoples of this 
h · h 56 emisp ere .... 
What Castro saw as a U.S. military build-up was another 
topic of the speech published March 16. He noted that the 
United States was building more military bases, stationing 
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naval squadrons in the Indian Ocean, planning to send 
missiles to Europe, intervening in Afghanistan, increasing 
the military budget. Castro seemed fearful of an American 
attack on Cuba. A comment by a Carter adviser that he 
took as a threat of such an attack produced the following 
Castro response: 
It was a clear threat to our country, imply-
ing that if conflict broke out in the Persian Gulf 
they would respond by attacking us .... 
The United States' plans for intervention 
everywhere but especially in this area are evident, 
in the Caribbean and Central America. They are 
planning to intervene in Grenada, Nicaragua, El 
Salvador, the Caribbean and Central America. 
Their plans for intervention to contain the revo-
lutionary movement are clear ...• 
We are not following a deliberate head-on 
policy as regards the United States. We're not 
even reluc~ant to talk; we are not against making 
any effort to improve relations, if this would in 
any way help bring about a climate of peace in 
this hemisphere or in the international arena.57 
Castro continued to accuse the United States of not 
trying to improve relations. In a speech given May 1, 1980, 
and published May 11, Castro stated: 
We are not to blame for the lack of a cli-
mate of peace in the Caribbean; they are. Let 
them lift their blockade, dismantle their base 
at Guantanamo, stop making flights over Cuba, 
respect Nicaragua and respect Grenada. If, in 
addition, they stop interfering in the inter-
national affairs of other peoples of Latin 
America~ then it might be possible to create 
a climate for peace and detente .... 58 
Even though Castro now saw Carter as not being interested 
in improvement of relations, the alternative to Carter did 
not seem any better. Even before the election, Castro had 
strong words for Reagan and his hard-line policy. In an 
interview given July 26 and published August 3, 1980, 
Castro commented that the Republican 
... platform must be denounced and world opinion 
has to be aware of this .... (W)e don't care who 
becomes the President of the United States; 
But we are interested in a situation that derives 
from the existence of a U.S. party platform that 
threatens the world with war .... 59 
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Castro continued to say that the blockade of Cuba was 
the major hurdle to overcome. In an article published 
November 30, 1980, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, vice president 
of the councils of State and of Ministers, reaffirmed: 
"Cuba stands firm in its principle that the blockade has 
to be eliminated for there to be official talks with the 
United States. 11 60 Castro said in an article published 
December 28, 1980, that Cuba would stand firm on its 
principles: 
On occasion, the imperialists speak condes-
cendingly about their being willing to lift the 
blockade, willing to spare our lives, if we 
stopped being internationalists, if we withdrew 
our fighters from Angola and Ethopia, if we 
severed our close ties with the Soviet Union. 
Needless to say, for us it is neither a pleasure 
nor a whim to have thousands of our fighters in 
other lands. However, the day that we call back 
a single man--a single one--it will be because 
he's no longer needed or because of an agreement 
between the governments of those countries and us, 
but never as a concession to imperialism! And 
our ties with the Soviet Union will never be broken. 
Never .... 
What right does the United Jtates have to 
tell us who our friends should be? 
So they threaten us with maintaining the 
economic blockade? Let them maintain it for 
100 years if they want to .. ,,61 
Castro continued the same theme in a speech about the 
president-elect published December 28, 1980. He stated: 
Needless to say, we have made it clear to 
Mr. Reagan that we're not afraid of his threats. 
If there's something we dislike very much, it's 
being threatened by anyone. We don't like anyone 
trying to intimidate us .... 62 
In a report to the Second Congress reported in the same 
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issue, Castro made further statements about the implications 
of a Reagan presidency, noting that 
... Reagan's electoral triumph is a right-wing 
victory that signifies a clear move in that direc-
tion by an important sector of U.S. public opinion . 
.. . The apparent national backing that the elec-
tion returns give Reagan opens up the possibility 
that he may throw caution to the wind and return 
to his earlier aggressiveness in supporting the 
most reactionary plans in the Republican Party 
platform.63 
The problems inherent in a Reagan presidency were presented 
in a speech by Castro to the National Assembly of the People's 
Power reported January 11, 1981: 
We're facing a really exceptional period. 
The change in the U.S. administration unques-
tionably implies .risks for our country, risks 
of all types; the risk that the blockade will be 
tightened, the risk implied by CIA activities, 
the risk that the hostility and counter-revolu-
tionary activities against Cuba will be stepped 
up, the risk of sabotage .... 
This doesn't mean we're bent on looking for 
confrontation, but rather that we're analyzing 
from a realistic situation and that we consider 
it a basic duty to be prepared for them.64 
Castro was moreconciliatory in a speech reported 
February 1, 1981, in which he stated: 
... We wish to maintain the most friendly 
relations with the United States. We don't want 
any conflict to develop between Cuba and the 
United States that can't be solved through reason 
and the rights of nations ... ,65 
He continued on a conciliatory note but still firm in his 
principles in a speech made April 16 and reported April 26: 
Our ideas are very clear, our convictions 
are very deep, our decisions are very resolute; 
we don't want war, we are not in the habit of 
provoking conflicts and we don't want to do so, 
but they should beware of provoking us .. 66 
He was tougher in a speech reported April 23, evidently 
in response to concerns that'he had appeared weak in the 
earlier speech, Castro stated that 
..• we said on April 16 that we're not in favor 
of creating conflicts or tensions, but we also 
warned the United States that it was making a 
big mistake if it insisted on renewing its clumsy, 
archaic policy on Cuba, if it thought that its 
differences with Cuba could be solved through 
threats and aggression .... 67 . 
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Castro's concerns about Reagan were evident again that 
fall when he expressed his thought that the administration 
had swung too f~~ to the right. In a speech published 
September 27, he differentiated between the U.S. system and 
its current administration. He stated: 
The U.S. system is not fascist, but I am deep-
ly convinced that the group which constitutes the 
main core of the ~urrent U.S. administrat~on is 
~ascist; its thinking is fascist; its arrogant 
rejection of every human rights policy is fascist; 
its foreign policy is fascist, etc . 
•.. Our hopes are founded on the certainty 
that fascism can succeed neither in the United 
States nor in the world, although it is true that, 
at present, a fascist leadership has established 
itself in the United States on the basis of a 
structure of an imperialist, bourgeois democracy.68 
Elsewhere in the speech, he was even'more forceful against 
the U.S. leaders: 
Since the days prior to the Munich Pact 
international forums have not rung with such 
unpolitic and threatening words as those U.S. 
leaders now repeat ... ~69 
That Castro felt that not only threatening words but 
physical thieats had increased was evident elsewhere in 
the speech published November 1, 1981, in which Castro 
charged: 
The imperialists have illusions and they have 
stepped up their economic blockage against Cuba, 
obstructing our economic activity and credits, 
They have Stepped up their espionage activity in 
our country and else~here, their contacts and 
efforts to bring about the dissertion of diplo-
matic personnel and techn~cians; in short, they 
have stepped u~ ~heir activity, their subver-
sion activity. 0 
Charges by U.S. columnists Robert Novak and Rowland 
Evans in an article they wrote October 19 stating that 
Cuba had sent between 500 and 600 troops to Nicaragua 
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brought a respoi~e from Castro. His reaction was printed 
November 8, 1981. The Granma article.noted: 
Fidel made it clear on October 24 that the 
article hadn't appeared by chance and that it 
was a result of new tactics employed by the 
Government of the United States, which had been 
placed in an embarrassing position by Cuba's 
vigorous rebuttals of i series of false state-
ments made by some U.S. Government spokesmen, 
who, naturally, had no evidence to back them up, 
and was blatantly manipulating the U.S. press to 
spread these statements about. He also stressed 
that the imperialists' purpose was evidently to 
justify their intervention in El Salvador and 
their crass threats and aggressive measures 
against Cuba.71 
That Castro perceived the United States might attack was 
even more apparent in a speech published Apr}l 18, 1982. 
He still said that he was willing to negotiate despite 
the threats: 
Faced by the threats of aggression we have 
taken many measures and made many plans; for 
example, on the most efficient way to resist a 
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total blockade of the country .•.. We have 
increased our defensive potential to the utmost, 
as was our duty; we have been doing so since last 
year, since they began threatening us, ... 
(W)e do not refuse dialogue, discussion 
or negotiations.72 
Conditions did not improve after that, however. One 
of the strongest statements against the United States was 
in an editorial published November 21, 1982, in reference 
to a statement by U.S. officials that four top Cuban 
officials were involved in drug trafficking between the 
United States and Columbia: 
For the last 24 years the Yankee imperialists 
have been inventing all sorts of lies and slander 
against Cuba, but never before have they made such 
a ridiculous claim or resorted to such wretched 
and cow~rdly tactics. 
Apparently the current U.S. administration's 
unique combination of lies, insolence and total 
hatred for our country is required for some senile 
brain to think up the idea of implicating Cuba in 
the international drug traffic. 
The Reagan administration and the .CIA are 
clearly behind this campaign, carried out by the 
reactionary press of the hemisphere for more than 
a year.73 . 
The ferocity of the attacks increased, however. A Granma 
editorial printed May 28, 1983, stated: 
Since that day in 1962 when another U.S. 
president was presented with what was not 
exactly the Cuban flag of glory by the defeated 
invaders of Playa Giron, promising to return it 
to them in Havana, the White House has perhaps 
never stooped to such ridiculous and simplistic 
levels as in this speech given by Ronald Reagan 
on May 20 .... 74 
In spite of his feelings about Reagan, Castro said 
he continued to have good feelings for the American 
people. In an interview with an unnamed U.S. journalist 
published August 14, 1983, Castro commented: 
If I have anything to say to the American 
people, it is that I imagine they've received a 
lot of information about our country, and I can 
say that our feeling toward the U.S. people, 
in spite of the problems we've had with the U.S. 
administrations, has always been one of respect 
and admiration. Actually, I make a distinction 
between the U.S. people and the administration, 
These are my feelings toward the U.S. people. 
I admire the U.S. people And I sin-
cerely wish one day circumstances can change and 
we can have broader coritacts with the people of 
the United States. We're neighbors; we're very 
much obligated to be friends, even if there's a 
~ocialist system and a capitalist system. I 
believe that the Latin American peoples and the 
U.S. people have to live in conditions of equali-
ty, respect and friendship on the same continent 
I was saying that if we were enemies of the 
United States we would be wishing that a conflict 
break out between the United States and Latin 
America. Really we do not wish this to happen 
75 
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In case friendship did not work, Castro in the same inter-
view stressed again Cuban preparedness for war: 
We're prepared to resist a military blockade. 
We're prepared to resist attacks and if they 
should choose to wage a war of attrition and 
bombing we're prepared for the worst, which would 
be an invasion of the country. We're even pre-
pared to fight if the country should be occupied 
We're prepared for that, not because we're 
braver than anybody else but because we've.been 
forced to by threats coming from the United 
States itself, especially from Reagan .... We're 
prepared for all eventualities; we have no choice. 
And I'm being serious, I'm sayi~g these things 
because I'm convinced of them.76 
Castro was still talking about a possible attack in 
an interview with a French journalist published 
August 21, 1983. Castro seemed to have perceived that his 
conciliatory tone may have been taken for weakness by 
Reagan. He stated: 
And it's too bad that the United States 
government feels our statements respond to its 
policy of force. Following that course, it may 
arrive at the conclusion at some time that it 
is completely mistaken, that revolutionaries don't 
give up or surrender to a policy of force .... 77 
The policy of force materialized in an attack, but not 
against Cuba itself. The attack came instead against 
Cubans on the island of Grenada. 
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Cuba and Grenada has had strong ties since the takeover 
by Maurice Bishop on March 13, 1979. An article published 
in Granma July 3, 1983, noted that the first group of 33 
Cubans arrived to start building the intercontinental 
airport there on December 6, 1979. An article on July 12, 
1981, had noted that Grenadians had been purchasing Inter-
national Airport Bonds to help finance the project and that 
financial assistance had come from Cuba, Syria, Libya, 
Iraq, Algeria, and Venezuela. It noted that 250 Cuban 
workers had joined 300 Grenadians working on the project. 
It stated, "The airport will bring night landing facilities 
to Grenada for the first time, and represents a vital link 
for tourism and trade. 11 78 United States opposition to the 
project was noted at that time by Bishop, who stated in a 
Granma interview that 
in the recent airport struggle we had to fight 
when the Americans tried to block our funding. 
possibilities from the European Economic Com-
munity. Our approach was to update the people 
fully on exactly what was happening, to give 
our appreciation of why America was seeking to 
block the construction of even one international 
airport in our country .. ,,79 
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Granma featured a lengthy article on Cuban construction 
projects in its February 27, 1983, issue, and there was a 
photo of the Grenada airport. The caption read: "The con-
struction of an international airport in Grenada called for 
a complex piece of engineering, including cutting down on 
the size of a mountain and draining and filling a bay. 11 80 
Granma reported on July 3, 1983, that as of late June the 
filling of the bay had been finished and a fourth layer of 
asphalt had been applied.Bl The attention that the 
United States started giving the airport in mid-1983 led 
Castro to speak out on the matter in the edition of August 
14. In the article he said: 
At a piess conference the other day they 
showed a picture of Grenada's airport. This is 
the height of absurdity as if they had discovered 
some mysterious thing .... 
It's U.S. citizens who will benefit from the 
airport .... Anyway they want to make the U.S. 
people believe that that airport, which is going 
to be used precisely by U.S. citizens, is a threat 
to U.S. security!82 
The events in Grenada surrounding Bishop's death 
caused alarm among Cuban leaders. A statement by the Party 
and Revolutionary Government released October 20 and printed 
in Granma on October 30 noted: 
No doctrine, no principle or proclaimed 
r evo 1 u t ionary posit ion and no in'terna 1 di vis ion 
can justify atrocious acts such as the physical 
elimination of Bishop and the prominent group 
of honest and worthy leaders who died yesterday. 
The death of Bishop and his comrades must 
be cleared up. If they were executed in cold 
blood, the guilty should receive exemplary 
punishment. 
Now imperialism will try to use this tragedy 
and the serious mistakes made by the Grenadian 
revolutionaries to sweep away the revolutionary 
process in Grenada and place the country under 
imperial and neocolonialist rule once again.83 
Before the statement was printed in Granma, U.S. troops 
invaded the island October 25. A statement by the party 
and government published in the same issue read: 
A large-scale Yankee aggression against us 
can take place at any moment in Grenada against 
our cooperation workers: in Nicaragua against 
our doctors, teachers, technicians, construction 
workers, etc.; in Angola against our troops, 
civilian personnel and others, or even in Cuba 
itself. We must always be ready and keep our 
morale high in the face of these painful possi-
bilities .... 84 
The article then quoted Castro: 
I believe that in the face of this new 
situation, we must strengthen our defense, keeping 
in ~ind th~ possibility of a surprise attack by 
the Yankees. The existing danger fully justifies 
our doing so. If the United States intervenes, 
we must vigorously defend ourselves as if we were 
in Cuba.BS 
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In a press conference October 26 with foreign, including 
American, journalists, Castro did not speak of how the 
attack would affect future U.S.-Cuban relations. He did 
say that Reagan used American medical school students 
studying in Grenada as a pretext for the attack: 
There was no pretext for attacking us. We 
were even at our work posts. What could the 
United States gain in the world by attacking 
the Cuban workers there, who we~e helping a 
tiny Third World country? What could it gain? 
All it could do was to turn a tiny country into 
a martyr ... ,86 
The Castro press conference was report~d in Granma 
November 6 (Figure 4). November 20 Granma reported a speech 
C.s.stro made at a rally in which he refuted the "19 lies" 
II . 
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the United States government had told about the invasion 
(Figure 5}. He compared the attack to the Japanese surprise 
attack on Pearl Harbor and the Nazi invasion of its neigh-
bors before the start of World War II. He also noted that 
the CIA may have been involved in the murder of Bishop and 
in fomenting the turmoil that led up to the invasion. He 
said again that the U.S. government was looking for an 
excuse to invade: 
The U.S. government looked down on Grenada 
and hated Bishop. It wanted to destroy Grenada's 
process and obliterate its example. It had even 
prepared military plans for invading the island 
--as Bishop had charged nearly two years ago--
but it lacked a pretext . 
..• Reagan wants to make corpses of all 
our people~ men, women, the elderly and the 
children; he wants to make corpses of all man-
kind ... 87 
The anger over the invasion was evident into 1984. In 
a speech published January 8, 1984, Castro stated: 
Tension has increased throughout the world 
as a result of the adventuristic, irresponsible 
and warlike policies of the present United States 
administration ... 
The imperialists are mistaken if they think 
they can get concessions from Cuba or bring it to 
its knees through threats and aggression .... 
If, after its sad exploit in Grenada, imperi-
alism thinks we Cubans are weaker, it is blinded 
by stupidity .... 88 
After that speech, however, Castro w~s relatively quiet, 
both in number of speeches and in references to the United 
States, through the first half of 1984. On the occasion 
of the 25th anniversary of the Agrarian Reform Law, the 
enactment of which Castro had said was the turning point 
in United States-Cuban relations, he made only fleeting 
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reference to the United States. In the speech, reported in 
the May 27, 1984, issue, he noted th.at the law was "the 
first really profound measure of the Revolution and, as 
we have said on other occasions, that which pitted us 
directly against U.S. imperialism. 11 89 He then spent the 
rest of the speech talking about the good that had come 
from the law. Castro next spoke on July 26 during the visit 
by Jesse Jackson, at which time he renewed his position 
concerning his willingness for talks. 
What does the record presented by Castro's speeches 
and the pages of Granma show? First, it is apparent that 
Castro has been saying for more than a decade that he is 
open to talks if he does not have to violate his principles. 
His preconditions are that Cuban's foreign policy and its 
links to the socialist system are not negotiable and that 
the embargo against Cuba must be halted. It also is 
apparent that hig foreign policy adventures stood in the 
way of the desired "normalcy." Was his desire for negotia-
tions reflected in his propaganda statements in other ways 
than overt statements? Castro's attitude toward the 
United States appeared less hard-line during the early 
Carter days while, at the same time, his language appeared 
to be stridently anti-American overall. Castro had praise 
for Carter's motives and indicated that some accord would 
have been possible during Carter's first term except for 
potential political consequences for Carter. However, 
later in Carter's term, the situation worsened. 
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The presence of Cuban troops in Africa during the 
period was a point of concern for the United States, 
Maurice Bishop's takeover in Grenada was viewed with alarm 
in Washington, as was Cuba's role in helping Bishop. The 
Panama Canal treaty was one of few events during that time 
that had a positive effect on United States relations with 
Cuba. On the negative side was the conducting of Operation 
Solid Shield by -the United States in the Caribbean at the 
time. The Mariel boatlift began April 23, 1980, and was 
seen by some people at the time as a sign of closer coopera-
tion between the two countries. The refugees were depicted 
in the pages of Granma as degenerates, antisocial elements 
and criminals, ;~ich is what the United States found out 
to be the case in many instances. The problem of dealing 
with those people continued throughout Reagan's first 
term. Carter's reaction to the Red Brigade also caused a 
setback in relations. 
Those major incidents and other lesser ones appeared 
to have cooled the prospects for negotiations and were 
reflected both in articles in Granma and in Castro's 
speeches. Reagan's election in November, 1980, was another 
major concern for Castro. Prospects for accord, then, 
appeared poor during Reagan's tenure with a low point 
coming with the Grenada invasion. The most obvious thing 
the qualitative analysis shows is that every time prospects 
for improved relations looked good or talks were held 
some event took place that set negotiations back. It 
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appeared that principles and non-negotiable demands tended 
to get in the way of any real progress toward normal 
relations. Whether Castro was serious about negotiations, 
or merely was using the long-standing Soviet tactic of 
shifting from conciliation to bluster is not known. 
Whatever the case, Castro continued to talk of negotiations 
at regular intervals. 
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CHAPTER V 
ANALYSIS OF THE DATA--PART II 
Quantitative Content Analysis Methods 
Factor analysis and the chi square test were used to 
interpret the data derived from word counts of selected 
issues of Granma and of all of Castro's speeches over the 
period February 1966 to July 1984. McQuitty's elementary 
linkage was used to compare language usage in various 
years of the study. Linkage can be seen as an index of 
agreement. O, P, Q, and R factor analyses were used in the 
study. 
O and P factor analyses are the reverse of each other. 
In O factor analysis, linkages were sought between the 
various years of the study when comparing categories of 
words. In P factor analysis, linkage was used to determine 
agreement between the categories of symbols when comparing 
the yearly data. Categories were developed through analysis 
of the 100 most-used propaganda symbols referring to the 
United States government or its policies. Words with 
similar roots were collapsed into one entry. The frequency 
of the same 100 words was determined for Castro's speeches, 
and O and P factor analyses were made of those data. Q 
factor analysis was used to determine how clusters of years 
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intercorrelated when compared to categories, and R factor 
analysis was used to determine how the categories inter-
correlated when compared to clusters, the two being the 
reverse of each other. The chi square test was used to-
compare the frequency of the different categories of words 
found in issues of Granma with their frequency in Castro's 
speeches. It also was used to compare the language used 
during the term of Jimmy Carter and the term of Ronald 
Reagan. It was expected that the change in frequency of 
different types of words would be useful in determining 
shifts in policy or, at least, propaganda values. No 
attempt was made to code direction of symbolic language, 
because all symbols were determined to be anti-America. 
Intensity was not measured, because of the lack of utility 
of such a measure and because of the problems inherent in 
scaling words to reflect intensity of feeling. A weak 
scale of intensity was seen as less useful than comparing 
the use of such aggressive words in relation to the other 
categories of words used. 
Counts of the most frequently used words in Granma were 
obtained by a random selection of issues, one per month. The 
page of each particular issue was also selected with a 
table of random numbers. The entire page was used as a 
context unit. If no story of more than three paragraphs 
(a brief) about the United States was found, then another 
page was selected randomly. If on the third attempt no 
mention of the United States was found, the newspaper was 
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scanned until an article about the United States larger than 
a brief was located. If that attempt was unsuccessful, 
another issue was picked randomly, and an attempt was made 
to select a page for study in the same random manner. If 
that was unsuccessful, the paper was then scanned for a story 
concerning the United States. If that was unsuccessful, 
zeros were to be entered. However, that step was never 
necessary. A lengthy attempt was made to locate a mention 
of the United States because the language used was of more 
importance than the frequency of mentions about the United 
States. Such presence or absence of a reference was deter-
mined, however, because it also had a bearing on the type 
of results to bi gained by the study. An average of the 
number of attempts necessary to find a reference was used 
as an index of the frequency of occurrence. 
In analyzing Castro's speeches, each paper during the· 
period under study was scanned for presence of a "major" 
speech by Castro--anything longer than half of a page. 
It was determined that anything less than half a page would 
not provide sufficient material to continue to the next 
step, which was the random selection of one column of that 
speech for analysis. If the randomly selected column had 
no mention of the United States, another column was 
selected randomly. If after the third attempt no mention 
was found, the rest of the speech was scanned until a 
column was found with a reference to the United States, and 
that column was used as the context unit. If nothing 
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was found, a zero was posted. 
Table I lists the 100 most-frequently used U.S. 
referents in Granma during the period. After the 100 words 
were determined, they were grouped into five categories -
or types of words. The five subject categories decided 
upon were: ideological words, aggressive words, organiza-
tions, locations, and people. Each word seemed to the 
researcher to fit into one of these categories. That 
method of placement was undertaken instead of the use of 
judges because the researcher was familiar with the words 
used and the context in which they were found. Even though 
a best-fit was desired, it was at least as important that 
the categories be consistent over the time period studied. 
Table II lists the top 100 words in the categories along 
with the percentage of the category to the total number of 
words counted (9,997). The ideological and aggressive word 
categories appeared to be the most useful in determining 
propaganda values that related to political attitudes. For 
the categories representing organizations, locations and 
people, the categor.ies as such were less useful than the 
individual words used. The frequency of mention of the 
Panama Canal, Guantanamo or the Organization of American 
States over time, for example, would show important changes 
in the focus of policy more than would the specific 
number of mentions in that category. The individual words 
making up the ideological and aggressive word categories 
did not seem as important as the categories themselves. 
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TABLE I 
FREQUENCY OF THE 100 MOST-USED WORDS IN GRANMA 
REFERRING TO THE UNITED STATES 
Word 
United States 
imperialism 
Yankees 
Puerto Rico 
aggression 
CIA 
Reagan 
Nixon 
blacks/Negroes 
OAS 
Panama Canal 
criminal 
Washington 
capitalism 
Carter 
intervention 
monopoly 
Giron/Bay of Pigs 
troops 
N. Rockefeller 
administration 
colonial 
planes 
Johnson 
invasion 
State Department 
Pentagon 
military 
exploitation 
bases 
bomb 
enemy 
blockade 
Haig 
Congress 
attacks 
soldiers 
Navy 
Marines 
companies 
Angela Davis 
White House 
racist 
threat 
Frequency 
3,322 
1,046 
711 
419 
368 
341 
205 
152 
149 
140 
128 
127 
107 
102 
96 
93 
92 
84 
78 
72 
69 
68 
67 
64 
61 
60 
58 
SS 
SS 
52 
49 
49 
47 
46 
42 
39 
39 
38 
36 
34 
34 
34 
33 
32 
Word Frequency 
army 30 
oppression 30 
provocation 29 
murder 28 
Guantanamo Navy Base 28 
Secretary of State 26 
Inter-American Police 
Force 25 
America 25 
embassy 24 
sabotage 24 
bourgeois 24 
bomber 23 
air force 23 
forces 22 
Senate 22 
violent 21 
press 21 
espionage 21 
repression 21 
lies 20 
subversion 20 
Gulf Oil 20 
domination 20 
occupation 20 
kill 19 
advisers 19 
NATO 18 
massacre 18 
genocide 18 
Malcolm X 17 
FBI 16 
ambassador 16 
brutality 16 
savage 15 
ships 15 
House 15 
Ford 15 
annexation 14 
women's rights 14 
reactionary 14 
propaganda 14 
treaty 14 
trusts 14 
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Word Frequency Word Frequency 
cynicism 13 International 
assassination 13 Monetary Fund 10 
Foreign Trade Law 12 Kissinger 10 
hegemony 11 destruction 9 
manuevers 11 warmongers 8 
slander 11 missiles 7 
M.L. King 11 
w. Colby 10 9, 9 9 7 
TABLE II 
TOP-FREQUENCY WORDS IN GRA~MA REFERRING TO THE 
UNITED STATES DISTRIBUTED BY CATEGORIES 
Ideological 
bourgeois 
capitalist 
colonial 
criminal 
cynicism 
enemy 
espionage 
exploitation 
hegemony 
imperialism 
lies 
manuevers 
monopoly 
oppression 
propaganda 
provocation 
racist 
reactionary 
repression 
slander 
subversion 
warmongers 
women's rights 
Total: 1,833 
Aggressive 
aggression 
annexation 
assassination 
attacks 
blockade 
bomb 
bomber 
brutality 
destruction 
domination 
forces 
genocide 
intervention 
invasion 
kill 
massacre 
missile 
murder 
occupation 
planes 
sabotage 
savage 
ships 
soldiers 
threats 
troops 
violent 
Total: 1,175 
Organizations 
administration 
air force 
army 
bases 
CIA 
companies 
Congress 
embassy 
FBI 
Foreign Trade Law 
Gulf Oil 
House 
IMF 
IAPF 
Marines 
military 
NATO 
navy 
OAS 
Pentagon 
press 
Senate 
State Dept. 
treaty 
trusts 
Washington 
White House 
Total: 1,330 
TABLE II (Continued) 
Locations People 
America advisers 
ambassador 
blacks/Negroes 
Carter 
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Kissinger 
Malcolm X 
Nixon 
Reagan 
Panama Canal 
Giron/Bay of Pigs 
Guantanamo Naval Base 
Puerto Rico 
United States 
Total: 4, 006 
W. Colby 
A. Davis 
G. Ford 
Haig 
Johnson 
M.L. King 
Rockefeller 
Secretary of State 
Yankees 
Total: 1,653 
Grand Total: 
The most important variables used in the study, then, 
were the word categoiies and the time at which the words 
were published. As noted above, the primary means for 
analyzing the raw data was factor analysis. The utility of 
O and P factor analyses in a study such as the present one 
was suggested 
1 in a 1965 article by Malcolm S. MacLean Jr. 
Two commonly used types of factor analysis are R, which 
correlates tests of a sample of "people,'' and Q, which com-
pares "people" taking a sample of tests. In both the time 
is held constant. On the other hand, 0 and P factor analy-
ses are useful because time is not held constant. MacLean 
wrote: 
P factor analysis factors tests on a sample 
of times and O analysis factors times on a sample 
of tests, with person held constant. That is, we 
can give only one person a whole battery of tests 
--or a Q sample of items--this week, next week, 
, 2 the week after and so on .... 
9, 9 9 7 
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What MacLean noted about Rand Q factor analyses also 
is applicable to O and P. In the place of "persons," the 
researcher might use 
any units for which we can obtain systematic, 
codable descriptive data. In place of tests, we 
might use statements, test items, concepts, 
pictures, news items--in fact anything of a symbo-
lic nature which might elicit responses of 
theoretical interest to us, any way of describing 
the "person."3 
O and P factor analyses are the main tools for the study 
being undertaken because, as MacLean noted, 
..• P factoring essentially reve~ls clusters of 
similar trend profiles, those variables which go 
up and down together. 
This kind of analysis might well be used in 
the historical study of a person, a community, a 
nation, a magazine, a television network, a 
newspaper. From such analysis of many variables, 
you could construct a few, relatively basic 
factor trend lines. 
Cattell's O factor analysis highlights 
occasions, times or situations in which the pat-
terns of responses to a sample of tests are 
similar. How much is a person like himself from 
one time to another, in terms of the characteris-
tics assessed by the tests?4 
As to the means of analyzing the factor scores, MacLean 
noted: 
In some cases, agreement scores may 
prove more appropriate than correlations; there 
are many different indices of relationship which 
might prove suitable. There are also various 
kinds of factor analysis and various analogs to 
factor analysis--McQuitty's elementary linkage 
analysis, elementary factor analysis, hierarchical 
syndrome analysis, etc .... 5 
The Granma Findings 
Frequency of Symbols 
Table III indicates the overall propaganda symbols 
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by year, and Table IV ranks years by the number of propa-
ganda symbols. The highest number of such symbols came 
during the first four years of the study--1968, 1969, 1967, 
and 1966. The rate of propaganda symbols aimed at the 
United States was the. next highest in 1983, followed by 1977, 
1981, 1984, ·and 1980--all years with a number of mentions 
above the median and, except for 1980, above the mean. The 
year 1982 is the only one among the last five that is not at 
the median or above, and it is fifth from the bottom. 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
TABLE III 
OVERALL PROPAGANDA SYMBOLS PER YEAR IN 
GRANMA REFERRING TO THE UNITED STATES 
671* 1971 371 1976 332 
855 1972 479 1977 585 
941 1973 473 1978 442 
858 1974 362 1979 446 
445 1975 396 1980 507 
*10 1/2 months 
**6 months 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
583 
432 
614 
282** 
1968 
1969 
1967 
1966 
1983 
TABLE IV 
RANKING BY YEAR OF PROPAGANDA SYMBOLS IN 
GRANMA REFERRING TO THE UNITED STATES 
941 1977 585 1973 473 
85 8 1981 583 1979 446 
855 1984 (564)'~ 1970 445 
(767)-Jc 1980 507 1978 442 
614 1972 479 1982 432 
Mean: 550.l Median: 1980 
*Expected yearly frequency 
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1975 396 
1971 371 
1974 362 
1976 332 
Increased mentions mean increased attention, but that 
does not indicate the type of attention. Table V reflects 
the frequency of occurrence. It is an index of the number 
of attempts that were necessary before a page was found 
with sufficient number of mentions of the United States to 
conduct a count. Table VI ranks.years for the frequency 
of occurrence. The list is somewhat different from the list 
of years ranked by the number of propaganda symbols. Only 
two of the years at or above the median made both lists, 
1983 and 1980. The correlation between the frequency of 
occurrence and the frequency of propaganda symbols is 
.3385 (r 2 is .1146), a minimal agreement. That seems to 
suggest that an increase or decrease of symbols does not 
translate into a wider distribution of stories throughout 
the paper but more symbols of the United States per story. 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1976 
1983 
1975 
1980 
1984 
TABLE V 
FREQUENCY BY YEAR OF PROPAGANDA SYMBOLS IN 
GRANMA REFERRING TO THE UNITED STATES 
3.36 1971 2.42 l 97 6 1,75 1981 
2.75 1972 2.42 1977 2. 8 3 1982 
2. 9 2 1973 2. 3 3 1978 2. 9 2 1983 
3.17 1974 2. 9 2 1979 3.33 1984 
3.58 1975 2.00 1980 2.08 
TABLE VI 
RANKING BY FREQUENCY OF OCCURRENCE OF PROPAGANDA 
SYMBOLS IN GRANMA REFERRING TO THE UNITED STATES 
1. 7 5 1973 2. 3 3 1967 2.75 1969 
1. 92 1982 2.42 1977 2. 8 3 1979 
2.00 1971 2.42 1974 2.92 1966 
2.08 1972 2.42 1978 2.92 1970 
2 .1 7 1981 2.50 1968 2.92 
Mean: 2. 6 2 Median: 2.50 
129 
2.50 
2.41 
1. 92 
2.17 
3.17 
3.33 
3. 3 6 
3.58 
No column-inch count of stories about the United States 
was attempted because no acceptable means could be found to 
determine if a particular story was "about the United States" 
or not. Many stories contained references to the United 
States even though the main topic of the article was some 
other country. There were other stories predominantly about 
the United States, which involved social problems and did 
130 
not contain many propaganda symbols. It would have been 
possible to measure the amount of news in various 
categories. The column-inch count of stories, though, 
was not the intention of the study, which concentrated 
only upon propaganda symbols and their relationship to 
each other. 
The Clusters 
The linkage technique in factor analysis is similar 
to that of determining factors themselves. Linkage draws 
out clusters, about which Fred Kerlinger stated: 
A cluster is a subset of a set of "objects"--
persons, tests, concepts, and so on--the members 
of which are more similar or closer to each other 
than they are to members outside the cluster. The 
key question is how to define and identify clusters 
and their members .... 6 
In this study, clusters are groups of years being studied. 
Years falling in the same cluster tend to be alike in the 
respects being investigated--in this case, the percentage 
of category frequencies. One of the analysis techniques 
suggested by both Kerlinger and MacLean is McQuitty's ele-
mentary linkage analysis.7 Clusters were determined in 
this study through linkage of the factor scores in the O 
factor analysis matrix. The O score matrix consists of 
the five categories as the independent variable and the 19 
time frames as the dependent variable. The correlation 
matrix consists of a grid of 19 columns and rows. 
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The linkage analysis drew out five clusters of years. 
Cluster V (Figure 10)--1982 and 1983--has the highest 
average correlation, .9604. Cluster I (Figure 6) has the 
second-highest average correlation of any cluster, .9231. 
It consists of years 1975 through 1980. The years 1979 
and 1977 have the highest correlation of any two years in 
the cluster, ,9989, and are the cluster's reciprocal pair. 
The third most closely related cluster is Cluster III 
(Figure 8) with an average correlation of .9202. It con-
sists of 1966, 1967, and 1974. Its reciprocal pair is 
1966 and 1974 with a correlation of .9742. Cluster IV 
(Figure 9) has the second-lowest correlation for its 
cluster average, .8532. It consists of 1970, 1972, and 
1973, and its reciprocal pair is 1970 and 1973 at .9612. 
The lowest-correlation is for Cluster II (Figure 7), .8183. 
It is composed of 1968, 1969, 1971, 1981 1 and 1984. Its· 
reciprocal pair is 1981 and 1984 with a correlation of 
.9751. The typal representative (the year most like 
the cluster average) for Cluster I is 1980. For Cluster 
II it is 1984, for Cluster III 1974, for Cluster IV 1970, 
and for Cluster V both 1983 and 1984, 
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75 76 77 78 79 80 
75 .8509 .9729 .9772 .9698 .9888 
76 .8509 .7597 .7756 .7733 .8377 
77 .9729 .7597 .9892 .9989 .9912 
78 .9772 .7756 .9892 .9847 .9837 
79 .9698 .7733 .9989 .9847 .9929 
80 .9888 .8377 .9912 .9837 .9929 
4.7586 3.9972 4.7119 4.7104 4.7196 4.7943 
Figure 6. 0 Data Matrix for Cluster I Years, Gr.anma Data 
68 69 71 81 84 
68 .8681 .6687 .6692 .7697 
69 .8681 .6932 .8546 .9281 
71 .6687 .6932 .9122 .8442 
81 .6692 .8546 .9122 .9751 
84 .7697 .9281 .8442 .9751 
2.9757 3.3440 3.1183 3.4111 3.5171 
Figure 7. 0 Data Matrix for Cluster II Years, Granma 
Data 
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66 67 74 
66 .8759 .9742 
67 .8759 .9106 
74 .9742 .9106 
1.8501 1.7865 1.8848 
Figure 8. 0 Data Matrix for Cluster 
III Years, Granma Data 
70 72 73 
70 .8647 .9612 
72 .8647 .7338 
73 .9612 .7338 
1.8259 1,5985 1.6950 
Figure 9 . 0 Data Matrix for Cluster 
IV Years, Granma Data 
82 83 
82 .9604 
83 .9604 
.9604 .9604 
-
Figure 10. 0 Data Matrix 
for Cluster 
v Years, 
Granma Data 
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Each cluster's dominant category is "location," and 
that category's highest-frequency symbol is "United States." 
In Clusters I and III, the second most-frequent category 
is "ideological words." Clusters II and IV have "people" 
as their second most-frequent category, while it is "organiza-
tions" for Cluster V. Cluster III is highest among the 
clusters for ideological and aggressive symbols, Cluster V 
for organizations, Cluster I for locations and Cluster IV 
for people. Figure 11 is a Q factor matrix that shows how 
the clusters intercorrelate as to number of symbols in 
each category. Cluster II is the typal representative. It 
is the most closely related to all other clusters. The 
ranking of intercluster correlations is shown in Table VII. 
Clusters II and IV are the most closely related, followed 
by I and V, II and V, I and II, and so on. 
I II III IV v 
I .8121 .7724 .7839 .8845 
II .8121 .6719 .9321 .8605 
III .7724 .6719 .7602 .4756 
IV .7839 .9321 .7602 . 6 9 7 8 
v .8845 .8605 .4756 .6978 
3.2529 3.2766 2.6801 3.1740 2.9184 
Figure 11. Q Correlation Matrix for Clusters, 
Granma Data 
TABLE VII 
RANKING OF INTERCLUSTER CORRELATIONS 
FOR GRANMA DATA 
Clusters Correlations 
II - IV .9321 
I - v .8845 
II - v .8605 
I - II .8121 
I - IV .7839 
I - III .7724 
III - IV .7602 
IV - v .6978 
II - III .6719 
III - v .4756 
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A comparison of the clusters to each other through Q 
factor analysis and linkage resulted in two ''clusters of 
clusters." The first of these 11 superclusters 11 consists of 
Clusters II and IV with a correlation of .9321. Thus, 
Supercluster A consists of yea~s 1968, 1969, 1970, 1971, 
1972, 1973, 1981, and 1984. Supercluster B consists of 
Clusters I, III, and V. Clusters I and V have a correlation 
of .8845, and I and III have a correlation of .7724. That 
supercluster consists of 1966, 1967~ 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 
1978, 1979, 1980, 1982, and 1983. 
A comparison of the percentages of each supercluster's 
symbols in each category is shown in Table VIII, followed 
by the level of significance obtained in a chi square test. 
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The test shows that there is no significant difference 
between the two superclusters as to the frequency of 
ideological symbols, but there is a statistically signi-
ficant difference for the other categories. Supercluster 
A has more aggressive symbols and has more mentions of 
people. Supercluster B has more mentions of organizations 
and locations. All four relationships are significant at 
the .001 level. Overall then, the years 1968, 1969, 1970, 
1971, 1972, 1973, 1981, and 1984--when taken as a type--
have more aggressive language and more people symbols, 
while 1966, 1967, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980 1 
1982, and 1983 have more organizations and locations. 
Category 
Ideological 
Aggressive 
TABLE VIII 
COMPARING SUPERCLUSTERS BY SYMBOL 
CATEGORY FOR GRANMA DATA 
Cluster A Cluster B Expected 
Freq. N Freq. N Frequency 
.1754 772 .1896 1061 .1834 
.1316 579 .1065 596 .1175 
Organizations.1023 450 .1572 880 .1337 
Location .3650 1606 .4288 2400 .4007 
People .2257 993 .1179 660 .1653 
Sign. 
Level 
.001 
.001 
.001 
.001 
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The P correlation matrix depicting the intercorrela-
tions of the categories is shown in Figure 12. Only one 
cluster emerged from linkage analysis of the five cate-
gories over the 19 years. The highest correlation was 
between use of aggressive and ideological symbols (.7795). 
The next highest correlation was between aggressive symbols 
and people (. 7228). It was followed by the correlation 
between aggressive symbols and organizations (.4811) and 
by the correlation between organizations and locations 
(.4806). The aggressive symbol category is the typal 
representative, the most like all the others. 
p 1 0 A I 
p 
.2321 .1448 .7228 .4405 
1 .2321 .4806 .3648 .2582 
0 .1448 .4806 .4811 .2147 
A .7228 .3648 .4811 .7795 
I .4405 .2582 .2147 .7795 
1.5295 1.3504 1.3467 2.3482 1.5568 
Figure 12. p Correlation Matrix for Categories, 
Granma Data 
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Individual Categories 
Though factor analysis is useful in determining the 
overall relationship among categories over time, it does 
-
not show how closely individual categories in each cluster 
compare to what would be expected if they were not signifi-
cantly different. Chi square is the tool for making that 
determination. Since aggressive and ideological categories 
had the highest correlations with each other (.7795), each 
cluster as a unit was compared to those two categories. As 
noted earlier, those two categories were seen as most use-
ful in answering the questions presented in the hypotheses 
to be tested. Table IX shows how clusters ranked for fre-
quency of aggressive symbols. Cluster III has the most 
aggressive terms (17.37 percent); Cluster II is second 
(15.32 percent) and Cluster V third (10.13 percent), 
Cluster IV fourth (8.52 percent) and Cluster I fifth 
(6.08 percent). 
Table X shows the result of the chi square analysis 
to determine if the clusters differ significantly as to 
level of aggressive terms. The table indicates that 
Clusters II and III are not significantly different as to 
aggressive symbols. That is, as a group, the totals 
for the years 1966, 1967, and 1974 are similar to years 
1968, 1969, 1971, 1981, and 1984 as to numbers of aggressive 
symbols compared to the total number of symbols. The totals 
for Cluster IV (1970, 1972, and 1973) and Cluster V 
(1982 and 1983) are not significantly different. It can 
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be stated that Cluster I has significantly fewer 
aggressive symbols than any other cluster. Clusters IV 
and V have fewer such symbols than do Clusters II and III. 
All but one of the significant relationships are signi-
ficant at the .001 level. 
TABLE IX 
RANKING OF AGGRESSIVE SYMBOLS BY 
CLUSTER FOR GRANMA DATA 
Cluster Frequency of Aggressive Terms 
Clusters 
Compared 
I - II 
I - III 
III .1737 
II .1532 
v .1013 
IV .0852 
I .0608 
TABLE X 
COMPARING CLUSTERS IN GRANMA DATA FOR 
FREQUENCIES OF AGGRESSIVE SYMBOLS 
Obtained Frequencies 
I .0608 II .1532 
I .0608 III .1737 
Expected 
Frequency 
.1098 
.1077 
Sign. 
Level 
.001 
.001 
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TABLE X (Continued) 
Clusters Expected Sign. 
Compared Obtained Frequencies Frequency Level 
I - IV I ,0608 IV ,0852 .0692 .01 
I - v I .0608 v .1013 .0723 .001 
II - III II .1532 III .1737 .1611 
II - IV II .1532 IV .0852 .1316 .001 
II - v II .1532 v .1013 .1398 .001 
III - IV III .1737 IV .0852 .1361 .001 
III - v III .1737 v .1013 .1479 .001 
IV - v IV ,0852 v .1013 .0921 
Table XI ranks clusters for frequency of ideological 
terms. Cluster III has the highest percentage of ideological 
terms (26.80 percent). It is followed by Cluster IV (21.62 
percent), Cluster I (18.70 percent), Cluster II (15.65 
percent\ and Cluster V (5.45 percent). Table XII shows the 
result of the chi square analysis to determine if the 
clusters differed significantly for ideological terms used. 
The table shows that all clusters differed significantly, 
and eight of the relationships were significantly different 
at the .001 level. 
Clusters 
Compared 
I - II 
I - III 
I - IV 
I - v 
II - III 
II - IV 
II - v 
III - IV 
TABLE XI 
RANKING CLUSTERS IN GRANMA DATA FOR 
FREQUENCY OF IDEOLOGICAL SYMBOLS 
Cluster Frequency of Ideologic~l 
III .2680 
IV .2162 
I .1870 
TI .1565 
v .0545 
TABLE XII 
COMPARING CLUSTERS IN GRANMA DATA FOR 
FREQUENCY OF IDEOLOGICAL SYMBOLS USED 
Expected 
Obtained Frequencies Frequency 
I .1870 II .1565 .1708 
I .1870 III .2680 .2187 
I .1870 IV .2162 .1970 
I .1870 v .0544 .1496 
II .1565 III .2680 .1996 
II .1565 IV .2162 .1755 
II .1565 v .0544 .1098 
III .2680 IV .2162 .2460 
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Terms 
Sign. 
Level 
.01 
.001 
.05 
.001 
.001 
.001 
.001 
.001 
Clusters 
Compared 
III - V 
IV - V 
III 
IV 
TABLE XII (Continued) 
Obtained Frequencies 
.2680 v .0544 
.2162 v .0544 
Intracluster Relationships 
Obtained 
Frequency 
.1919 
.1470 
Clusters can have significant differences between 
category frequenc\es and have significant differences 
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Sign. 
Level 
.001 
.001 
between various years in a particular category as well. 
Thus, some years may be more ~ike years in another cluster 
for use of symbols in a particular category. To determine 
such relationships, chi square tests were .performed. The 
first comparison is for aggressive terms Table XIII ranks 
years for percent of aggressive symbols, with 1968 heading 
the list and 1979 at the bottom. The ranking does not 
exactly follow cluster boundaries. 
Table XIV shows how each year in Cluster I compares 
to the cluster as a whole as to aggressive symbols. It 
indicates that the years 1975, 1976, 1977, and 1978 do not 
vary significantly from the cluster frequency. The year 
1979 had a significantly smaller percentage of aggressive 
symbols than did the cluster mean, and 1980 had significantly 
more, which indicates a significant change in symbolic usage 
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at that time. Table XV shows the comparison for individual 
years in Cluster II with the average for the cluster, It 
can be seen that the cluster is a divergent one as far as 
aggressive symbols are concerned. The only year that is 
not significantly different from the cluster average is 1984. 
1968 .211 
1967 .202 
1969 .196 
1966 .165 
1983 .137 
Mean: 
TABLE XIII 
RANKING YEARS OF GRANMA DATA FOR 
USE OF AGGRESSIVE SYMBOLS 
1984 .135 19-78 .077 
1974 .122 1981 .073 
1972 .106 1976 .063 
1970 .099 1975 .053 
1980 .087 1977 .053 
.104 Median: 1980 
19_7 3 ,051 
1982 .051 
1971 .040 
1979 .034 
Year 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
Year 
1968 
1969 
1971 
1981 
1984 
TABLE XIV 
FREQUENCIES FOR AGGRESSIVE SYMBOLS USED 
IN CLUSTER I YEARS, GRANMA DATA 
Obtained Freguency Expected 
Year Cluster Frequency 
,0530 .0608 .0598 
,0632 .0608 .0611 
,0530 .0608 ,0594 
,0769 .0608 .0674 
,0336 .0608 .0569 
.0866 .0608 .0646 
TABLE XV 
FREQUENCIES FOR AGGRESSIVE SYMBOLS USED 
IN CLUSTER II YEARS, GRANMA DATA 
Obtained Frequency Expected 
'Year Cluster Frequency 
,2115 ,1532 ;1671 
.1958 .1532 .1627 
.0404 .1532 .1408 
,0726 .1532 .1407 
.1348 .1532 .1516 
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Sign. 
Level 
.05 
,05 
Sign. 
Level 
.001 
.01 
.001 
.001 
145 
Table XVI compares the individual years in the cluster 
to the mean for Cluster III. It shows that 1974 is signi-
ficantly different from the cluster average for aggressive 
terms. Table XVII compares the individual years in 
Cluster IV to the cluster average. It indicates that only 
1973 is significantly different from the cluster average. 
Table XVIII shows how years in Cluster V compare with the 
average for that cluster. It indicates that 1982 is 
significantly lower and 1983 significantly higher than the 
cluster average. 
Year 
1966 
1967 
1974 
TABLE XVI 
FREQUENCIES FOR AGGRESSIVE SYMBOLS USED 
IN CLUSTER 111 YEARS, GRANMA DATA 
Obtained Freguency Expected 
Year Cluster Frequency 
.1654 .1737 .1715 
.2023 .1737 .1826 
.1215 . 17 3 7 .1653 
Sign. 
Level 
.01 
Year 
1970 
1972 
1973 
Year 
1982 
1983 
TABLE XVII 
FREQUENCIES FOR AGGRESSIVE SYMBOLS USED 
IN CLUSTER IV YEARS, GRANMA DATA 
Obtained Freguency Expected 
Year Cluster Frequency 
.0989 .0852 .0885 
.1065 .0852 .0906 
.0507 .0852 .0765 
TABLE XVIII 
FREQUENCIES FOR AGGRESSIVE SYMBOLS USED 
IN CLUSTER V YEARS, GRANMA DATA 
Obtained Frequency 
Year Cluster 
.0509 .1013 
.1368 .1013 
E.xpected 
Frequency 
.0866 
.1145 
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Sign. 
Level 
.os 
Sign. 
Level 
.01 
.OS 
Table XIX ranks years according to percent of ideologi-
cal symbols, with 1974 the highest and 1983 the lowest. 
Once again the ranking does not fit exactly into clusters. 
Table XX details how each year in Cluster I compares with 
the cluster average. No year in the cluster is significantly 
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different from the cluster average. Table XXI compares 
yearly frequencies as to ideological terms in Cluster II 
with the cluster average. The table shows that three of the 
five years in the cluster are significantly different from 
the cluster average. The years 1981 and 1984 have fewer 
ideological symbols, while 1969 h~s more such symbols than 
the cluster average. 
1974 
1967 
1966 
1973 
1972 
TABLE XIX 
RANKING YEARS BY FREQUENCY OF USE OF 
IDEOLOGICAL SYMBOLS, GRANMA DATA 
.301 1978 .222 1980 .182 
.280 1975 .202 1977 .178 
.235 1970 . 19 8 1968 .175 
.226 1969 .190 1979 .159 
• 2 2 3 1976 .184 1971 .132 
1981 .116 
1984 .103 
1982 .056 
1983 .054 
Year 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
Year 
1968 
1969 
1971 
1981 
1984 
TABLE XX 
FREQUENCIES FOR IDEOLOGICAL SYMBOLS -USED 
IN CLUSTER I YEARS, GRANMA DATA 
Obtained Freguency Expected 
Year Cluster Frequency 
.2020 .1870 .1889 
.1837 .1870 .1867 
.1778 .1870 .1853 
.2217 .1870 .1919 
,1592 .1870 .1830 
.1818 .1870 .1862 
TABLE XXI 
FREQUENCIES FOR IDEOLOGICAL SYMBOLS'USED 
IN CLUSTER II YEARS, GRANMA DATA 
Obtained Frequency Expected 
Year Cluster Frequency 
.1753 .1565 .1614 
.1900 .1565 .1640 
, 
.1321 .1565 .1538 
.1162 .1565 .1503 
.1028 .1565 .1519 
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-Sign. 
Level 
Sign. 
Level 
.os 
.OS 
.OS 
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Table XXII compares the years of Cluster III for 
ideological symbols. The table indicates that no year in 
the cluster is significantly different from the yearly 
average frequency for the cluster, Table XXIII indicates 
how the years of Cluster IV compare with the cluster average 
for ideological symbols. It shows that no year in the 
cluster is significantly different from any other as to fre-
quency of ideological terms. Table XXIV compares the years 
in Cluster V for ideological symbols. It shows that the two 
years in the cluster are not significantly different from 
the cluster average. Nor do they differ from each other. 
Year 
1966 
1967 
1974 
TABLE XXII 
FREQUENCIES FOR IDEOLOGICAL SYMBOLS USED 
IN CLUSTER III YEARS, GRANMA DATA 
Obtained Freguency Expected 
Year Cluster Frequency 
.2355 .2680 .2360 
~2795 .2680 .2716 
.3011 .2680 .2733 
Sign. 
Level 
Year 
1970 
1972 
1973 
Year 
1982 
1983 
TABLE XXIII 
FREQUENCIES FOR IDEOLOGICAL SYMBOLS USED 
IN CLUSTER IV YEARS, GRANMA DATA 
Obtained Freguency· Expected 
Year Cluster Frequency 
.1978 .2162 .2117 
.2234 .2162 .2180 
.2262 .2162 .2187 
TABLE XXIV 
FREQUENCIES FOR IDEOLOGICAL SYMBOLS USED 
IN CLUSTER V YEARS, GRANMA DATA 
Obtained Freguency 
Year Cluster 
.0556 .0545 
.0537 .0545 
Expected 
Frequency 
,0548 
.0544 
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Sign. 
Level 
Sign. 
Level 
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Castro's Speeches: The Findings 
Frequency of Symbols 
T h.e a na 1 y s is o f Ca s t r o ' s s p e e ch e s f o r fr e q u ency o f 
symbolic usage differed from the analysis of Granma in that 
each speech of a predetermined length was analyzed. 
Table XXV indicates how the number of speeches reported in 
the English-language edition of Granma varied for each year 
studied. The table shows that Castro reached a peak as to. 
number of speeches reported in 1971 and, except for 1977 and 
1981, the reports declined consistently until 1984. The 
same 100 words identified in Granma as the top-frequency 
symbols were used"in analyzing the symbol frequency of 
Gas tro 's speeches because it would allow comparisons between 
the two sets of data. Though no tally was made of frequency 
of other words about the United States used by Castro, the 
use of symbolic words seemed remarkably consistent between 
the two sets of data. Table XXVI indicates the number of 
overall propaganda symbols per year, and Table XXVII ranks 
the years for average number of symbols per column analyzed, 
an index of frequency. No overall trend is readily 
apparent in the figures. 
1966 17* 
1967 15 
1968 21 
1969 13 
1970 12 
TABLE XXV 
NUMBER OF SPEECHES BY FIDEL CASTRO 
REPORTED IN GRANMA BY YEARS 
1971 39 1976 14 
1972 22 1977 20 
1973 18 1978 11 
1974 14 1979 11 
1975 14 1980 11 
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1981 15 
1982 8 
1983 4 
1984 
*There were 15 speeches for the 10 1/2 months of the 
study. To hav,e the time frame the same for each year, the 
number expected for a 12-month period was calculated. 
**There were three in the six-month time frame of the 
study. The number expected in a 12-month period was 
calculated. 
Year 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
TABLE XXVI 
OVERALL PROPAGANDA SYMBOLS IN CASTRO'S 
SPEECHES REPORTED BY YEAR 
Number of Symbols Number of Speeches 
224 15 
229 15 
232 ,21 
97 13 
149 12 
217 39 
212 22 
177 18 
249 14 
159 14 
252 14 
191 20 
Av. 
14.93 
15.27 
11.05 
7.46 
12.42 
5.56 
9.64 
8.83 
17.79 
11.36 
18.00 
9.55 
Year 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1982 
1976 
1974 
1980 
1967 
TABLE XXVI (Continued) 
Number of Symbols Number of Speeches 
114 11 
58 11 
181 11 
198 15 
169 8 
61 4 
44 3 
TABLE XXVII 
RANKING YEARS FOR FREQUENCY OF USE OF 
PROPAGANDA SYMBOLS IN CASTRO'S SPEECHES 
21.12 1983 15.25 1975 11.36 1973 
18.00 1966 14.93 1968 11.05 1969 
17.79 1984 14.67 1978 10.36 1971 
16.45 1981 13.20 1972 9.64 1979 
15.27 1970 12.42 1977 9.55 
Mean: 12.54 Median: 1970 
The Clusters 
153 
Av. 
10-. 36 
5.27 
16.45 
13.20 
21.12 
15.25 
14.67 
8.83 
7.46 
5.56 
5.27 
Four clusters were derived through O factor analysis 
of Castro's speeches in relation to the five categories 
of symbols used in the Granma analysis--ideological 
symbols, aggressive symbols, organizations, locations, 
and people. The cluster with the highest correlation 
average is Cluster I (Figure 13) at ,9775. The year most 
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like all the others in that cluster--the typal representative 
--is 1968. The second-highest average correlation is for 
Cluster II (Yigure 14), .9326. Its typal representative is 
1972. Cluster III (Figure 15) is the third-highest cluster 
for average correlation at .9254. Its most representative 
year is 1966. Cluster IV (Figure 16} is the least 
correlated at :1225, Its most typical year is 1969. Table 
XXVIII shows the top-frequency categories for the Castro 
data. Ideology is ranked first with 42.83 percent of the 
symbols. It is followed by location, 23.00 percent; 
aggression, 16.40 percent; people, 11.45 percent; and 
organizations, 6.32 percent. Clusters I, II and III each 
have ideology as the category with the greatest percentage 
of symbols. Cluster IV is ranked highest for all categories 
except for ideology. The ranking of the intercorrelations 
for clusters is.shown in Table XXIX, which indicates that 
Clusters I and II are the most highly correlated and 
Clusters II and III the next most highly correlated. 
are followed by Clusters I and IV, Clusters I and III, 
Clusters II and IV, and Clusters III and IV. 
They 
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68 70 71 
68 .9726 .9951 
70 .9726 .9647 
71 .9951 .9647 
1.9677 1.8907 1.9598 
Figure 13. 0 Data Matrix 
for Cluster I 
Years, Castro 
Data 
72 73 78 
72 .9891 .9353 
73 .9891 .8734 
78 .9353 .8734 
1.9244 1.8625 1.8087 
Figure 14. 0 Data Matrix 
for Cluster II 
Years, Castro 
Data 
66 67 74 75 76 77 82 
66 .9498 .9861 .9651 .9192 .9650 .9787 
67 .9498 .9601 .9420 .8708 .9716 .7388 
74 ,9861 .9601 .9751 .8780 .9360 .9318 
75 .9651 .9420 ,9751 .7883 .9196 .9163 
76 .9192 .8708 .8780 .7883 .9271 .9385 
77 .9650 .9716 .9360 .9196 .9271 .9745 
82 . 9 7 8 7 .7388 .9318 .9164 .9385 .9745 
5.7639 5.4331 5.6671 5.5065 5.3219 5.6938 5.4787 
Figure 15. 0 Data Matrix for Cluster III Years, Castro Data 
69 79 80 81 83 84 
69 .9160 .8812 .8893 .8071 .6558 
79 .9160 .7826 .9166 .7872 .5303 
80 .8812 .7826 .7855 .4416 . 9 2 7 9 
81 .8893 .9166 .7855 .7822 .6123 
83 .8071 .7872 .4416 .7822 .1212 
84 .6558 .5303 .9279 .6123 .1212 
4.1494 3.9327 3.8188 3.9859 2.9393 2.8475 
Figure 16. 0 Data Matrix for Cluster IV Years, 
Castro Data 
_· I 
TABLE XXVIII 
TOP-FREQUENCY WORDS USED IN CASTRO'S 
SPEECHES BY CATEGORY 
Category Total Frequency 
Ideology 1376 .4283 
Location 739 .2300 
Aggression 527 .1640 
156 
TABLE XXVIII (Continued) 
Category Total Frequency 
People 368 .1145 
Organizations 203 .0632 
TABLE XXIX 
RANKING OF CLUSTER INTERCORRELATIONS 
IN CASTRO DATA 
Clusters Inter correlations 
I - II .9738 
II - III .9406 
I - IV .8899 
I - III .8769 
II - IV .6377 
III - IV .4503 
Figure 17 is a Q factor analysis correlation matrix 
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that shows how the clusters are intercorrelated as to number 
of symbols in each category. Cluster I is the typal 
representative, i.e., the cluster most like the typical 
cluster. Linkage shows that the four clusters form only one 
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supercluster. Thus, they may be said to be of the same type. 
The correlation matrix for P factor analysis of the five 
categories is shown in Figure 18. Location is the typal 
representative, Linkage determined two clusters of cate-
gories. The first cluster consists of the organization, 
location, and people categories, Location and people were 
the two most-highly correlated categories, at .5629. 
Location is the typal representative for the cluster. The 
second cluster consists of aggression and ideology, correlated 
at .3984. 
I II III IV 
I .9738 .8769 .8899 
II ,9738 .9406 .6377 
III .8769 ,9406 .4503 
IV .8899 .6377 .4503 
2.7406 2.5521 2.2678 1.9779 
Figure 17. Q Correlation Matrix for Clusters, 
Castro Data 
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p L 0 A I 
p , 5629_ .1689 .0201 .3801 
L .5629 .4293 ,2634 .3408 
0 .1689 .4293 .3476 .3441 
A .0201 .2634 .3476 .3984 
I .3801 .3408 .3441 .3984 
1.1320 1.5964 1.2899 1.0295 1.4634 
Figure 18. p Correlation Matrix for Categories, Castro 
Data 
Individual Categories 
Each category was compared with all others through a 
chi square test to determine how clusters were related as to 
frequency of aggressive terms. Table XXX indicates how 
clusters are ranked for aggression. Cluster IV ranks first 
at 23.79 percent. Cluster III is second at 17.99, Cluster II 
third at 14.31 percent, and Cluster I fourth at 6.35 percent. 
Table XXXI shows the result of the chi square analysis to 
determine if the clusters differ significantly for aggression. 
The table shows that only Clusters II and III are not signi-
ficantly different as to use of aggressive symbols. Cluster 
IV has significantly more aggressive terms than the other 
clusters. Clusters II and III have significiantly more 
aggressive terms than Cluster I. 
TABLE XXX 
FREQUENCY OF AGGRESSIVE SYMBOLS USED 
IN CASTRO'S SPEECHES BY ciLUSTER 
160 
Cluster Frequency of Aggressive Terms 
IV .2379 
III .1799 
II .1431 
I .0635 
TABLE XXXI 
COMPARING CLUSTERS FOR FREQUENCY OF AGGRESSIVE 
SYMBOLS USED IN CASTRO'S SPEECHES 
Clusters Expected 
Compared Obtained Frequencies Frequency 
I - II I .0635 II .1431 .0999 
I - III I .0635 III .1799 .1463 
I - IV I .0635 IV .2379 .1536 
II - III II .1431 III .1799 .1705 
II - IV II .1431 IV .2379 .1961 
III - IV III .1799 IV .2379 .1974 
Sign. 
Level 
.001 
.001 
.001 
.001 
.01 
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Table XXXII shows the results of the chi square analysis 
to determine if the clusters differ significantly for ideolo-
gy. The table shows that four of the six comparisons result 
in a significant difference in frequency for ideological 
terms. Only Clusters I and II and Clusters I and III are 
not significantly different. Clusters I, II, and III are 
significantly greater than Cluster IV in number of mentions. 
Cluster III has significantly more mentions of ideological 
terms than does Cluster II. 
Intracluster Relationships 
Individual years in clusters were compared with the 
average for the cluster to determine if some years were more 
closely related to years in other clusters as to use of 
aggressive terms. Table XXXIII ranks years for percentage 
of aggressive symbols reported in Castro's speeches. 
Ranked first is 1984 with 29.55 percent, with 1980 second 
at 29.28 percent. Several of the early years were ranked 
lowest--1968, 1970, and 1971. Table XXXIV details how each 
year in Cluster I compares with the average of the cluster 
for aggressive symbols. It shows that there is no signifi-
cant difference between any year of ~he cluster and the 
cluster average. Table XXXV shows the comparison for the 
individual members in Cluster II with the average for the 
cluster. The table shows that no year in Type II is 
significantly different from the cluster average as to 
use of aggressive terms. Table XXXVI shows the comparison 
of the individual years in the cluster to the average of 
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Cluster III. Once again, there is no significant difference 
in any year in the cluster from the cluster average. Table 
XXXVII compares the aggressive symbols of Cluster IV years 
with the cluster average. None of the years is significantly 
different from the cluster average for the frequency of 
aggressive symbols. 
TABLE XXXII 
COMPARING CLUSTERS FOR FREQUENCY OF IDEOLOGICAL 
SYMBOLS USED IN CASTRO'S SPEECHES 
Clusters Expected 
Compared Obtained Frequencies Frequency 
I - II I .4649 II .4195 .4441 
I - III I .4649 III .4990 .4891 
I - IV I .. 4 6 4 9 IV .2379 .3476 
II - III II .4195 I I I .4990 .4787 
II - IV II .4195 IV .2379 .3179 
III - IV III .4990 IV .2379 .4200 
Sign. 
Level 
.001 
.001 
.001 
.001 
1984 
1980 
1969 
1982 
1977 
Year 
1968 
1970 
1971 
TABLE XXXIII 
RANKING YEARS FOR USE OF AGGRESSIVE 
SYMBOLS IN CASTRO'S SPEECHES 
.2955 1981 .2020 19.79 .1724 
.2928 1978 ,2018 1976 .1667 
.2474 1975 .2013 1974 - ·; 1526 
.2308 1983 .1967 1967 -.1441 
.2042 1966 .1875 1972 .1415 
Mean: .1711 Median: 1966 
TABLE XXXIV 
1973 
1968 
1970 
1971 
FREQUENCIES FOR AGGRESSIVE SYMBOLS USED 
IN CLUSTER I YEARS, CASTRO DATA 
Obtained Frequency Expected 
Year Cluster 'Frequency 
.0776 .0635 .0675 
.0604 .0635 .0629 
,0507 ,0635 .0631 
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.1073 
,0776 
.0604 
.0507 
Sign. 
Level 
Year 
1972 
1973 
1978 
Year 
1966 
1967 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
TABLE XXXV 
FREQUENCIES FOR AGGRESSIVE SYMBOLS USED 
IN CLUSTER II YEARS, CASTRO DATA 
Obtained Freguency Expected 
Year Cluster Frequency 
.1415 .1431 .1426 
.1073 .1431 .1338 
.2018 .1431 .1539 
TABLE XXXVI 
FREQUENCIES FOR AGGRESSIVE SYMBOLS USED 
IN CLUSTER III YEARS, CASTRO DATA 
Obtained Freguency Expected 
Year Cluster Frequency 
.1875 .1799 .1809 
.1441 .1799 .1751 
.1526 .1799 .1759 
.2013 .1799 .1820 
.1667 .1799 .1780 
.2042 .1799 .1827 
.2308 .1799 .1851 
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Sign.-
Level 
Sign. 
Level 
TABLE XXXVII 
FREQUENCIES FOR AGGRESSIVE SYMBOLS USED 
IN CLUSTER IV YEARS, CASTRO DATA 
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Obtained Freguency Expected Sign. -
Year Year Cluster Frequency Level 
1969 .2474 .2379 .2392 
1979 .1724 .2379 .2324 
1980 ,2928 .2379 .2379 
1981 .2020 .2379 .2294 
1983 ,1967 .2379 .2343 
1984 ,2954 .2379 .2416 
Table XXXVIII ranks years according to percent of 
ideological symbols. It shows that 1977 is the highest and 
1983 the lowest. Table XXXIX shows how each year in Cluster 
I compares with the cluster average for ideological references. 
It shows that no year in the cluster is significantly 
different from the cluster average. Table XL compares the 
yearly frequencies as to ideology in Cluster II with the 
cluster average. The table indicates 'that none of the years 
is significantly different from the cluster average. Table 
XLI compares the years of Cluster II with the cluster average 
for ideological terms. The year 1976 is significantly 
lower in the percentage of ideological mentions and 1977 
significantly higher. The other years are not significantly 
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different from the average. Table XLII compares the years in 
Cluster IV with the cluster average for ideological symbols. 
It shows that there are no significant differences in yearly 
frequencies as compared with the cluster average. 
1977 
1967 
1971 
1966 
1974 
Year 
1968 
1970 
1971 
TABLE XXXVIII 
RANKING YEARS FOR FREQUENCY OF USE OF 
IDEOLOGICAL SYMBOLS, CASTRO DATA 
.6492 1973 .4576 1976 .4127 1984 
.5502 1982 .4556 1970 .3960 1969 
.5392 1968 .4397 1978 .3421 1981 
.5179 1975 .4340 1980 .2818 1983 
.4779 1972 .4292 1979 .2759 
Mean: .428 Median: 1972 
TABLE XXXIX 
FREQUENCIES FOR IDEOLOGICAL SYMBOLS USED 
IN CLUSTER I YEARS, CASTRO DATA 
Obtained Freguenc;y: Expected 
Year Cluster Frequency 
.4397 .4649 .4578 
.3960 .4649 .4511 
.5392 .4649 .4847 
.2500 
.2371 
.2020 
.180 3 
Sign. 
Level 
Year 
1972 
1973 
1978 
Year 
1966 
1967 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1982 
TABLE XL 
FREQUENCIES FOR IDEOLOGICAL SYMBOLS USED 
IN CLUSTER II YEARS, CASTRO DATA 
Obtained Freguency Expected 
Year Cluster Frequency 
.4292 .4195 .4224 
.4576 .4195 .4294 
.3421 .4195 .4052 
TABLE XLI 
FREQUENCIES FOR IDEOLOGICAL SYMBOLS USED 
IN CLUSTER III YEARS, CASTRO DATA 
Obtained Freguency Expected 
Year Cluster Frequency 
.5179 .4990 .4942 
.5502 .4990 .5059 
.4779 .4990 .4959 
.4340 .4990 . 494 2 
.4127 .4990 .4864 
.6492 .4990 .5132 
.4556 .4990 .4945 
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Sign. 
Level 
Sign. 
Level 
.OS 
.001 
Year 
1969 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1983 
1984 
TABLE XLII 
FREQUENCIES FOR IDEOLOGICAL SYMBOLS USED 
IN CLUSTER IV YEARS, CASTRO DATA 
Obtained Freguency Expected 
Year Cluster Frequency 
.2371 .2379 .2377 
. 2 7 5 9 .2379 .2410 
.2818 .2379 .2476 
.2020 .2379 .2294 
.1803 .2379 .2328 
.2500 .2379 .2386 
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Sign. 
Level 
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CHAPTER VI 
ANALYSIS OF THE DATA--PART III 
Comparing Symbols in Castro's Speeches 
With Those in Granma 
The preceding two chapters detailed the relationships 
between the propaganda symbols in weekly issues of the 
English-language edition of the Cuban Communist Party 
newspaper, Granma, and the relationships between the same 
symbols in the speeches of Fidel Castro. This chapter 
compares and contrasts the use of propaganda symbols in 
Castro's speeches and in Granma. Chi square analysis was 
used to compare frequency of word usage in each of the five 
categories over the 19 years covered by the study. 
Table XLIII shows the relationship for ideological symbols. 
Only one of the relationships is not significantly different, 
that for 1969. In the other years, the frequency of symbols 
in the ideological category was different in Granma and 
Castro's speeches. Table XLIV shows ~he relationship 
between Granma articles and Castro's speeches for use of 
aggressive symbols. It indicates that in six of 19 years 
there was no significant difference in the use of aggressive 
terms by Granma and Castro with reference to the United 
States. Table XLV compares Castro's speeches and Granma 
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Year 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
TABLE XLIII 
COMPARING CASTRO'S AND GRANMA'S USE 
OF IDEOLOGICAL SYMBOLS 
Granrna Castro Expected 
Observed Observed Frequency 
.235 .518 .306 
.280 .550 .337 
.175 .440 . 2 2 8 
.190 .195 .193 
. 2 3 3 .396 .279 
.132 .539 .282 
. 2 2 3 .429 .287 
.226 .458 .289 
.301 .478 .373 
.202 .434 .268 
.184 .413 .283 
.178 .649 . 2 9 4 
.222 .342 .246 
.159 .276 .173 
.182 .282 .320 
.116 .202 .139 
.056 .456 .168 
.054 .180 .065 
.103 .250 .123 
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Sign. 
Level 
.001 
.001 
.001 
.001 
.001 
.001 
.001 
.001 
.001 
.001 
.001 
.01 
. 05 
.01 
.01 
.001 
.001 
.01 
Year 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
TABLE XLIV 
COMPARING CASTRO'S AND GRANMA'S USE 
OF AGGRESSIVE SYMBOLS 
Granma Castro Expected 
Observed Observed Frequency 
.166 .188 .171 
.202 .144 .190 
.211 .078 .185 
.196 .247 .201 
.117 .060 .101 
.040 .051 .044 
.106 .142 .117 
.051 .107 .066 
.122 .153 .134 
.053 .201 .096 
.063 .167 .108 
.053 .204 .090 
.077 .202 .103 
.034 .172 .050 
.087 .293 .145 
.073 .202 .105 
.051 .231 .102 
.054 .180 .065 
.135 .295 .156 
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Sign, 
Level 
.05 
.001 
.01 
.001 
.001 
.001 
.001 
.001 
.001 
.001 
.001 
.001 
.01 
Year 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
TABLE XLV 
COMPARING CASTRO'S AND GRANMA'S USE OF 
SYMBOLS REFERRING TO ORGANIZATIONS 
Granma Castro Expected 
Observed Observed Frequency 
.115 .022 ,092 
.117 .066 .106 
.099 .082 .095 
.139 .041 .129 
.077 .074 .976 
.127 .028 .090 
.038 .157 .043 
.093 .051 .082 
.077 .149 .061 
.192 .025 .144 
.319 .159 .250 
.130 .042 .108 
.147 .088 .135 
.128 .034 .117 
.184 .oso .146 
.131 .086 .119 
.222 .077 .194 
.186 .066 .175 
.099 .136 .104 
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Sign. 
Level 
.001 
. 05 
.01 
.001 
.OS 
.001 
.001 
.001 
. 05 
.001 
.001 
.05 
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for their use of terms referring to organizations. In 
six of the 19 years, there was no significant difference 
between the frequency of organization symbols used by 
Castro and Granma. Table XLVI compares the use of symbols 
representing locations by Granma and Castro. In only 
three years was there no significant difference between 
the two. Table XLVII compares the use of people symbols 
by Castro and Granma. In nine of the 19 years there was 
not a significant ~ifference in people symbols. Overall, 
there was no category in which a majority of the years had 
no significant difference in symbolic usage. 
C scores were used to compare the chi square test 
results over th~ length of the study. Table XLVIII shows 
how the C scores compare. The lower the C score the more 
similar are the use of symbols by Castro and Granma during 
that year. Table XLIX ranks years by C scores, from most 
similar to most divergent. The two were the most similar 
in 1969 and most divergent in 1982. In three Reagan years 
(1983, 1984, and 1981), the two data sources were above the 
mean and median for their similarity. In three Carter 
years and one Reagan year, Castro and Granma were below the 
median year as to their similarity. 
Table L compares the four years of the Carter admin-
istration to the four years of the Reagan administration 
to July 1984 as to symbols used by Castro. Castro's 
speeches had more mentions of organizations and people in 
the Reagan years and more frequent use of ideological 
Year 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
TABLE XLVI 
~COMPARING CASTRO'S AND GRANMA'S USE OF 
SYMBOLS REFERRING TO LOCATIONS 
Granma Castro Expected 
Observed Observed Frequency 
.344 .192 .306 
. 2 7 8 .105 .242 
.278 .254 .274 
.289 .271 .387 
.485 .302 .433 
.399 .290 .359 
.315 .250 . 295 
.457 .237 .397 
.387 ,197 .309 
.429 .170 .353 
.319 .159 .250 
.130 .042 .108 
.457 .272 .419 
.621 .345 .589 
.433 .309 .398 
.479 .354 .446 
.484 .178 .398 
.471 ,295 .455 
.475 .273 .448 
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Sign. 
Level 
.001 
.001 
.001 
.01 
.001 
.001 
,001 
.001 
.001 
.001 
.001 
• 01 
.01 
.001 
.01 
.01 
Year 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
TABLE XLVII 
COMPARING CASTRots AND GRANMA'S USE OF 
SYMBOLS REFERRING TO PEOPLE 
Granma Castro Expected 
Observed Observed Frequency 
.140 .080 .125 
.123 .135 .125 
. 2 3 6 .147 .218 
. 18 6 .175 .183 
.268 .168 .240 
.302 .092 . 2 2 5 
.317 .123 .358 
.173 .147 .166 
.113 .137 .123 
.126 .170 .139 
.063 .056 .060 
.089 .021 .072 
.097 .097 .097 
.058 .172 .071 
.115 .066 .101 
.201 . 15 7 .190 
.188 .059 .151 
.153 .262 .163 
.188 .045 .169 
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Sign. 
Level 
.os 
.01 
.OS 
.001 
.001 
.01 
.01 
.001 
.OS 
.OS 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1969 
1983 
1978 
1984 
1968 
.128 
.107 
.102 
.036 
.106 
TABLE XLVIII 
COMPARING MEAN C SCORES FOR USE 
OF SYMBOLS BY CASTRO AND GRANMA 
1971 .187 1976 .156 
1972 .110 1977 .213 
1973 .124 1978 .099 
1974 .108 1979 .141 
1975 .185 1980 .144 
TABLE XLIX 
RANKING YEARS BY C SCORES FOR USE 
OF SYMBOLS BY CASTRO AND GRANMA 
.036 1981 .103 1973 .124 
.094 1970 .106 1966 .128 
.099 1966 .107 1979 .141 
.100 1974 .108 1980 .144 
.102 1972 .110 1976 .156 
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1981 .103 
1982 . 258 
1983 .094 
1984 .100 
1975 .185 
1971 .187 
1977 .213 
1982 .258 
Category 
Ideology 
TABLE L 
COMPARING CARTER'S AND REAGAN'S TERMS 
OF OFFICE FOR SYMBOL FREQUENCY IN 
CASTRO'S SPEECHES 
Carter's Reagan's 
Obtained Obtained Expected 
Frequencies Frequencies Frequencies 
.4228 .2945 .3632 
Aggression .2298 .2203 .2254 
Organizations .0533 .0847 .0679 
Locations .2261 .2754 .2490 
People .0680 .1250 .0945 
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Sign. 
Level 
.001 
.05 
.01 
symbols in the Carter years. There was no difference as to 
use of aggressive symbols or locations. Table LI compares 
the four years of the Carter administration to the four 
years of the Reagan administration as to the frequency of 
symbols used in Granma. It shows that during the Reagan 
years Granma used significantly more aggressive terms and 
more people symbols. During the Carter years Granma used 
significantly more ideological terms ·and more locations. 
Both presidents' tenures were equal in frequency of 
organization symbols used. 
Category 
Ideology 
TABLE LI 
COMPARING CARTER'S AND REAGAN'S TERMS 
OF OFFICE FOR SYMBOL FREQUENCY IN 
GRANMA 
Carter's Reagan's 
Obtained Obtained Expected 
Frequencies Frequencies Frequencies 
.1845 .0798 .1329 
Aggression .0620 .0979 .0797 
Organizations .1463 .1650 .1555 
Locations .5173 ;4768 .4974 
People .0899 .1804 .1345 
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Sign. 
Level 
.001 
.001 
.OS 
.001 
Granma 
CHAPTER VII 
ANALYSIS OF THE DATA--PART IV 
Important Findings Affecting 
the Hypotheses 
There were several important findings with reference to 
propaganda symbols in Granma and in Castro's speeches. The 
first point of interest in Granma itself is that two of the 
four Reagan years ranked among the top half (including the 
median year) in the number of symbols used, as did two Carter 
years. The fotir earliest years, 1966 through 1969, produced 
the largest number of symbols relating to the United States. 
They were followed by 1983 (Reagan), 1977 (Carter), 1981 and 
1984 (Reagan), and 1980 (Carter). Reagan had the edge in 
number of symbols overall, however-- 2,161 to 1,935--if the 
rate of symbols for the first half of 1984 is assumed for the 
last half in determining the 1984 12-month total. 
Second, three Reagan years and only one Carter year 
scored at or above the median in ranked frequencies of 
symbol occurrence. The Reagan years 1983 (second), 1982, 
(sixth), and 1981 (ninth) were in the top half as is 
Carter year 1980 (fourth) Thus, the likelihood of there 
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being a reference to the United States on any particular 
page is more closely related to Ronald Reagan than to Jimmy 
Carter. 
Third, location symbols were by far the most dominant 
category in Granma, accounting for 40.07 percent of the 
' ·,' ' 
symbols. Ideological words were next at 18.34 percent, 
people at 16.54 percent, organizations at 13.30 percent, and 
then aggressive terms at 11.75 percent. 
Fourth, some clusters were more similar than others. 
Years 1982 and 1983 were the most closely correlated in 
their cluster, followed by the cluster 1975-1980, which 
includes all the Carter years plus the Ford years, The 
Reagan years 1981 and 1984 were in the least-correlated 
cluster and--as shown again--were closely related to the 
other two Reagan years when comparing those symbols most 
related to the hypotheses. All correlations are high, 
ranging between .9130 and .9618. 
Fifth, location symbols were the most frequent 
category for all clusters; however, clusters differed as 
to the second-ranked category. Clusters I (1975-1980) and 
III (1966, 1967, 1974) had ideology as to the next most-
frequent symbol category, while Clust~r II (1968, 1969, 
1971, 1981, 1984) and Cluster IV (1970, 1972, 1973) had 
people as the second-highest-frequency symbol. In 
Cluster V, organizations ranked second. Thus, there is 
considerable difference between clusters as to frequency 
of symbols in the No. 2 spot, though not at No. 1. 
Sixth, Cluster III (1966, 1967, 1974) was the 
highest-ranked cluster as to ideological and aggressive 
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words. The second-most-aggressive cluster was Cluster II 
(1968, 1969, 1971, 1981, 1984). Cluster IV (1970, 1972,_ 
1973) was the next most ideological. The clusters formed 
two superclusters. The supercluster composed of Clusters 
II and IV consists of years 1968, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972, 
1973, 1981, and 1984. That supercluster is significantly 
higher in use of aggressive symbols and has a higher fre-
quency of mentions of people than the other supercluster. 
It consists of two Reagan years along with six early 
years but not the two earliest studied. The other super-
cluster has significantly more mentions of organizations 
and locations. However, the two superclusters do not vary 
in their use of ideological terms. The first supercluster 
is more highly correlated than the second. An interesting 
finding is that the two Reagan years 1982 and 1983 fit in 
better overall with the Carter years than with the other 
two Reagan years. 
Seventh, all the categories formed one cluster, and 
the aggressive symbol category had the strongest correla-
tion with ideology (.7795), people (.]228), and organiza-
tions (. 4811). It is important to note that aggressive 
symbols comprise the most cohesive element among all 
categories, even though these symbols are lower in 
frequency of mention. 
Eighth--and important in relation to the hypotheses--
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when clusters were looked at in terms of aggression, 
Clusters II and III did not vary significantly. Thus, 1966, 
1967, 1968, 1969, 1971, 1974, 1981, and 1984 are the most 
closely related years in terms of aggressive mentions. 
That clustering again includes only two of the four Reagan 
years. The other two, 1982 and 1983, are in Cluster V. 
Those two Reagan years are on the second tier of years as 
to aggression, ahead of the least-aggressive years. 
Cluster I years, which are all the Carter years plus 1975 
and 1976, stand by themselves as a third tier and are 
significantly lower in aggressive terms. 
Because the researcher expected that the frequency 
of aggressive words would have increased during the second 
half of 1983 following the invasion of Grenada, the year 
was broken down first by halves and then quarters. Comparing 
halves, the first and second halves were not significantly 
different. When riomparing the third to the fourth quarter, 
however, it is evident that a change in the level of the 
aggressive language took place. The frequency increased to 
22.8 percent in the fourth 4uarter from 5.7 percent in the 
third, statistically significant at the .001 level. The 
third quarter was a 10 percent decreqse from 15.6 percent 
aggressive terms in the second quarter, also significant 
at the .001 level. The second quarter followed a 13.7 
percent level in the first quarter, not a statistically 
significant change. The qualitative critique of Castro's 
language in the third quarter of 1983 also indicated his 
language had moderated. 
Ninth, a look at intracluster relationships for 
aggression revealed some situations that merit special 
attention. An evaluation of Cluster I showed 1979 had 
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significantly fewer aggressive symbols than did the overall 
cluster, while 1980 had significantly more aggressive 
symbols. Overall, 1979 was the least aggressive year of the 
study, and all years in the cluster composed of 1975 through 
1980 were at the median or below, 1980 being the median year 
and the highest of the cluster. This indicates that a 
change in Granma's propaganda level with reference to the 
United States began during the last year of the Carter 
administration. Breaking the year down by quarters, it was 
found that there was no statistically significant difference 
among the first, second and fourth quarters. However, 
there was a significant difference between the second and 
third and between the third and fourth quarters at the .001 
level. The third quarter had significantly less aggressive 
language, possibly due to the election campaign being 
waged in the United States between Carter and Reagan. In 
fact, there were no aggressive terms found in the three 
samples for the third quarter. 
Cluster II (1968, 1969, 1971, 1981, 1984) was 
particularly divergent, all years except 1984 being 
significantly different as to aggression from the cluster 
mean. The year 1984 is almost identical in percentage of 
aggressive words to 1983 (.135 to .137), and both are above 
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the median in aggression. However, the other two Reagan 
years, 1981 and 1982, are below the median, The level of 
aggressive language decreased during the first two years 
of Reagan's term. It fell from a high in 1980 to the range 
it had been during the other years of Carter's term. It 
then rose in late 1983 and remained constant into 1984. 
Cluster III is somewhat divergent as to aggression, 
1974 being significantly lower in aggressive language than 
the other two years, which are among the top half of the 
years as to frequency of aggressive symbols. In Cluster 
IV, 1973 is significantly lower in aggression than 1970 
and 1972, which are in the top half of the rankings. Thus, 
overall only two Reagan years--1983 and 1984--are in the 
top half of the most-aggressive years, Also in the top half 
are the early years of the study--1966 through 1970, 1972 
and 1974, plus 1980 as the median year. Thus, Reagan holds 
an edge over Carter for the frequency of aggressive language 
directed against the United States during his term. Two 
of Reagan's years are among the ones with the most 
aggressive symbols. But somewhat surprisingly Reagan had 
a period in which the frequency of Granma's aggressive 
language was lower than during the Carter year 1980. 
As for ideology, intracluster comparisons indicated 
that each cluster was significantly different from the 
others. Clusters I, II, IV, and Vall are homogeneous 
ideologically. In Cluster II, 1969 is higher than 
expected in ideological terms and 1981 and 1984 less 
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ideological. Because of the lack of many significant 
differences within clusters, ideology can be said to be 
more important to determining the shape of clusters than 
is aggression. Looking at the rankings as to ideology, 
the Reagan years (1981 through 1984} are the least 
ideological years. However, two of the Carter years (1978 
and 1980} are at the median or above in Granma's use of 
ideological terms, a somewhat unexpected finding. 
Castro 
The first point to be made about the Castro data is 
that four Reagan years but only one Carter year (1980) 
scored at the median or above for frequency of symbols. 
Other high-frequency years are 1976, 1974, 1967, and 1966. 
Second, ideology is the top-frequency category. 
Aggressive language was the third-highest-frequency cate-
gory for Castro's speeches, while it was the lowest-
frequency category for Granma. The percentage of mentions, 
however, differed relatively little--11.8 percent for Granma 
and 16.4 percent for Castro's speeches. 
A third point is that all clusters except Cluster IV 
were highly correlated, but they were not as compact as to 
the spread of years that comprise the clusters. It also 
should be noted that three Reagan years and two Carter 
years were in the least-correlated cluster, Cluster IV 
(.7225). 
Fourth, location symbols were the most frequent in 
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all categories for Granma, but they were second-most-
frequent in Castro's speeches. For Castro's speeches, 
location was highest only in Cluster IV. Ideology was 
highest in the other three clusters. Location was the 
second highest in frequency in Clusters I and II and 
aggression the second highest in Cluster III. Therefore, 
more diversity in clusters was apparent in the Castro data. 
Fifth, Cluster IV was the most aggressive cluster, 
It includes three Reagan years (1981, 1983, and 1984) and 
two Carter years (1979 and 1980) plus 1969. Cluster III is 
the second-most-aggressive cluster. It includes the fourth 
Reagan year and one Carter year (1977). 
Sixth, there was only one supercluster in the data, 
as compared to two for the Granma data. Comparing clusters, 
Cluster I (1968, 1970, and 1971) and Cluster II (1972, 1973, 
and 1978) were the most-highly correlated, at .9738, but 
Cluster II and Cluster III were highly correlated, too 
(.9406). 
Seventh, categories formed two clusters--though they 
were not highly correlated--while they formed one for the 
Granma data. The first such cluster was locations and 
people (.5629) and locations and orga~izations (.4293). The 
second was aggression and ideology (.3984). Thus, the 
categories in the Castro data were less highly related than 
are those in Granma data and co-varied differently, possibly 
because of more-spontaneous or less-well-planned content in 
Castro's speeches. 
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Eighth--and an important finding--was that Cluster IV 
was significantly more aggressive than the others. It 
consists of three Reagan years (1981, 1983, and 1984) and 
two Carter years (1979 and 1980) plus 1969, Clusters II 
and III, which consist of one Reagan year and two Carter 
years,did not differ significantly from each other as to 
aggression symbols. 
of aggressive terms. 
They ranked next highest as to use 
However, as discussed below, the year 
1978 had its best fit elsewhere as to use of aggressive 
symbols. The level of aggression for the Carter years 
differed considerably from the Granrna data, in which the 
Carter years were in one cluster at the bottom of the 
rankings for aggression. The year 1982 ranked lower than 
the other three Reagan years, which partially paralleled the 
Granma data, in which 1981 and 1982 showed a decline in use 
of aggressive symbols. Somewhat unexpectedly, Cluster I 
(1968, 1970, and 1971) had significantly fewer aggressive 
mentions than the other clusters. The findings on 
aggression seem even more important when one notes that 
intracluster relationships showed no statistically signifi-
cant difference as to use of aggressive language in any of 
the four clusters between yearly tota~s and cluster means. 
To that extent, all were homogeneous. 
Looking at the overall frequency rankings, all four 
of the Reagan years were at or above the median as to 
aggressive words, as were three Carter years (1977, 1978, 
and 1980), along with the years 1966, 1969, and 1975. It 
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should be noted that 1980, Carter's last year, was the 
second-most-aggressive year as to frequency (.2928), just 
behind Reagan year 1984 (.2955). Also, 1983, which might 
have been expected to rank higher, was slightly above the 
median. It also is noteworthy that, while 1983 ranked 
above the median in frequency of symbols, it ranked last 
as to number of speeches made. 
Next, Cluster I, Cluster II, and Cluster IV all were 
homogeneous ideologically. In Cluster II, 1967 was higher, 
1976 lower, and 1977 higher than the cluster average. 
Thus, aggression is a better determinant of cluster structure, 
though ideology is not a poor .one. Ranking the clusters 
according to fre~uency of ideological terms, Cluster III 
ranked highest (.4990}. It consists of one Reagan year 
(1982) and one Carter year (1977). Cluster I was next at 
.4649. It has no Carter or Reagan years. One Carter year 
is in the third-ranked cluster, Cluster II (1978), and 
three Reagan years and two Carter years are in the bottom-
ranked cluster, Cluster IV (.2379). 
Looking at the ideological data overall, one Carter 
year (1977, at No. 1) was in the top half of the ideologi-
cal rankings as was one Reagan year (1982 at No. 7). 
Three Reagan years ranked among the lowest four with three 
Carter years just above that. The period of Carter's 
and Reagan's terms of office, then, had low frequency of 
ideological language in Granma and the Castro data when 
compared with the other years of the study. Exceptions 
were the years 1977 and 1982. 
Castro and Granma Data Compared 
Ideological language for the Castro and Granma data 
was significantly different, as determined by chi square 
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tests, for every year but 1969. For only six of the 19 years 
was the aggressive language not significantly different. In 
only six of the years was there no significant difference 
between the two sets of data in organization symbols, and 
in only three years was there no difference in use of 
location symbols. The greatest similarity was in use of 
people symbols. In only nine years were the two sets of 
data significantly similar. Castro and Granma data overall 
were most alike as to people terms, as shown by C scores. 
The C score for people term usage similarity was .081, 
follo~ed by organizations (.092), aggression (.111), 
locations (.151), and ideology (.195). 
Three Reagan years (1981, 1983, and 1984) were above 
the median in the ranking of C scores comparing the similari-
ty of the two types of data, as was one Carter year (1978). 
Thus, they were among the only years seen as most similar. 
The years 1982 and 1977 were the mo~t divergent. For 
Castro's speeches during the Carter and Reagan administra-
tions, the number of aggressive terms, the number of loca-
tions and the number of people mentions did not vary 
significantly. Carter's term elicited significantly more 
ideological terms. For Granma, the only significantly 
similar category was organization. Language references to 
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the United States in Reagan's term of office was signifi-
cantly more aggressive and Carter's significantly more 
ideological. However, the level of aggression by Castro 
in both terms of office was significantly higher than it 
was in Granma. 
During the Reagan years, the data were more alike 
than during Carter's tenure (.181 versus .198). During 
Reagan's years they were most alike on organizations (.087) 
and then people (.106), aggression and locations (.160 for 
each), and ideology (.211). During Carter's tenure, 
Castro and Granma were most alike on people (.081), then 
organizations (.113), ideology (.182), locations (.204), 
and aggression (.210) Aggressive terms were not a good 
means of determining similarities in Castro's speeches 
and stories in Granma during the Carter and Reagan year. 
CHAPTER VIII 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of the. study was to determine if there had 
been any change in the Cuban piopaganda language in Granma 
Weekly Review or in the speeches of Fidel Castro since 
Granma was first published in 1966. It was predicted that 
there would be evidence of any change in propaganda and that 
the change could be measured. It was expected that the 
official newspaper of the Communist Party Central Committee 
and the speeches of Castro would be good sources for a 
study of the propaganda symbols and that 1966 to 1984 
would offer sufficient time for a trend analysis of 
symbolic content. 
The study plan involved two major parts: one, an 
analysis of historical antecedents to the current status 
of relations between the United States and Cuba and,the 
other a comparison of language used in propaganda state-
ments. A qualitative comparison was made of two widely 
separated issues of Granma to determine if this propaganda 
organ had changed in any major way, and a quantitative 
study was made to determine in what ways the use of 
particular key symbols changed over time. The literature 
192 
193 
suggests the need to study changes in political-symbol 
usage over time. The null hypothesis was that there would 
be no change in the use of propaganda symbols over time. 
The first sub-hypothesis was; "During periods of increased 
tension in Cuban-United States relations, there will be an 
increased use of propaganda symbols." The second sub-hypo-
thesis was: "During times of increased tension in Cuban-
United States relations, there will be greater mention of 
the United States in Cuban propaganda." The major hypothe-
sis was: 
There were periods during the 1970s when 
political statements that attacked the United 
States were fewer than normal during the study 
period, which would suggest that Cuban policy 
toward the United States moderated. Furthermore, 
during the Carter administration there would be 
the lowest level of such attacks. 
A review of the literature indicated that content 
analysis would be a fruitful procedure to use in the study. 
It was shown that trend analysis, looking at issues over 
time, also would be appropriate in studying propaganda. 
The use of key words or word pairs in the analysis was 
shown to simplify category construction and improve 
reliability of the data. Each of Castro's speeches during 
the period of study (1966 to 1984) wfrs analyzed, and one 
page of one issue per month of Granma was examined. It 
was determined that one column from each of Castro's 
speeches would be analyzed. In each case, the number of 
times a symbol appeared became the unit of enumeration. 
The sampling plan was random and stratified. If no mention 
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of the United States was found in the context unit, then an 
appropriate alternative procedure was followed to select 
another context unit. 
The propaganda symbols were put into five categories; 
ideological, aggressive, organizations, locations, and 
people. 
lat ion. 
Analysis was by chi square and the Pearson r corre~ 
Both increased numbers of references to the United 
States and increased aggressivity of the language (a larger 
percentage of aggressive words) were seen as indicators of 
policy change, the first indicating increased interest in 
the United States and the other increased hostility. The 
change in the use of ideological words also was of particular 
interest. McQuitty's elementary linkage analysis was the 
method chosen to compare language used in various years of 
the study. 0, P, Q, and R factor analyses were used. 
Results of the Study 
The null hypothesis that the speeches of Castro and 
the articles in Granma would not be similar was not rejected. 
It was shown that the two sets of data varied considerably 
over the time period studied, but there were several years 
in which their use of propaganda was similar. The years 
when their use of aggressive symbols were most similar 
(above the median year) were 1966, 1967, 1969, 1970, 1971, 
1972, 1973, 1974, and 1983. Since 1974 there has been a 
trend toward more aggressive language in Castro's speeches 
than in the language of Granma. In three of the first 
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six years of the study, the language in Granma was more 
aggressive than it was in Castro's speeches. From that 
point on, however, Castro's language had more aggressive 
symbols than did Granma. Throughout the 19 years, Castro's 
speeches had more ideological symbols than did Granma. 
The null hypothesis that there would be no change in 
propaganda symbols over time in Castro's speeches was 
rejected. There were major fluctuations. Except for a 
major increase in aggressive symbols in 1969, Castro's use 
of aggressive symbols moderated to a low point in 1971 before 
increasing fairly steadily, with highs in 1980 and 1984. All 
three peaks (1969, 1980, and 1984) were preceded by years 
that showed decreases in propaganda symbols for aggression 
from the previous year. The 1969 peak of 24.74 percent 
ideological terms followed a 7.76 percent year. The 1980 
peak of 29.28 percent followed a low point of 17.24 percent 
the previous year. The 1984 peak of 29.55 percent followed 
a year with a frequency of 19.67 percent. Two. other points 
of relatively large increases in aggressive symbols were 
between 1971 and 1972 (from 5.7 percent to 14.15 percent) 
and between 1973 and the two years from 1973 to 1975 (10.73 
percent, to 15.26 percent, to 20.13 percent). One also 
could say that the drop in aggressive language from 1980 
to 1981 (29.28 percent to 20.20 percent) was a noteworthy 
development. Changes in other categories of symbols were 
as apparent but not as useful to the study. 
The null hypothesis that there would be no change in 
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the language used in ~ranma over time also was rejected. 
Granma's use of aggressive language reached a low point in 
1971 and rose to small peaks in 1972 and in 1974. The 
qualitative analysis indicated that 1975 was a key year in 
the relations between the United States and Cuba because of 
the talks being held. Linkage analysis showed that 1975 was 
more like the Carter years than it was previous years. 
A minor peak occurred in 1980, which had the highest level 
of aggressive symbols since the 1974 peak. The use of 
aggressive symbols hit a high peak in 1983, where it stayed 
into 1984. The 1983 peak came despite a low third quarter 
and took place because of the increase in aggressive symbols 
following the Gr~nada invasion during the fourth quarter. 
That each peak followed at least two years of declining 
aggressive symbols indicates a major shift in the propaganda 
flow and, possibly, in policy. 
It should be asked at this point which of the two sets 
of data is more useful in determining the attitude of Cuba 
toward the United States. Both have their utility, but 
the Castro data seem a better indicator of the level of 
symbolic language that most realistically depicts Cuba's 
foreign-policy line. Granma is a political newspaper closely 
tied to the government and presents the official party line, 
but it attempts to provide information on a wide range of 
subjects: culture, sports, foreign and domestic affairs, 
etc. It does publish official statements that, like 
Castro's speeches, offer fruitful areas of research. In 
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essence, however, Castro's view is the Cuban government's 
view. If his words are to be believed, they are valuable 
indicators of change in policy and c~n, at least, show 
overt trends in the party line. Previous studies have 
shown that propaganda is purposeful. The Institute for 
Propaganda Analysis in 1941 succinctly stated the purpose 
of propaganda: 
•.. Propaganda is a method.of rationalizing the 
facts so as to make the propagandist's cause 
seem well-sanctioned, customary, or in accord 
with prevailin~ moral views--or so as to make 
a rival cause seem the opposite, if the propa~ 
gandist 1 s aim is to kill it,l · 
One reason for a difference in symbolic content in 
Granma and in Castro's speeches is th~ audience. Granma's 
articles are compiled to present a particular image of the 
country to the outside world and to put its enemies in the 
most unfavorable light possible. It .is mainly for 
international and not domestic consumption. Castro may 
be considering the impact of his speeches on the outside 
world, but he is aiming them at the citizens of Cuba. His 
audience wants and expects him to attack the United States. 
The slogan the crowds often yell at Castro's carefully 
staged speeches, "Hit the Yankees Hard," is one they no 
doubt are eager to use. Castro must put in something to 
please the crowds while also considering foreign reactions. 
Such considerations taken into account, the researcher 
must be careful in drawing his conclusions. 
The addition of conclusions drawn from the qualitative 
critique of Granma and Castro's speeches should strengthen 
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any conclusions drawn from the quantitative data, .In both 
cases, the researcher to some extent must take words at 
their face value. When Castro states his conditions for 
peace, his words might well be given some consideration -as 
an accurate representative of his thinking. He may, in 
fact, be making such a statement for political or propaganda 
reasons, but such a determination cannot be made through 
quantitative content analysis. It seems obvious that Castro 
has been consistent in his statements concerning his 
minimum requirements for serious negotiation: ending the 
blockade and allowing Cuba to conduct its foreign policy 
its own way while continuing its firmly established contacts 
with the socialist world. 
The data show that as late as June 1972 Castro was 
opposed to talks with the United States. The Vietnam War 
ended for the United States in January 1973, and in May 
1973 Castro set out his requirements for talks. After 
Richard Nixon left the presidency in August 1974, secret 
negotiations began under President Ford. The concessions 
required by the United States for an end to the blockade 
were stated in Castro's speeches. More than once he noted 
that the United States had its own demands--that Cuba give 
up what Castro saw as the principles of his revolution. 
Many times Castro also said that it was the United States 
that did not want normalization of relations. The 
Institute of Propaganda Analysis proposed a general princi-
ple of propaganda analysis that seems to relate to the 
situation: 
... Propaganda is part of an individual's or 
group's drive to advance its own interests, 
and the common sense attitude is to judge the 
drive by how it affects our own interests,2 
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Evidently such a determination by the United States has -
resulted in a steadfast position throughout the past decade. 
It is not the purpose of this dissertation to ascribe 
blame to one side or another, if "blame" is an accurate 
term. Talks have taken place at various times during the 
past decade, and there has been some improvement of rela-
tions evident. Castro has continued to ask for improved 
relations with the United States, but he has not wanted 
improved relations enough to give up his revolutionary 
principles. The United States, apparently, has not been 
willing to accept Cuba's basic demands or to allow talks to 
progress further while Cuban troops remain in Africa or 
Nicaragua. Castro has been serious enough to restate his 
desire for normalization and also to decrease his level of 
aggressive propaganda language. Each time, however, either 
the United States has been unwilling to take the necessary 
steps or some event has intervened. Once again, in July 
1984, Castro put forward a plea for normalization. Whether 
it will be accepted will depend on how much, if any, the 
sides display flexibility. 
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Recommendations for Future Study 
The possibilities for content analysis research into 
propaganda are nearly endless. Th~ data collected for this 
study alone could provide the basis for several other analy-
ses. Numerous trends in language, such as the emphasis on 
one particular foreign-policy area, also are fruitful 
possibilities for research. Other aspects of Granma itself 
could be studied, such as changes in Cuban policy toward 
China or shifts in emphasis over time. 
for the way it represents Cuban life. 
It could be studied 
Likewise, Castro's 
speeches could be analyzed for his stress on numerous policy 
areas. It also would be a fruitful study to analyze 
American foreign policy pronouncements concerning Cuba to 
compare them with trends seen in Cuban propaganda. 
The drawback to a study such as this one is the amount 
of time necessary for word counts. Of course, the computer 
can be an appropriate tool for such a study, but first the 
data base must be available. The efforts of John Naisbitt 
and his Center for Policy Process is a positive step in 
that direction. Paradoxically, the strength of a computer-
counting method is also a drawback. It counts everything 
it is told to count. Since the study'at hand was designed 
to investigate only those propaganda symbols referring to the 
United States, a non-computer search was necessary. Even if 
the hand search misses some such references, it will still 
be more accurate than a computer search because the computer 
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cannot differentiate the conte.xt and the referent of a 
particular word, It is expected that any error in word 
counts ~n the current study would be random error and, thus, 
not affect the outcome of the study. It is hoped that. the 
study is an indication that content analysis remains a tool 
with considerable potential for studying who says what to 
whom and with what result. 
ENDNOTES 
lPropaganda Analysis, IV (1941}, p. 1. 
2rbid. 
202 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Almond, Gabriel. "Content Analysis of Communist Communi-
cations." The Appeals.£.!.. Communism. Ed. Gabriel 
Almond. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1954. 
Almond, Gabriel. The Appeals Qi_ Communism. Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1954. 
Axelrod, Robert, and William Zimmerman. "The Soviet Press 
on Soviet Foreign Policy: A Usually Reliable Source." 
British Journal of Political Science, 11 (1981), 183-
200. 
Berelson, Bernard. Content Analysis in Communication 
Research. New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1971. 
Berelson, Bernard. "Communications and Public Opinion." 
Mass Communications. Ed. Wilbur Schramm. Urbana, Ill.: 
1960, 527-543. 
Carty, James W. R. 
1978. 
Cuban Communications. Bethany, W. Va.: 
Clews, John C. Communist Propaganda Techniques. New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1974. 
Clippinger, Morgan E. "Chong-Il in the North Korean Mass 
Media: A Study of Semi-Esoteric Communication.'' Asian 
Survey, 21 (1981), 289-309. 
Davison, W. Phillips. "The Media Kaleidoscope: . General 
Trends in the Channels." A Pluralizing World in Forma-
tion. Vol. III of Propaganda and Communication in World 
History. Ed. Harold Lasswell, Daniel Lerner and Hans 
Speier. Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 
1980, 191-248. 
Dominguez, 
Mass.: 
Jorge I. Cuba: Order and Revolution. 
Belknap Press of Harvard University, 
Cambridge, 
1978. 
Dominguez, Jorge I. 11 Cuban Military and National Security 
Policies." Revolutionary Cuba in the World Arena. 
Ed. Martin Weinstein. Philadelphia, 1979. 
Eckhardt, w. "War Propaganda Welfare Values and Political 
Ideologies . 11 Journal of Conflict Resolution, 9 (1965), 
345-358. 
203 
204 
Fagen, Richard R, "Mass Mobilization in Cuba: The Symbolism 
of Struggle." Cuba in Revolution. Ed. Roland E. 
Bongachea and Nelson P. Valdez, Garden City, N.J., 1972. 
Fagen, Richard R. Politics and Communication. Boston: 
Little, Brown, 1966. 
Festinger, Leon. "Behavioral Support for Opinion Change. 11 
Pub.lie Opinion Quarterly, 28 (1964}, 400-414. 
Festinger, Leon. "Informal Social Communication." Psycho-
logical Review," 57 (1950), 271-292. 
Garver, R.A. "Polite Propaganda: 'USSR' and 'American 
Illustrated. 1 " Journalism Quarterly, 38 (1961), 480-484. 
George, Alexander L. Propaganda Analysis: !::_ Study E.1_ Infer-
ences Made from Nazi Propaganda in World War 1._l. 
Evanston, Ill,: Row, Peterson and Co., 1959. 
Holbrook, Bruce. "Mainland China's External Propaganda 
Values, 1958-74: A Content Analysis of the Peking 
Review." Microfilm copy. (Unpub. Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Texas-Austin, 1976.) 
Holsti, Ole. "Content Analysis in Communication Research." 
The Handbook of Social Psychology. Vol. II. Ed. Gardner 
Lindzey. Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1954. 
Holsti, Ole. Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and 
Humanities. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing 
Co., 1969. 
Holsti, Ole. "External Conflict and Internal Consensus: The 
Sino-Soviet Case." The General Inquirer: !::_ Computer 
Approach~ Content Analysis. Cambridge, Mass.: The 
M.I.T. Press, 1966. 
Hurwitz, Leon. "Watergate and Detente: A Content Analysis 
of Five Communist Newspapers." Studies in Comparative 
Communism, 9 (1976), 244-256, 
Janowitz, Morris. "Content Analysis and the Study of 
Socio-political Change.'·' Journal of Communication, 26 
(1976), 110-120. 
Kerlinger, Fred N. 
Ed. New York: 
Foundations of Behavioral Research, 2nd 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973. 
Kraus, Sidney, Dennis Davis, Gladys E. Lang, and Kurt Lang. 
"Critical Events Analysis." Political Communication: 
Issues and Strategies for Research. Ed. Steven H. 
Chaffee. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1975, 195-217. 
205 
Krippendorff, Klaus. Content Analysis: An Introduction l..2_ 
Its Methodology. Vol. IV of the Sage CommText Series. 
Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1980. 
Langley, Lester D. The Cuban Policy~ the United States: 
A Brief History. New York: Wiley, 1968. 
Lasswell, Harold. "Style in the Language of Politics . 11 - The 
Language~ Politics. Ed. H. Lasswell and N. Leites-.-. 
New York: G.W. Stewart, 1949. 
Lasswell, Harold. "The Structure and Function of Communica-
tion in Society." The Communication of Ideas. Ed. 
Lyman Bryson. New York, 1948. 
Lasswell, Harold, and Joseph Goldsen. "Public Attention, 
Opinion and Action." International Journal of Opinion 
and Attitude Research, 1 (1947). 
Lasswell, Harold, Daniel Lerner and Ithiel de Sola Pool. 
The Comparative Study~ Symbols. Stanford, Calif.: 
Stanford University Press, 1959. 
Lasswell, Harold, Daniel Lerner and Hans Speier. A Plurali-
zing World 'in Formation. Vol. III of Propaganda and 
Communication in World History. Honolulu: The Univer-
sity Press of Hawaii, 1980. 
Lee, Alfred M. "The Analysis of Propaganda: A Clinical Sum-
mary." American Journal of Sociology, 51 (1945). 
LeoGrande, William M. 
Berkley, Cal.if.: 
1980. 
Cuba's Policy in Africa, 1959-1980. 
Institute of Inernational Studies, 
Liao, Kuang-Sheng, and Allen Whiting. "Chinese Press Per-
ceptions of Threats." Communication Quarterly, 53 
(1972}, 80-97. 
Martin, John. "The Moving Target: General Trends in Audi-
ence Composition." ~ Pluralizing World in Formation. 
Vol. III of Propaganda and Communication in World 
History. Ed. Harold Lasswell, Daniel Lerner and Hans 
Speier. Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press, 
1980, 249-294. 
Mesa Lago, Carmelo. Cuba in the 1970s: Pragmatism and Insti-
tutionalization. Albuquerque: University of New 
Mexico Press, 1974. 
Naisbitt, John. 
Our Lives. 
Megatrends: Ten New Directions Transforming 
2nd Ed. New York: Warner Books, 1984. 
206 
Nichols, John Spicer, 11 Cuban Mass Media: Organization, Con-
trol and Functions." Journalism Monographs, 78 (1982). 
Nichols, John Spicer. Keeping the Flame: Media and Govern-
ment in Latin America. New York, 1~79. 
Ohlstrom, B. "Information and Propaganda." Journal of Peace 
Resolution, 1 (1966), 75-88. 
On Trial: Fidel Castro/Regis Debray. London: Lorrimer, 1968. 
Perkins, Anthony C. Letter, January 25, 1984. 
Peterson, Richard A. "Advances in Content Analysis. 1' Acts 
Sociologica, 25 (1982), 196-199. 
Pool, Ithiel de Sola. The Prestige Press: ~ Comparative 
Study~ Political Symbols. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. 
Press, 1970. 
Rapoport, Anatol. "A System-Theoretic View of Content 
Analysis." The Analysis~ Communication Content: 
Developments in Scientific Theories and Computer Tech-
niques. Ed. George Gerbner and others. New York: 
Wiley, 1969. 
Rodrigues, Ernesto E. "Public Opinion and the Press in 
Cuba." Cuban Studies/Estudios Cubanos, 8 (1978). 
Rosengren, Karl Erik, ed. Advances in Content Analysis. 
Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1981. 
Sandman, Peter M., David M. Rubin and David B. Sachsman. 
Media: An Introductory Analysis~ American Mass 
Communication. 3rd Ed. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1982. 
Schramm, Wilbur. "Mass Media in an Information Era." A Plu-
ralizing World in Formation. Vol. III of Propaganda and 
Co·mmunica t ion in World History. Ed. Harold Las swe 11, 
Daniel Lerner and Hans Speier. Honolulu: The University 
Press of Hawaii, 1980, 295-345. 
Schramm, Wilbur. "The Nature of News." Journalism 
Quarterly, 26 (1949), 259-269. 
Siebert, Fred S., Theodore Peterson and Wilbur Schramm. 
Four Theories~ the Press. 9th Ed. Chicago: Univer-
sity of Illinois Press, 1974. 
Stone, Philip J., Dexter C. Dunphy, Marshall S. Smith et 
al. The General Inquirer: A Computer Approach !_Q_ Con-
tent Analysis. Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 
1966. 
207 
Sullivan, Laurence, and Richard H. Solomon. "The Formulation 
of Chinese Communist Ideology in the May Fourth Era." 
Ideology and Politics in Contemporary China. Ed. 
Chalmers Johnson, 117-170. 
Tichenor, Phillip J,, George A. Donahue and Clarice Olien. 
"Mass Communication Research: Evaluation of a Struc-
tural Model." Journalism Quarterly, 50 (19731, 419=-425. 
Thomas, Hugh. The Cuban Revolution. New York, 1977. 
Volsky, George. "Cuba." The United States and the Caribbean. 
Ed. Tad Szulc. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1971. 
Walder, Andrew G. "Methodological Note: Press Accounts and 
the Study of Chinese Society." China Quarterly, 79 
(1979), 568-592. 
Wang, Kai, and Kenneth Stark. "Red China's 
ganda During Sino-U.S. Rapprochement." 
Quarterly, 49 (1972), 674-678. 
External Propa-
Journalism 
White, R.K. "Hitler, Roosevelt and the Nature of War 
Propaganda." Journal .Q.f Abnormal Social Psychology, 44 
(19492, 157.:..174, 
Wicker, A.W. "Attitudes Versus Actions: The Relationship of 
Verbal and Overt Behavioral Responses to Attitude 
Objects." Journal of Social Issues, 25 (1969), 41-78. 
Thesis: 
VITA 
Thomas Victor Dickson 
Candidate for the Degree of 
Doctor of Education 
CUBA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE UNITED STATES AS 
INDICATED BY ITS USE OF PROPAGANDA SYMBOLS 
Major Field: Higher Education 
Minor Field: Mass Communication 
Biographical: 
Personal Data: Born in Union City, Tennessee, October 
22, 1946, the son of Floyd W. and Frances H. 
Dickson. 
Education: Graduated from Jonesboro High School, 
Jonesboro, Arkansas, in May, 1964; received 
Bachelor of Arts degree from Arkansas State 
University in May, 1968; received Master of Arts 
degree from Tulane University in December, 1971; 
completed requirements for the Doctor of Education 
degree at Oklahoma State University in D_ecember_ 1984; 
Professional Experience: Reporter, Jonesboro, Arkansas, 
Evening Sun, June, 1965, to September, 1966; Radio 
Wire Editor, Associated Press, Little Rock, 
Arkansas, June, 1967, to August, 1967; Editor, 
18th Military Police Brigade Roundup, September, 
1969, to July, 1970; Community Development 
Representative, Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, New Orleans, Louisiana, September, 
1971, to June, 1976; Sports Editor and Managing 
Editor, Blue Springs Examiner, November, 1976, to 
May, 1983; Teaching Assistant, Oklahoma State 
University, August, 1983, to May, 1984; Assistant 
Professor, Department of Communication, University 
of Evansville, August, 1984, to present. 
